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I.

INTRODUCTION

For over thirty years, repeat players on the defense side of tort
litigation have undertaken to "reform" tort doctrine in their favor.
Initially, these efforts consisted of ad hoc efforts to address a series of
"crises," primarily in terms of the cost and availability of liability
insurance. In the 1980s, the tort reform movement began to develop a
more permanent institutionalized approach to the push for "reform." Not
surprisingly, there has been considerable debate about the goals of this
movement, the fairness or efficiency of the specific doctrinal reforms it
seeks, and the methods it uses. ' This Article places this debate in
1. For support of "reform," see, for example, PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2001); PETER
W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); WALTER K.
OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE
LAWSUIT (1991); THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND

INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587-90 (1987). For opposition to
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perspective by addressing the nature and impact of the movement in
terms of its goals and the doctrinal changes it seeks, the positions for and
against these doctrinal changes, the broader context of the role of courts
and tort law, and of competing approaches to the reform of accident law.
Ultimately, the specific doctrinal changes may be less important than the
changes in this broader context, particularly the shift from judicial
development of doctrine based on common law reasoning to legislative
changes. In particular, this shift indicates that legislation, politics,
money, and rhetoric will play an increasing role in the resolution of the
struggle over the proper role of tort liability in American society.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE

A.

TORT SYSTEM

Definition

Ever since tort law became a distinct doctrinal area in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, 2 a tort has been defined as a civil "wrong"other than a breach of contract-that causes injury, for which a victim
can get a judicial remedy, usually in the form of damages.3 This broad
"reform," see, for example, CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA:
DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); JAY M. FEINMAN, UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW (2004);
THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001). For more neutral

perspectives, see, for example, I ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK (1991); 2 ALl REPORTERS' STUDY,
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (1991) [hereinafter 2 ALl, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY]; THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS,
LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002);
DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY
(1996); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE (2003) (focusing

on products liability and viewing the debate over tort reform as a conflict between two cultural
views about the allocation of risk); TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter TORT LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST]. For recent symposia on tort reform, see, for example, Symposium, Access
to Justice: Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice System?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009 (2005);
Symposium, Starting Over?: Redesigning the Medical MalpracticeSystem, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 203

(2005); Symposium, Who Feels Their Pain?: The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil
Litigation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 249 (2006); The 2004 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, The
Future of Tort Reform: Reforming the Remedy, Re-Balancing the Scales, 53 EMORY L.J. 1219

(2004).
2. See, e.g., G.

EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3-19

(expanded ed. 2003).
3. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 1-2 (2000); 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD,
THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 1-3 (1861); SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON
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definition requires clarification in many ways, particularly in two
respects. First, the operation of tort law involves a complex system of
interrelated rules, including not only substantive rules of conduct and
liability, but also damages rules, evidentiary rules concerning proof, and
procedural rules concerning trial. One practical result of this complexity
is that proposals to reform tort law have included changes in all these
types of rules. At a conceptual level, any definition of tort law has to
recognize this interconnection and the resulting arbitrariness of schemes
for drawing lines between the substantive rules of tort liability vis Avis
rules concerning evidence, damages, and procedure. Second, tort law
encompasses such a broad range of "wrongs" that there can be no
meaningful test or definition of a wrong. The central concern of the tort
system is to address claims for personal injury caused by negligence, 4
and many claim that negligence is a basic foundational principle to
identify wrongdoing. 5 However, tortious wrongdoing has an open-ended,
contingent quality, which restricts such attempts to develop a universal
basis for tort liability for accidental injury.6

The tort system usually addresses wrongs by requiring the
wrongdoer to pay compensatory money damages to the victim sufficient
to restore the victim to status quo ante-i.e., to the position the victim
would have occupied had the injury not been caused by the defendant's
wrong.7 These money damages compensate for two types of losses: (1)
economic losses like medical bills and lost income; and (2)
noneconomic losses like mental distress and pain.8 In a case involving

THE LAW OF TORTS 3-4 (New Am. ed. 1894); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 1-6 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY 28-29 tbl. C-2 (June 30, 2002) (indicating that 30,194 of 34,071 tort cases commenced in
a one-year period were for personal injury); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT

23-29 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter WORK OF STATE COURTS] (indicating that
areas like automobile litigation and medical malpractice comprise most of tort filings).
5. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-78 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963); David G. Owen, PhilosophicalFoundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 224-26 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS].
6. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 7, at 10-11 (arguing that any coherence in tort law is
"derived from.., its focus on wrongdoing, its increased emphasis on certain analytical tools, and its
virtually unique process of lawyering and deciding cases").
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979); DOBBS, supra note 3,
§ 1, at 2; Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation,
75 TEX. L. REv. 1567, 1577-94 (1997).
8. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 377, at 1048-53.
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exceptionally wrongful conduct like intentional or reckless actions, the
tort system may also grant punitive damages to the victim.9
B.

Tort Law and Compensationfor Accidental Injuries

Though there are only limited statistics on how the tort system
provides compensation for "wrongs" in practice,' ° it is possible to make
some generalizations about three important issues concerning the role of
tort law in providing compensation for injuries. First, what role does tort
law play in compensating for accidents in the United States? Second, to
what extent do potential tort claims actually become the subject of
formal litigation? Third, of the cases that are litigated, what is known
about the administration of these cases?
1. Compensation Schemes for Accidental Injury
The tort system plays a relatively limited role in compensating for
accidental injury in the United States. Because tort law focuses on
wrongdoing, the system does not generally provide compensation where
the injurer was not a wrongdoer." In addition, the system does not
provide compensation where a wrongdoer has no insurance or no
personal assets to pay compensation, or where the amount of loss is too
small to be worth the cost of litigation.12 Even where a wrongdoer has
assets or insurance, the tort system will not provide recovery for injury
unless the victim brings a claim. 13 As to compensation systems other
than tort law, the United States has a diverse set of partially overlapping
schemes. For example, nearly all workplace injuries are covered
exclusively by workers' compensation, not tort. 14 The costs of accidental
9.
10.

Id. § 1, at 2.
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 3-

4 (2003) [hereinafter C.B.O. PRIMER]; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 338-41

(1991); Eric Helland et al., Data Watch: Tort-uring the Data, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 207, 207-15
(2005) (listing and reviewing sources of data); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1154-56,
1245-46 (1992).
11.

DOBBS, supranote 3, §§ 9-10, at 14-15, 17.

12. Stephen G. Gilles, As the System Currently Operates, Liability Is, for
Wrongdoers... Voluntary, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 606 (2006).
13. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 2, at 5 ("[T]ort suits may be brought by an aggrieved
individual.... [and] can succeed if the proof shows an actionable tort by a more-likely-than-not
standard.").
14. Id. § 395, at 1104. A worker injured on the job cannot usually sue the employer, but can
sue a third party-for example, a negligent driver who collides with an employee making a delivery
for the employer. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
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injuries are also covered by no-fault auto insurance schemes in some
states, by private first party insurance schemes like life insurance and
15
health insurance, and by public schemes like Medicare and Medicaid.
As indicated below, coordinating
these schemes with tort law is both
6
controversial.'
and
complicated
2. Injuries, Grievances, Legal Wrongs, and Claims in Tort
People who have been injured can relate to the legal system in
terms of three overlapping categories: (1) those who feel that they have a
legal grievance in the sense that they feel they have been wrongfully
injured, (2) those who have been wrongfully injured, and (3) those who
make a claim in tort, either informally or formally through litigation.
The categories are not the same because: (1) some persons who feel they
have been wrongfully injured and some persons who have been
wrongfully injured may not file a claim, and (2) some people who feel
wronged or file a claim may not actually have a valid tort claim. Our
understanding of tort claims is improved if we can compare the three
categories in terms of the ratio of grievances to filed claims and of valid
claims to filed claims. Unfortunately, it is hard to determine these ratios
because there is so little data on nonclaiming by people who feel they
have a grievance or people who have been wronged. To the extent data
on the ratio of grievances to filed claims are available, it appears that
many accidentally injured people do not make a claim of tortious injury
even though they feel they have a grievance for having been wrongfully
injured. 17 In addition, it appears that the ratio of valid claims to filed
15. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-PartyInsurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 625-29 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Auto No-Fault] (discussing
role of non-tort compensation schemes in terms of auto injuries). One study indicates that liability
payments (not including attorney fees) by the tort system provide only 7% of total compensation for
economic loss caused by nonfatal accidents. If noneconomic losses are included, the tort system
provides 11% of the payments. Percentages vary by type of accident. For example, for motor
vehicle accidents, the percentages for economic and noneconomic loss were 22% and 33%.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES

107-08 & n.53 (1991).
16. See infra notes 220-36 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 63-65 (providing results from various
studies, which demonstrate the low occurrence of personal injury claims relative to the number of
individuals sustaining actionable injuries); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 110 (concluding that,
typically, an "injured person does not even consider the notion of seeking compensation from some
other person or entity who might have been associated with the accident ... or if he does think
about this possibility, he is unlikely to pursue it" and that except for "motor vehicle accident
victims, only a minority, even among those who are quite seriously injured, ever consider claiming;
of those, just a small fraction use legal mechanisms"); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song:
Insiders, Outsiders, and PersonalInjuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 551,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/4

6

Hubbard: The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement
THE "TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT

20061

claims is very high. For example, such a pattern of underclaiming is
supported by studies of medical negligence, which indicate 18the ratios of
to one.
valid claims to filed claims to be ten to one and eight
3. Administration and Distributive Impact of the Tort System
Though data about litigation are easier to find than data about the
ratios of claims to grievances and of claims to negligence, there are
substantial shortcomings in the available litigation data. 19 As a result, it
is only possible to sketch rough approximations about tort settlements
and litigation. One recent study provides the following crude overview
of the tort system in terms of data for the year 2000: The number of civil
suits in state courts-excluding domestic relations litigation-has been
roughly the same in proportion to the population from 1987 to 2001, tort
filings in state courts declined from 1992 to 2001, and the states vary
considerably in terms of whether these rates have increased or decreased
and in terms of the rates of increase and decrease in any given year.20
Another study indicated that approximately 750,000 tort suits were filed

551-62 (1984) (noting the low use of litigation and that this low use is based upon a culture of
"individualism emphasizing self-sufficiency"); Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort
Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 157-60 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,

1998) (describing two studies which indicated that few individuals commenced liability claims after
sustaining an injury); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 536-46 (1980-81) (noting that
"significant grievances [are] by no means a rare or unusual event," but with tortious conduct,
litigation is "relatively rare").
18. PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 24 (1985) (ratio of ten-to-one); PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK: THE REPORT OF THE
HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (1990) (ratio of eight-to-

one). Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1599 (2002) (citations omitted)
summarizes an earlier study as follows:
In the mid-1970s, at the height of the tort crisis in California, the California Medical
Association sponsored a study of the costs of medical injuries. The investigators asked
nurses and then physicians to review nearly 21,000 medical records in twenty-three
California hospitals and to identify patients who had suffered an iatrogenic injury. Raters
also evaluated the likelihood of a jury finding of liability. They determined that 4.65% of
people hospitalized suffered an adverse event and that 0.79% suffered an adverse event
for which the provider would likely be found liable-levels of injury that stunned the
sponsors.

Because of its interest "in reducing the amount of tort litigation, the California Medical Association
quietly killed the study." Id. The results of all three studies have been replicated in other studies. Id.
at 1600; see infra note 440.
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 4, at 16-29. In all but four years in this period,
contract filings were either greater than or equal to tort filings. Id. at 30.
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in state and federal courts in 2000; about half of these involved
automobile cases. 2' In general, about 3% of tort cases filed are actually
tried.22 A verdict study of the nation's seventy-five largest counties in
1996 indicated that plaintiffs prevailed 48% of the time and that the
median plaintiff's verdict was $30,500. 23 Some specific median
plaintiffs' verdicts were $285,576 for medical malpractice, $176,787 for
nonasbestos product liability, and $17,931 for automobile accidents.24
This study indicated that about 3% of winning plaintiffs received
punitive damages with the median punitive award being $38,000.25 In
terms of overall costs of the tort system, one recent estimate, based on
payments by liability insurance companies and by self-insured
defendants as a result of both verdicts and other payments, is that $260
billion was paid out for processing and paying tort claims in 2004.26 A
study of the distribution of these costs indicates that plaintiffs received
46% of the total costs and that 54% went to pay for plaintiffs' attorneys
(19%), defense costs (14%), and for the insurance companies'
administrative costs (2 1%).27 Because the 46% that goes to plaintiffs is
simply a redistribution of loss, it is arguably not a cost of the tort system.
By themselves, these data about the tort system do not tell us the whole
story because important concerns, like the following, are not addressed:
Are there indirect benefits from the redistribution to victims? Are the
overall benefits of tort liability worth the costs? As to the 54%

21. C.B.O. PRIMER, supra note 10, at 6-7; See, e.g., WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 4,
at 26 (discussing a 1992 study of the seventy-five largest counties, which indicated that automobile
cases constituted 60% of state tort cases).
22. C.B.O. PRIMER, supra note 10, at 5-6.
23.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., NCJ 179769, BULLETIN: TORT TRIALS

AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (2000) [hereinafter TRIALS AND VERDICTS].

24. Id. These results vary enormously among the states. For example, a study of tort verdicts
in several Georgia counties, including counties in the Atlanta metropolitan area, for the period 1994
through 1997 indicated "an overall pattern where modest compensatory damages are the norm and
large awards are the rare exception." Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An
Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1089 (2000). For jury
trials in Georgia, the median verdict was $5650 in state court and $7859 in superior court. Id.
25. TRIALS AND VERDICTS, supra note 23. For a discussion of other punitive award studies,
see infra notes 324-28, 341-43 and accompanying text.
26.

TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS AND CROSS-BORDER PERSPECTIVES:

2005 UPDATE 3, 6 (2006), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc
?webc=TILL/USA/2006/200603/2005_Tort.pdf [hereinafter 2005 TORT COSTS]. In 2001, the
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin figure was approximately $205 billion. Id. app. 2, at 17.
27. C.B.O. PRIMER, supra note 10, at 20. The amount spent on court administrative costs is
omitted from in-total costs, partly because court administrative costs are viewed as only 1% of total
direct costs. Id. at 20 n.4.
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compare to the administrative
administrative costs, how does this figure
28
costs of other compensation schemes?
As these figures indicate, the tort system is one of the basic
schemes used to allocate the costs of injuries in the United States. As a
result, it has a fundamental impact on the distribution of wealth because,
for any injury, there are four potential bearers of the costs involved: the
victim, the injurer, a third party like a private insurer, or the public
through a social welfare scheme. If the costs are left on victims, they are
poorer; if costs are shifted, victims are richer while injurers, third parties,
or the public are poorer. In the tort system, the decision tends to be
limited to whether the loss will be borne by the victim or the injurer.
Third parties like liability insurers may ultimately bear the cost, but the
initial judicial allocation will not usually involve the third party.
C. The Goals of Tort Law
The distributional impact of the tort system's imposition of accident
costs raises fundamental moral and political issues concerning the
29
reasons for and methods of allocating the loss. The tort system's
redistribution of the loss from the plaintiff to the defendant has been
justified in terms of three policy goals. First, the liability for payment of
compensatory damages prevents wrongdoing and thus protects rights in
several ways, particularly: (1) the payment for injuries caused by
conduct; 30
wrongful conduct provides an incentive to avoid wrongful
and (2) even where no wrongdoing is involved, imposing liability for
accident costs provides an incentive to reduce injuries not currently
28. See infra note 48 and accompanying text for discussion of such a comparison. The
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin report explicitly notes that it has not addressed such issues. See 2005
TORT COSTS, supra note 26, at 2.
29. See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill
Lecture in Jurisprudence and Public Policy), 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 93-94 (1995) (arguing that
corrective justice in tort is connected with distributional issues concerning the allocation of costs of
"misfortune").
30.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 68-94 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical
Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 99. Prevention is not only achieved by
the "negative" impact of liability on a wrongdoer, but also by several related effects of liability.
These other effects are: (1) assuring careful members of society that it is not foolish to conform their
behavior to legal norms of safety; (2) conveying a strong message about social disapproval of
certain types of conduct and thus strengthening moral frameworks; and (3) inculcating the habit of
obeying the law. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard et al., A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty:
The Practice, Constitutionality, and Justice of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 34 S.C. L.
REv. 391, 546-49 (1982); Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate
EnvironmentalBehavior, 27 LAW & POL'Y 262, 263-67 (2005).
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preventable by due care by lowering the level of activity, or by seeking
31
innovations that result in new, more cost-effective safety measures.
Second, our sense of fairness requires that, as a matter of "corrective
justice," victims who suffer injury because their rights have been
wrongly denied should have recourse to a system that requires injurers to
pay compensation. These injurers "deserve" to bear the costs of their
wrongs, not innocent victims. 32 This concept of "just desert" also serves
to limit liability from becoming disproportionately large in comparison
to a defendant's wrongdoing. 3 Third, compensation of victims is
frequently said to be, by itself, a goal of tort law. 34 Punitive damages are
justified in terms of the first two goals. More specifically, these damages
provide additional prevention by increasing the deterrent impact. This is
particularly true in situations where compensatory damages alone may
be insufficient. In terms of corrective justice, punitive awards provide
vindication for the victim's rights where they have been violated by an

31. See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990); CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 73, 155; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1082 (1972); Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise
Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liabilityfor Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 611,652-63 (1998).
32. See, e.g., ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 99-109 (1997); JULES L. COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY xiii-xx,
3-63 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE]; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS 303-28 (1992); IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 11-20 (1993); ERNEST
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995); James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian
Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 131; Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility
for Outcomes, Risk and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (Gerald J.
Postema ed., 2001); Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 159; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695 (2003); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409
(1992). Some versions of corrective justice do not require wrongdoing on the part of the injurer.
See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 544-45,
548-59 (1972) (arguing that persons who impose nonreciprocal risks on others must compensate
victims of such risk).
33. See, e.g., BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-76 (1996) (holding that the
amount of punitive damages must be proportional to the degree of reprehensibility); Portee v.
Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (N.J. 1980) (limiting liability for recovery of mental trauma caused by
injury to another person to avoid imposing "liability that is not commensurate with the culpability of
defendant's conduct"); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1-13 (1968) (discussing role of retribution as a limit on deterrence in criminal
law).
34. See, e.g., 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at
1299 (1956); ABA COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-29 to
4-33 (1984). The view that compensation is a goal of tort law originally developed in the 1930s. See
WHITE, supra note 2, at 147-52.
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exceptionally egregious wrong and satisfy a need for retribution for such
conduct.3 5
All three goals have been the subject of extensive debate and
disagreement. For example, prevention/deterrence theories are criticized
on the ground that they rely on unrealistic assumptions about human
behavior-particularly given the widespread use of insurance schemes
and the practical problems of suing for small losses and collecting
judgments from most uninsured defendants-and about our ability to
calculate costs and benefits. 36 Corrective justice is problematic in
situations where the loss is not worth the cost of litigation or where the
wrongdoer lacks insurance or assets to pay a judgment. 3 Both
deterrence and corrective justice theories rely on a concept of a "wrong"
to be deterred or corrected, yet both lack a generally accepted theory of
rights and of correlative wrongdoing or a theory of allocation of loss
where multiple wrongdoers are involved.38 Moreover, specific tests of

35. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,19 (1991) ("[U]nder the law of
most States, punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (punitive damages awarded "to punish" and "to
deter"); I JAMES D. GHIARDI ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.01-.13, 4.12.14 (1985); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 373-82 (1994). The lists in some of these authorities include more goals. For
example, Owen includes education, compensation, and law enforcement as goals. Id. at 373-74.
However, education and law enforcement overlap with prevention/deterrence and vindication, while
compensation is a very questionable basis for a punitive award. See supra note 34 and infra notes
40-53 and accompanying text (discussing compensation as a goal).
36. See Gilles, supra note 12, at 609-10 (discussing lack of deterrent impact on actors who are
judgment proof); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REV. 115, 115-17 (1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (reviewing arguments and studies and
concluding that tort law deters enough injuries to be worth its administrative costs but that
deterrence is not sufficiently precise to support theoretical schemes to fine-tune liability rules to
achieve perfect deterrence); see also infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
37. Gilles, supra note 12, at 610.
38. Some deterrence theorists emphasize economic efficiency and define "wrong" as an
"inefficient accident" in the sense that it would have been cheaper to expend the costs of a safety
measure that would have prevented the accident. See infra note 67 (discussion of cost-benefit tests
of liability). Other theorists would impose liability on the actor who can best make and implement
decisions as to efficiency-i.e., to decide whether it is cheaper to pay safety costs to avoid the
accidents or to have the accidents-regardless of whether this decision-maker has made a "wrong"
decision in the case involving plaintiffs injury. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 133-73;
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 31, at 1057, 1059-60. Efficiency-based theories are sometimes
criticized on the basis that they ignore concerns for fairness. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Principle,9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 242 (1980) (arguing that the wealth
maximizing theory is incoherent and "biased in favor of those who are already well-off'); cf JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing in favor of a conception of justice as
fairness and against utilitarian conceptions ofjustice).
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wrongdoing are often extremely vague. 39 The view that compensation is
a goal of tort law is particularly questionable because the position
arguably confuses goals and means. For example, compensatory
damages are also used in contract law, but virtually no one asserts that
compensation is a goal of contracts. As with torts, contract damages are
a means of achieving goals. 40 The role of compensation as a means can
be seen more clearly if damages are contrasted with injunctions, which
are sometimes granted as the remedy for a tort41 and thus are a means of
achieving goals. Yet no one argues that injunctions are a goal of tort law.
Statements about compensation as a goal often indicate a concern
for victims having to bear all the costs of an injury as a "lump-sum"
loss. 4 2 From this perspective, it is better to "spread" the loss among a
large group of people, each of whom only pays a small part of the total
cost. In order to achieve this better result, a defendant has a duty to

For critiques of corrective justice, see, for example, Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 31,
at 1077-82; Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 29; Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE
L.J. 2261 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)). Coleman,
who argues in favor of a corrective justice approach and of a concept of wrong based on fairness,
contends that the content of "wrong" comes not only from tort law but also "from the criminal law,
from our political ideals, and from the content of our everyday moral judgments." COLEMAN,
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 32, at 57. Consistent with this argument, he notes that "the
actual content of corrective justice-and of fairness itself-may vary" from culture to culture. Id. at
58-59. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801, 1802-11 (1997), contains a useful review of criticisms of both
deterrence and corrective justice theories. Some corrective justice theorists would require
compensation in order to rectify injustice even if there is no wrongdoing. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra
note 32, at 544-45, 548-49.
For discussion of problems with multiple wrongdoers, see infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing
joint and several liability).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
40. The underlying goals of contract law are also the subject of dispute, primarily in terms of
whether the goal is the promotion of efficiency or the protection of promise-based or expectationbased rights. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (6th ed. 2003)
(arguing for efficiency),

with

CHARLES FRIED,

CONTRACT AS PROMISE:

A

THEORY OF

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 8 (1981) (discussing promise-based rights), HENRY MATHER,
CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY 1, 3-6 (1999) (asserting that facilitation of reliance and beneficial
coordination is the goal), and STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 3 (2004).
41. See, e.g., Allred v. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1993) (enjoining trespass); Jost
v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969) (enjoining nuisance and granting damages
for time period prior to injunction); Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) (enjoining
performances by singer for anyone other than the operator of the theatre where she had contracted to
sing). See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing injunctions as
mechanism for enforcing "property rules").
42. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 148.
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compensate if the defendant is the best party to spread the lOSS.
However, this approach rests on a desire to achieve loss-spreading as a
goal, not compensation in itself. Consequently, a concern for lossspreading would require a denial of compensation where the plaintiff is
in the best position to spread the loss. 44 Moreover, even though
spreading may be a legitimate goal as part of a legislative approach to
accident law in general, 45 using spreading as a goal for the common law
scheme of judicially developed tort law is subject to two basic
objections.
First, tort-based compensation awards rely on litigation, which
involves high administrative costs. The tort system is, therefore, a
relatively expensive way of achieving compensation based on spreading
in comparison to private first-party insurance or publicly funded
compensation schemes.4 6 Because of these high costs, tort law is almost

43. See id. at 147. The judicial approach to using compensation and spreading as goals is
illustrated by Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). In justifying the imposition of "strict liability" on the manufacturers of
products, Justice Traynor argued in part as follows:
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.
Id. at 440-41. Traynor also relied on deterrence and corrective justice to support his position. Id. at
440-43. Traynor's argument for "strict liability" has received only limited acceptance in terms of
tort doctrine, and product manufacturers are not generally subject to "strict liability." See infra notes
51-53, 403-05 and accompanying text. For a more extensive analysis of spreading as an approach to
accidental injuries, see CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 39-67.

44. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a private water company was liable
for negligence in failing to provide sufficient water pressure to fire hydrants, but only to the extent
that claims were not covered or were not adequately covered by first party insurance. Weinberg v.
Dinger, 524 A.2d 366 (N.J. 1987). Similarly, one reason for refusing to grant compensation to the
plaintiff in Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), was that persons like the plaintiff
were in the best position to spread the costs of the loss of plaintiff's house from a fire negligently
started by the defendant. In an area where liability was suspect, the court justified the lack of
liability as follows:
[E]ach man, to some extent, runs the hazard of his neighbor's conduct, and each, by
insurance against such hazards, is enabled to obtain a reasonable security against loss. To
neglect such precaution, and to call upon his neighbor, on whose premises a fire
originated, to indemnify him instead, would be to award a punishment quite beyond the
offence committed.
Id. at 217.
45. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 39-67 (discussing the strategy of placing accident
costs on the party "most likely to spread the loss broadly"); infra notes 130, 182-84 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative adoption of workers' compensation schemes).
46. See, e.g., Priest, supra note I, at 1559-60. Plaintiffs receive about half of each dollar in
compensation in the tort system; the other part of each dollar is spent on administration. See supra
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always a less efficient way to spread losses. In addition, the costs of
liability insurance in an area like products liability are unfairly imposed
on low income purchasers who pay the same in purchasing the liability
coverage as higher income purchasers, but who receive less
compensation for such injuries as lost income.4 7 Unless compensation in
torts also achieves a deterrent or corrective goal, it is wasteful and unfair
to use torts, rather than a cheaper administrative scheme, for spreading.
However, if deterrence or corrective justice is included as a requirement
for compensation in a particular doctrinal context, loss-spreading
becomes irrelevant-or at least less relevant-because these other goals
provide a justification. 4 In addition, the spreading goal cannot be
achieved in cases where there is no wrong to deter or correct by
requiring compensation.
Second, serious questions of competency and legitimacy are raised
if courts, rather than legislatures, compel a defendant to compensate a
victim's lump-sum loss simply because the defendant is in a better
position to spread the loss. The basic reason for questioning the
competence of courts to use spreading as a justification in this way is
that courts either have no way or only a limited capacity to address such
problems as: (1) defining and identifying the best spreader,
(2) identifying which victims of accidents are entitled to such
compensation, (3) determining whether compensation should be based
on a welfare-type basis of equal need or a tort-type basis of
compensation in terms of status quo ante, no matter how unfair or
unequal that prior status may have been, and (4)providing collective
regulatory approaches to achieve the deterrent role of compensation.4 9
note 27 and accompanying text. In contrast, a first party insurance scheme like Blue Cross/Blue
Shield has administrative costs that are 10% of benefits. Priest, supra, at 1560. Workers'
compensation schemes typically spend 15-20% on administration, including attorney costs. See,

e.g., C.B.O. PRIMER, supra note 10, at 21 (20%); DEWEES ET AL., supra note 1, at 393-94 (15-20%).
One study indicates that a pure no-fault scheme for automobile injuries would involve
administrative costs of only 7%. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., NO-FAULT APPROACHES TO
COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS xvi (1991) ("No-fault plans that
entirely ban access to the liability system reduce transaction costs by about 80 percent."). The
federal no-fault scheme for vaccine injuries has administrative costs of 15%. C.B.O. PRIMER supra
note 10, at 21; cf infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing childhood vaccine
compensation scheme).
47. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 1, at 1585-86.
48. In addition to problems of administrative costs, liability based solely on spreading will
generally conflict with deterrence because the defendant's incentive to change wrongful behavior is
reduced by his ability to use spreading to externalize the costs of the injury from that behavior. See
CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 64-67, 278-85.
49. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 278-85; Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37
UCLA L. REV. 785, 798-802 (1990) (criticizing status quo ante approach on the ground that it
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Legislation is superior to adjudication in addressing not only these tasks,
but also the underlying separation of powers issue of the legitimacy of a
court's use of spreading as a reason for a redistribution of loss. Because
such a distributive choice is usually viewed as a legislative matter in a
democracy, there is considerable dispute about whether, when, and to
what extent a court may engage in redistribution for the sake of
redistribution.5 ° Thus, it is not surprising that courts have been generally
unreceptive to schemes of "enterprise liability" which justify imposing
liability for characteristic risks 5' on a business regardless of fault, partly
because it is better able to spread the loss than the victim. 52 For example,
imposing liability without fault for product-caused harms based on this
53
concept of enterprise liability has been generally rejected by the courts.
simply reinforces questionable inequalities in income distribution); Martha Chamallas, Questioning
the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation. A Constitutional
Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 97, 101-02 (1994); Priest, supra note 1, at 1546, 1585-86
(arguing that spreading by imposing liability on product sellers is unfairly regressive because all
consumers pay the same for the spreading "insurance," while high income plaintiffs are
compensated in terms of status quo ante and therefore receive more in damages awards than low
income plaintiffs); see also Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: The Context of the Controversy, in TORT
LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 1, at 17, 36-37.
50. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 31, at 1077-78, 1081-84; Alan Schwartz,
ProductsLiability and Judicial Wealth Redistributions,51 IND. L.J. 558, 564-68 (1976).
5 1. See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1334 (2001) (characterizing enterprise liability as a scheme based
on the assertion "that actors should bear the costs of those accidents that are 'characteristic' of their
activities and then distribute those costs among all those who benefit from the imposition of the
risks at issue") (citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 663-68 (1990) (book
review). For discussions of enterprise liability, see CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 50-51
(distinguishing two uses of the term: (1) referring to self insurer; and (2) referring to entity best able
to pass costs onto a large pool of customers); Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and
Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. L. REv. 573, 599-608 (2005) (tracing
history of the concept of enterprise liability); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of
Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REv. 1190, 1192-93 (1996) (referring to a "pattern of retreat" from
support of the doctrine). Enterprise liability also rests on a concern for deterring accidents by
imposing liability on the enterprise best able to make decisions about reducing accidents not
preventable by due care, by reducing the level of the activity or by innovation that results in costeffective safety measures. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The concept of enterprise
liability also overlaps with concepts of corrective justice like that expressed, for example, in
Fletcher, supra note 32.
Perhaps the primary area where enterprise liability is embraced is in the area of vicarious
liability, particularly under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes employers liable for
the torts of their employees committed within the scope of employment. Though fault on the part of
the employee is generally required, the doctrine imposes "strict liability" on the employer, who is
liable even though the employer did nothing wrong. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 333-36, at
905-20; Keating, supra note 51, at 1292-93.
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a, at 16-17 (1998)
(rejecting enterprise liability in the form of strict liability for design or warning). For further
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In contrast, some legislative schemes for spreading, notably workers'
compensation, have been accepted as a basic approach to redistributing
the costs of accidents.
The goals of tort law are central to understanding tort reform
because many proposed reforms are supported-or attacked-in terms
of the validity of a particular goal or of how the proposals would achieve
a particular goal. This Article will not attempt to resolve this debate in
general or in terms of a particular proposal. Instead, it will simply note
the ways in which the goals of tort law are involved in the debate about
torts as a system and about specific tort reforms.
The debate about goals is further complicated by the complexity of
the tort system, by goals outside tort law, and by broad conceptions of a
just society. The broader systemic dimension is illustrated by egalitarian
criticisms of limitations on recovery in tort for noneconomic injuries.
For example, such limitations have been criticized on the ground that
they have a disproportionate impact on women and minorities because
these groups tend to have lower amounts of economic loss, particularly
in terms of lost earnings, than men.55 Another egalitarian criticism of the
tort system is that it unfairly favors the rich by reinforcing unfair
inequalities in distribution by restoring plaintiffs to the positions they
would have been in but for the tortious injury even though these preinjury positions are unfair.56 A different, more "conservative" criticism
is that "excessive" tort liability has hindered the broader national goals
of fostering innovation and protecting the competitive capabilities of the
57
United States in the global economy.

discussion of the role of nonfault liability in products liability, see infra notes 403-04 and
accompanying text.
54. For discussion of these limitations, see infra Part IV.A.3.
55. See, e.g., Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 465-68, 491 (Wis. 2005)
(holding that limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions was
unconstitutional in part because of the disproportionate impact on children); KOENIG & RUSTAD,
supranote 1, § 3.5, at 113-15; Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 466 (1998) (criticizing approach on the basis of gender
discrimination); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1280-1314 (2004); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The
Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847, 850-67 (1997); Lisa M. Ruda, Note,
Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the FemalePlaintiff."Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 197, 207-26 (1993); cf Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform:
Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH L. REV. 1 (1995) (criticizing punitive damages award
restrictions on gender grounds).
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths
and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 1, at 127, 128; ATRA:

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/4

16

Hubbard: The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement
THE "TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT

20061
D.

The Mechanics of the System

Though many claims involving compensation for tort liability are
resolved without an attorney, attorneys are central in the operation of the
tort system. Plaintiffs in tort litigation are generally represented by
attorneys paid on the basis of a contingency fee in the range of 30-40%
of recovery,58 which provides an incentive for the plaintiffs attorney to
maximize the amount of compensation per unit of his input. This

incentive scheme operates differently with different segments of the
plaintiffs' bar. For example, some attorneys specializing in plaintiffs'
work handle a large number of cases involving smaller amounts of
compensation

that can generally be resolved without trial; other

plaintiffs' attorneys specialize in trying a small number of cases
involving the potential for substantial verdicts or settlements. 59 The
contingency fee system forces plaintiffs' attorneys to act as gatekeepers
who only take cases likely to generate a return greater than their
investment. In ordinary cases, lawyers may reject as many as nine out of
ten potential cases. In complex expensive matters, like medical
60
malpractice, the rates of rejection are likely to be much higher. The

defense bar generally operates on the basis of a fee paid regardless of

American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter About ATRA].
58. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of
Times: The PrecariousNature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1781 n.2
(2002) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Precarious Nature]; Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip
Corboy and the Construction of the Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 269,
274 n.4 (noting that "the contingency fee had become an accepted practice in America by the mid19th century"); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 212-14
(2001); infra notes 392-400 and accompanying text (discussing contingency fee system).
59. See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN
URBAN SETTING 71-91 (1994) (contrasting the typical work of high-level lawyers with that of lowlevel lawyers); Daniels & Martin, PrecariousNature, supra note 58, at 1788-95 (dividing plaintiffs'
lawyers into four categories); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact That It Has Had Is
Between People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
453, 476-82 (2000) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, The Impact] (describing "bread and butter"
lawyers); Parikh & Garth, supra note 58, at 272, 297 (discussing the market referral system as a
means of maximizing profit and investing in high-stakes litigation); Yeazell, supra note 58, at 208,
213-14; cf. Catherine T. Harris et al., Who Are Those Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical
MalpracticePlaintiffs' Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225, 245-47 (2005) (noting the highly successful
role of "seasoned attorneys").
60. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Medical MalpracticeLawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the
Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1233 (2005). It is
hard to evaluate the rejection rate of lawyers who focus on a small number of high value cases
because much of their practice comes from referrals from other attorneys. See, e.g., Daniels &
Martin, PrecariousNature,supra note 58, at 1793-95.
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outcome. 6 Because defendants in tort disputes tend to have more wealth
than plaintiffs, 62 they have an advantage in the litigation. Defendants'
resources will be superior to those of the plaintiffs' side, particularly
where the plaintiffs' lawyers handle a large number of cases involving
relatively low damages. 63 However, in litigation involving plaintiffs'
lawyers with a small-volume, high-damages practice, the plaintiffs side
may have superior resources because cost-containment measures
by
64
insurance companies often limit expenditures by the defense side.
Though the overwhelming majority of tort suits are resolved
without a trial,65 the jury is usually involved where a tort suit is tried.66
The jury's role in trials is crucial in three respects. First, juries provide
community input on norms of behavior by giving contextual specificity
to wrongdoing, which is generally defined in vague terms like
"reasonable" and "negligent," 67 and they determine the amount of
61. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1234; Yeazell, supranote 58, at 197-98, 214.
62. Most defendants are business entities or automobile drivers with insurance, in which case
the insurance company usually provides defense counsel. See 2005 TORT COSTS, supra note 26, at
7-8 (discussing characteristics of defendants in tort disputes).
63. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13, 22 (Herbert M.
Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (observing that defense lawyers' successes are attributable in
part to their status as "repeat players," armed with "better information ... greater continuity, better
record-keeping, more anticipatory or preventative work, more experience and specialized skill in
pertinent areas, and more control over counsel"); Symposium, Do the "Haves" Still Come Out
Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 795, 809 (1999).
64. See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 58, at 197-98.
65. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 4 (1980).

66. A study of the seventy-five largest counties indicates that 85% of the estimated 10,278
tort trials in 1996 were jury trials. TRIALS AND VERDICTS, supra note 23, at 1.
67. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407, 424-39 (1999); Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29
U. ILL. L. REV. 582, 595 (1935); Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood
Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 639-42 (2003). The normative role of the jury is not
substantially reduced by the use of "mathematical" risk/benefit approaches like that in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) (referring to "balancing

of risks and benefits") and in Learned Hand's opinions in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) and Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) ("The
degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood
that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk."). As Judge Hand noted in
another portion of Conway, the three factors of probability, seriousness of injury, and cost of
accident avoidance "are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and the second two
are generally not so, even theoretically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference,
or choice between incommensurables ..... I II F.2d at 612. Moreover, there is a possibility that the
jury may be reluctant to accept the results of a starkly utilitarian application of a cost/benefit test.
See Hetcher, supra, at 647-52; Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1700, 1737-38 (2003).
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damages necessary to compensate the plaintiffs. 68 This role has
increased in an era of comparative fault, which requires not only a
qualitative evaluation of conduct in terms of vague tests but also a
quantitative determination of the relative amounts of fault of a plaintiff
vis A vis the defendant(s) 69 and among different defendants. 70 Second,
the jury resolves fact disputes, particularly in situations where the facts
are capable of being resolved with some "reasonable" evidentiary basis,
even though the factual disagreement cannot be resolved with
certainty. 71 Finally, jury verdicts provide a benchmark for settling claims
that are not tried.72
Both trial judges and appellate judges are central to the system of
tort law. Trial judges supervise the conduct of the parties, their attorneys,
the witnesses, and the jury. They regulate the jury by serving as
gatekeepers as to the cases that can be tried by a jury through motions to
dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions for directed
verdict. Trial judges also decide what evidence reaches the jury and
guide the jury through instructions. In addition, judges exercise
considerable control over the jury through post-verdict review, including
review of the amount of damages.73 Appellate judges not only review
decisions by the trial court judges but also make a considerable amount
of the rules governing tort law.74
Two characteristics of the judicial system are important in terms of
political power. First, because it is composed of lay persons and because
of its ad hoc, for-this-case-only character, a jury's decision process is
hard to manipulate with economic resources. Second, though all
government entities are subject to influence through wealth and
economic power, judges are far less subject to influence than legislators
through political contributions and lobbying by those with substantial

68. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing noneconomic
damages).
69. See infra notes 119 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part IV.A.2.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (providing that disputed fact issues are to be resolved by the jury
unless "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to" resolve the factual
issue).
72. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 62-66; Gross & Syverud, supra note 10.

The role of the concern for the results of formal litigation appears to diminish where a large number
of routine small-stakes claims are being settled because it is administratively cheaper to address
most of these claims in terms of negotiation using categories rather than case-by-case analysis. See
ROSS, supra note 65, at 136-39.
73. See infra notes 267-70, 317, 323 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Part lII.B.1.
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economic resources. 75 This difference may be less where judges are
elected, but judicial norms and behavior arguably constrain even elected
judges.76 The judicial system is also not subject to "capture" in the same
way as regulatory agencies, which can have their role affected by
staffing decisions by the executive, funding and other decisions of the
legislature, and connections of the agency personnel with the regulated
industry. 77 The effectiveness of regulatory control by agencies is also
reduced by judicial review of their decisions, particularly in terms of
delaying implementation.78

75.

See, e.g., SIMON LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS 27-28, 245-48 (1974); G. Alan Tarr,

Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445 (2003)
(arguing that various methods of selecting judges are less different than supposed, that substantial
politicization of judicial elections is unusual, and that when politics does become involved, judicial
elections are virtually indistinguishable from other election contests). Lazarus summarizes this
difference as follows:
[T]hree items-wealth, organization, and persuasion-comprise the elements of
influence in democratic politics. If everyone can participate by right in the political
process, then, inevitably, those who are best able to amass and deploy the ingredients of
influence will participate most effectively.
This is not an inflexible rule. Though the means of influence are the same in all
arenas of democratic politics, their relative value does vary somewhat from one forum to
another. Persuasion counts for more and money for less before the courts and even
before administrative agencies, than before congressional committees.
LAZARUS, supra, at 28.

76. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1489-94 (2005); Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, PartisanJudicialElections: Lessons
from a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1372-80 (2003) (noting a strong
relationship between electoral success and relative advantages of political party affiliation and
money); James C. Foster, The Interplay of Legitimacy, Elections, and Crocodiles in the Bathtub:
Making Sense of Politicizationof Oregon's Appellate Courts, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 132734 (2003); infra Part IV.C. The textual reference to states where "judges are elected" is a very broad
generalization. Judicial selection methods, whether formally termed elections or not, vary
immensely not only from state to state, but also within a state in terms of particular elections. See,
e.g., Cheek & Champagne, supra; Tarr, supra note 75. Moreover, as the experience with
appointments to the United States Supreme Court indicates, a lifetime appointment scheme is also
subject to being politicized.
77. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 14-15; Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the
Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130-33 (1954); Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997);
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in HistoricalPerspective,38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1296 (1986)
(noting a pattern where agencies "exhibited a consistent bias in favor of the interests of politically
influential constituents").
78. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 11, 14-15; Merrill, supra note 77, at 1050-52; Rabin,
supra note 77, at 1295-1315. One commentator argues that this pattern of assertive judicial review
of administrative decisions is caused by a concern that agencies are not "neutral" experts because
they are too prone to control by the political branches and by the industry being regulated. See id. at
1299.
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III.

TORT REFORM

A.

Issues

1. Whether a Specific Doctrinal Proposal Is a Reform
By definition, reform is a good thing because the term identifies
changes that will remove or reduce faults or abuses and thus provide
improvement. Given this definition, it is generally good policy to reform
the tort system where possible. However, people frequently disagree
about whether a particular proposal for change in tort is, in fact, a
"reform." One side argues the tort system suffers from some defect that
must be addressed by adopting the proposed reform. 79 The other side
argues the defect does not exist or that, even if there is a problem, the
proposed reform will be ineffective or will make the system worse.
This dialogue necessarily focuses on specific proposals for reforms
because, given the complexity of the tort system, tort law can be
changed in numerous ways. There is no one single reform for tort law in
general; nor is there a single way to change any specific tort doctrine.
Consequently, it might be more accurate to speak in terms of a tort
reforms movement. Because of the extensive dispute about whether the
changes sought by the "tort reform" movement are truly reforms, this
Article frequently uses quotations around "tort reform" to clarify that it
is referring to changes sought by the movement rather than changes that
are reforms in the sense of being an improvement in tort law by some
more objective standard.
2. How to Decide: "Rationality" Versus Politics
There are many ways to address debate about a specific doctrinal
change. A common approach, which can be termed the "rational" or
deliberative model,81 structures the debate by requiring the proponent of
a change to specify the reasons why a particular rule is flawed in terms
of justice or policy.8 2 A decision-maker will then rationally evaluate the
79. For an example of this type of argument, see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text
(criticizing collateral source rule).
80. For an example of this type of argument, see infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text
(defending collateral source rule).
81. "Rational" is put in quotations to recognize that there is considerable debate about the
nature and normative significance of the concept. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF
RATIONALITY (1993) (exploring rationality of decision and rationality of belief).
82. In terms of democratic theory, this model is sometimes referred to as the "deliberative
model" or the "public interest model." See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
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proposal in terms of three issues: First, is the rule flawed as the
proponents claim? Second, if there is a flaw, will the proposed change
ameliorate the problem, at least to some extent? Third, if the change
does ameliorate the problem, is it also just or good policy in terms of
such questions as: What are the benefits and costs of change? Do the
benefits outweigh the costs? If so, who bears these costs and who
receives the benefits of change? Is there a better way to address the
problem?
The rational model has been subjected to considerable criticism in
recent decades on two grounds. One criticism stresses the model's need
for some normative measure of justice or good policy to evaluate any
proposed change to an area of law, and argues that disagreements about
basic conceptions of fairness, justice, and good instrumental policy,
particularly in terms of specifics, are, at best, difficult to resolve in any
"objective" way in a modem pluralistic society. 83 Second, the rational
DEMOCRACY 130-31 (2003) (discussing deliberative democracy and public interest); Frank I.
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977) (detailing the "public-interest model");
Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 169 (1988) (discussing the "public interest
model"). Michelman describes this model as follow:
The... public-interest model depends at bottom on a belief in the reality-or at least the
possibility--of public or objective values and ends for human action. In this publicinterest model the legislature is regarded as a forum for identifying or defining, and
acting towards those ends. The process is one of mutual search through joint
deliberation, relying on the use of reason supposed to have persuasive force. Majority
rule is experienced as the natural way of taking action as and for a group-or as a device
for filtering the reasonable from the unreasonable, the persuasive from the unpersuasive,
the right from the wrong and the good from the bad.
Michelman, supra, at 149 (citations omitted). In this context, the attainment of individual freedom
"depends on the possibility of values that are communal and objective." Id. at 150.
83. Any claim of "objective normative truth" can be challenged as being actually a matter of:
(1) claiming to choose the basic assumptions necessary for the theory on the basis of objective
normative truth even though the choice can only be based on personal opinion or preference;
(2) avoiding the need to choose between competing values by using a theory that is vague or
internally inconsistent; or (3) using basic assumptions but mistakenly claiming that there are no
such assumptions and that, therefore, the theory is neutral. Reasoned argument can have no special
status because any logical argument based on personally preferred normative postulates or
assumptions cannot provide "objective normative truth." Instead, these arguments are simply
attempts to present one's favorite views in the guise of objective normative truth. This mode of
criticism includes many modem versions of pragmatism and the "critical legal studies" approach.
The literature on both topics is vast. Discussions of pragmatic approaches include, for example,
POSNER, supra note 82, at 84-85 (summarizing "legal pragmatism"); PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY,
AND SOLIDARITY (1989); THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW,

AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990). Anthologies, reviews of the field, and
symposia on "critical legal studies" include: ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A
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model is based on the premise that there is a meaningful way to resolve
factual disputes. However, factual disputes about the impact of a
proposed doctrinal change in law are often not determinable in an
objective undisputed fashion. For example, proposals to reform tort law
often involve complex, difficult to resolve empirical issues about the
operation of the system in terms of a specific aspect of the tort system
and about the effects of a proposed change.
There are responses to these criticisms. For example, the
disagreement about objective values does not mean that a particular
culture, even a pluralistic culture, will not have shared values that can
provide the basis for agreement.84 In the United States, efficiency and
wealth maximization are widely viewed as important values. 85 Similarly,

LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990); RAYMOND A. BELLIOTTI, JUSTIFYING LAW: THE DEBATE OVER
FOUNDATIONS, GOALS, AND METHODS 162-89 (1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed.,
1994); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36

STAN. L. REV. I (1984); A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 929 (1985);
Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461
(1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Introduction to Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239 (1984); and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 563, 565-67 (1983).
84. See supra note 82. In addressing the problem of a lack of demonstrative objective
normative "truths," many philosophers have adopted a concept of shared cultural consensus on
political values as a foundation for justice. For example, John Rawls has argued that his "political
conception of justice" is better than other conceptions because citizens will "view the political
conception as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values."
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 10-11 (1993). Ronald Dworkin has argued that moral "truth"
can be based on the human capacity to make moral judgments that bring conviction, are durable, are
shared by many others, and are amenable to logic and the capacity to combine these judgments in a
harmonious intellectual structure. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You 'd Better Believe It,
25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 118-19, 128, 135 (1996). For an example of connecting a political
conception like that of Rawls to popular culture, see F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice, Creativity, and
Popular Culture: The "Jurisprudence" of Mary Chapin Carpenter, 27 PAC. L.J. 1139, 1156-68
(1996).
85. In the context of tort law, Richard Posner has supported his deterrence/efficiency
framework as follows:
[T]he most constructive philosophical approach to the question whether wealth
maximization should guide tort law may be... to relate it to the various moral traditions
that might have or imply a position on tort liability. If, as I believe, wealth maximization
resonates well with several moral theories and offends none, a tort system founded on
wealth maximization may deserve to command the widespread support that it does in
fact seem to command in our society. To put this another way, the unreflective public
opinion underlying a system of tort law that can be best understood and explained in
terms of wealth maximization intersects the principal moral traditions found in our
society.
Posner, supra note 30, at 103 (citations omitted).
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fairness is a basic value. 86 Insofar as empirical issues are involved, the
lack of precision and certainty in terms of tort litigation data is, to some
extent, a matter of degree. These data are not simply meaningless. For
example, if nearly all studies show a lack of rapid increase in the number
and size of successful tort claims, this lack is a good reason for
legislators to reject claims of a litigation explosion.
Where a large pluralistic society like the United States must address
normative and factual issues that are difficult to resolve objectively by
using the rational model, it is common to argue in favor of using a
democratic scheme based on a majority decision-making process
through a democratically elected legislature, so long as basic
constitutional liberties are not violated. 87 Where such legislative
decisions are constitutionally appropriate, it is common to speak in terms
of "legislative supremacy," particularly in relation to the power of courts
88
or administrative agencies as they interpret and apply statutes. Because
of the central role of the political process in selecting and influencing
legislatures, this approach is referred to herein as the "political" model
of decision-making.
On the surface, the political model will resemble the rational model
in that proponents will give reasons for the change, and the evaluation of
the proposal will involve similar questions about the need for change
and the relative costs and benefits of change. However, the answers to
these questions will be substantially influenced by "nonrational" factors
like popular opinion and political contributions and the process will
resemble more of a market-like dickering in terms of legislative deals
among competing special interests rather than a concern for a broader
public interest. 89 Though these characteristics can be defended on the

86. Jules Coleman makes this argument in terms of his defense of a corrective justice
approach to tort law. See discussion supra note 38. From a broader perspective, John Rawls has
constructed his theory of justice on the basis of shared values about a fair process of decisionmaking. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10-19 (rev. ed. 1999).
87. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY 17-33 (1980); RAWLS,

supranote 84, at 174-75.
88. See, e.g., Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1129, 1132-39 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 320-27 (1989); Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative History, the
Neutral, DispassionateJudge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the LatterIdeals Through the
Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 819-20 (1998).

89. This view of the democratic process is sometimes referred to as the "public choice"
model, in contrast to the public interest model, which is discussed at supra note 82 and
accompanying text. In this model, "all substantive values or ends are regarded as strictly private and
subjective," the legislature is a "market-like arena in which votes instead of money are the medium
of exchange," and legislatures "dicker towards terms" and bargain rather than deliberate about
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grounds of the need for and nature of democratic legislation, they
constitute a major difference.
Like the rational model, the political model is subject to criticism,
primarily concerning the extent to which the legislature is democratic in
the sense that it properly represents the views of the electorate. Given
practices like campaign contributions, lobbying, mass advertising
campaigns, "safe" districts, and low attention and voting rates on the
part of voters, there is good reason to question the democratic nature of a
decision about tort reform. The issues raised by these practices will not
be addressed in this Article, except to note their impact. 90 Instead, it will
simply be assumed that both the rational model and the political model
are legitimate and useful and that the doctrine of legislative supremacy is
legitimate and binding on the courts.
In practice, the two conceptual models overlap; politics can become
involved in a rational scientific debate, and rationality is involved in
politics. 9 1 Moreover, both models can be used to support the same
asserted need for reform because criticism of a rule can be both rational
and democratic; however, the choice of the model may affect the precise
nature of the new rule that will address the problem criticized. 92 In
addition, because "rationality" has persuasive power in the political
arena, pushing for a position in the political arena often involves the
defense of the position through the use of the rational model.9 3 However,
despite this overlap, one model tends to dominate in a concrete situation.
For example, a person emphasizing the political approach is likely to use
goals. Michelman, supra note 82, at 148. It adopts an "individualist and subjectivist conception of
human experience" in which
values, so-called, are taken to be nothing but individually held, arbitrary and inexplicable
preferences (the subjectivist element) having no objective significance apart from what
individuals are actually found choosing to do under the conditions that confront them
(the behaviorist element); from which it seems to follow that there can be no objective
good apart from allowing for the maximum feasible satisfaction of private preference as
revealed through actual choice.
Id. at 152. Within this conception, politicians are viewed as "wealth maximizing egoists." Mikva,
supra note 82, at 167; see also POSNER, supra note 82, at 196-99.
90. For useful reviews of the issues concerning the democratic nature of American
government, see, for example, BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE CAPTIVE PUBLIC: How MASS OPINION
PROMOTES STATE POWER (1986); POSNER, supra note 82, at 130-212.
91. In addition, conceptual models can never capture all the complexity of the real world.
"IT]he motivations of politicians are far too mixed to be understood through the
generalizations ... theorists formulate about political behavior." Mikva, supranote 82, at 169.
92. See infra notes 177-80, 228, 243, 277-80 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE NEW
WASHINGTON AND THE RISE OF THINK TANKS (1993) (discussing the rise of think tanks and their
importance in politics); JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE
THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996).
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"rational" arguments and factual studies of verdicts as parts of a broader
political push for change. However, this person will be likely to
manipulate or "spin" the arguments and studies to support a position and
to persuade the political decision-makers to accept this spin by
supplementing it with techniques like campaign contributions. Such
model,
manipulation can result because, in the context of the political
94
is.
success
standard-political
measuring
the
"[v]eracity is not
The distinctions underlying these conceptual models are important
because they identify a central division in the tort reform debate: By and
large, supporters of the movement use the political model; opponents,
particularly academic opponents, prefer the rational process model. 95
Because of this division, the tort reform debate involves not just dispute
about which model to use
about doctrine but also a deeper disagreement
96
controversies.
legal
important
deciding
in
It would be surprising if self-interest does not play a role in
choosing a model. For example, an academic opponent of reform may
prefer the rational model, at least in part, because it provides relative
advantages in terms of ability to use and manipulate the model.
Similarly, supporters of reform could prefer the political model because
it gives them a comparative advantage in manipulating political
decisions by using their wealth to fund political contributions and onesided publicity campaigns to gain support for a position.
B.

Conventional Tort Reform

In "conventional" or "traditional" tort reform, the complex
interrelated issues involved in evaluating a proposed reform are
generally addressed by a scheme in which the reasons for and against the
proposal are examined by the rational process model. This "reasoned"
approach is favored by common law courts97 and has been used as they

94. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of ldeas:
Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 71, 73 [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Punitive
Damages].
95. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (discussing supporters). For information on
opponents of the political model, see infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
96. See infra Part IV.B.3.
97.

See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE

COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 246-50 (1960) (discussing the relationship between
rule and reason for rule); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 601-07 (1993); Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our

Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 890-96 (1981); infra
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98
adopted both common law rules-such as the "fellow-servant rule" which favored defendants, and also as they rendered decisions-like
abolishing privity as a requirement for suits for injury caused by
negligently manufactured products 99 -which favored plaintiffs. This
approach has also played a role in legislative reforms, and, "objective"
policy studies of "tort reform" legislation are common. 00 This approach
has also been used in considering alternatives to the tort system. For
example, statistical expertise in analyzing workplace accidents was
instrumental in the push to replace the tort system with workers'
compensation schemes, 101 and "objective" studies of automobile
accidents played a role0 2in decisions concerning the adoption of no-fault
automobile insurance.1

1. Judicial Reforms
Initially, tort law was primarily a matter of common law and, like
any area of common law, was constantly evolving. This dynamic quality
continues today and is captured by the following:
It is the glory of the common law that it is not a rigid, immutable code.
On the contrary, it is a vital, living force that endows with the breath of
life a body of practical principles governing human rights and duties.
These rules are subject to gradual modification and continuous
adjustment to changing social and economic conditions and shifting

note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of comparative fault). "Reasoned" is in
quotes to indicate (and avoid) dispute as to the nature and normative status ofjudicial reasoning.
98. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION

LAW § 2.03 (2006).
99. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 97, at 430-37 (discussing Justice Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
100. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force to Consider Tort Reform Proposals,N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Apr. 1999, at 80 (detailing a traditional "objective" analysis of proposed "tort reform" legislation);
infra notes 472, 484 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 139-46 (2004). For further
discussion of the adoption of workers' compensation schemes, see infra notes 261, 503-05 and
accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 7, 11-13 (1965); N.Y.
STATE INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 3-4, 83 (1970); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Costs, and
Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 353; Schwartz, Auto NoFault, supra note 15. See infra note 139 and accompanying text for discussion of adoption of nofault automobile scheme.
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needs of society. This characteristic is the life blood of the common
law. 103

Such open acceptance of change was not always so common. For
example, in 1900, the New Jersey Supreme Court gave the following
argument as a reason for requiring that a plaintiff suffer a physical
impact in order to recover for mental distress from fear of being
physically injured by a collision with a train:
I think it safe to say that the consensus of opinion of the bar of this
state has been that no liability exists for such injuries as are the
foundations for the present suit. The fact that, in the mass of suits with
which our courts have been crowded for the past decade, this is the
been set up, goes far to
first time that any such cause of action has
10 4
demonstrate the accuracy of this statement.
In 1965, this case was overruled by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in favor of a rule allowing recovery for mental distress if the plaintiff
suffered fear from being in the "zone of danger" of a physical impact
that would cause a physical injury. 10 5 In addressing the need to adopt
new rules, the court rejected the reasoning of the 1900 opinion by the
following argument: "[T]he common law would have atrophied
ago if it had continued to deny relief in cases of first
hundreds of years
06
impression."'
The conventional method for courts to address tort reform issues
emphasizes "rationality" in the sense of giving reasons for a particular
position. 107 For example, a court adopting comparative fault will
typically identify the flaws in the all-or-nothing character of contributory
negligence and then indicate reasons for changing to comparative
fault. 0 8 If the details of the new scheme are addressed-for example,
how to address assumption of risk-reasons for this change will also be
given.10 9 The following examples convey a sense of the range of judicial
changes adopted to reform tort law:

103. Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'don other grounds, 240
F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
104. Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R., 47 A. 561, 562 (N.J. 1900), overruled by Falzone v.
Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965).
105. See Falzone, 214 A.2d at 17.
106. Id. at 15.
107. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32 (Cal. 1975).
109. See, e.g., id. at 1240-41.
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for imposing tort
(1) adoption of negligence as the basic standard 110
liability on persons whose actions injure others;
(2) expansion of the role of negligence by abolishing privity
limitations on products liability claims;''1
charitable, 113 and parental
(3) abolition of sovereign,
immunities;114
(4) extension of right to recover for mental distress to persons in the
"zone of danger," 15 to certain bystanders, 116 and to victims of
,outrage;,,1
(5) abolition of category system of entrants for determining liability
for injuries on premises;118 and
(6) replacement of the doctrine of "contributory negligence," which
totally barred an at-fault plaintiff from recovery, with comparative
to recover some of his loss
fault, which allows an at-fault
119 plaintiff
defendant.
at-fault
the
from

110. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850); WHITE, supra note 2, at
3-19.
111. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 395 (1934); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.2, at 22-23

(2005).
112. See, e.g., Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 889 (Pa. 1973) (abolishing
governmental immunity and listing status of immunity in other states), superceded by 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8553 (West 1980). See Michel v. City of Bethlehem, 478 A.2d 164 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984). Legislatures have also abolished sovereign immunity. See infra note 136 and accompanying
text.
113. See, e.g., EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 623
(1974); Paul A. Hattis, Overcoming Barriersto Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State Laws
Providing Reduced Malpractice Liability Exposure for Clinician Volunteers, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
1033, 1034-35 (analyzing the various state and federal statutory approaches taken to deal with
volunteer liability in the medical field).
114. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 280, at 753-57.
115. See, e.g., id. § 309, at 839-40; see also Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965) (holding
that "where negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury, which
fright is adequately demonstrated to have resulted in substantial bodily injury or sickness, the
injured person may recover"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965) (stating that a
third party who suffers emotional distress from harm to another can only recover if "the negligence
of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the [third party]").
116. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 309, at 839-41.
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); DOBBS, supra note 3, § 304, at
826.
118. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 237, at 615-16.
119. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1-5, at 18 (3d ed. 1994).
There are two basic approaches to comparative fault: (1) the pure system, which allows a plaintiff to
recover regardless of how great his fault is-for example, a plaintiff who was 90% at fault would
recover, but the recovery would be reduced by 90% to reflect plaintiffs fault; and (2) mixed
schemes, which allow partial recovery unless, in one variation, his fault is greater than the
defendant's, or in the other variation, his fault is equal to the defendant's. Within each approach,
there are variations in how to address a wide range of issues concerning the applicability of the
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Though states have varied on whether or when to adopt these changes
and on the specifics of the new rule to be adopted, the range of changes
indicates a willingness to use the rational model to change the rules.
A common effect of many of these changes, which were adopted in
the period from the 1930s until the 1970s, was to increase the rights of
plaintiffs to recover for injuries. This time period also encompassed an
increase in the size, role, and influence of the plaintiffs' bar. For these
reasons, this period has been referred to as a time of "plaintiff-friendly
tort expansion." 2 ° This pattern of judicial changes favoring plaintiffs is
sometimes used by supporters of "tort reform" to justify a shift to
changes in favor of defendants on the ground that the plaintiff-favoring
shift has gone too far. 12 Not surprisingly, there is dispute about whether
the plaintiff-oriented shift simply constitutes a shift necessary to offset a
prior scheme that was too defense-oriented, and thus, about whether
there is a need to adopt a more defense-oriented approach.1 22 In addition,
there is considerable evidence that at least some of the trend toward
plaintiff-oriented liberalization has ended and, to some extent, has been
restricted in recent years. 121
doctrine. See generally, e.g., CLARK, BOARDMAN, CALLAGHAN, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL (1995); SCHWARTZ, supra, § 2-1(b)(3), at 33; F. Patrick Hubbard & Robert L. Felix,
ComparativeNegligence in South Carolina:Implementing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 43 S.C.
L. REv. 273, 277-78 (1992). For example, a jurisdiction must determine whether the exceptions to
the total bar to recovery, like "last clear chance," will continue to be exceptions or become simply a
factor to be considered in determining shares of fault. See Hubbard & Felix, supra, at 283-84, 332.
Similarly, the jurisdiction must determine whether the comparative system applies in cases of
intentional torts, nuisance, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty. Id. at 295-304, 341-43.
120. John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Futureof Tort
Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2005); See, e.g., KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1,
§ 1.7, at 46 (referring to "Progressive Era" from 1945-1980, during which plaintiffs' rights were
expanded); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 601-03 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law]
(referring to "modem tort law," spanning 1960 to the early 1980s, and post-modem tort law, which
followed); Yeazell, supra note 58 (discussing changes occurring between 1925 and 2000 in
substantive and procedural law as well as economic changes that resulted in expanded plaintiffs'
bar).
121. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 1, at 7-10, 231.
122. See, e.g., KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1,§ 1.8, at 59-60 (referring to period of
retraction of rights from 1981 to present and resulting reduction in ability of tort law to "constrain
new forms of oppression"); Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 120, at 1027 (arguing against
"retrenchment" of the expansion by asserting that expansion followed "two centuries of law
favorable to society's wealthy and educated elite"); Page, supra note 52, at 651-54 (noting that "'old
tort reform' [in the 1950s and 1960s] was partly an effort to rectify ... imbalances" in favor of
defendants).
123. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 2, at 244-90; Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law, supra
note 120, at 647-48; infra note 404 and accompanying text (discussing developments in products
liability law).
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Two types of approaches have been used to explain the shift in
favor of plaintiffs. One approach views the shift as a matter of
intellectual history and argues that the changes resulted from the
influence of academics and judges who pushed for reforms that
increased the rights of victims. 124 The other approach views law as a
reflection of popular culture and argues that the tort law developments in
favor of plaintiffs reflect a cultural shift in our ideological scheme for
defining injuries-whether from accidents, illness, or natural disaster.
The intellectual history approach and the cultural approach are not
inconsistent; both could be involved in the shift in tort
necessarily
125
law.
Whether viewed as a matter of elite intellectual history, of popular
culture, or of a combination of both, two underlying competing
ideologies are involved. 126 One scheme, which defines injuries as one of
the costs of living that all individuals face and must personally find a
way to address, is viewed as underlying much of nineteenth-century tort
law. The alternative scheme views injuries as a social matter which
requires legal schemes that not only help prevent accidents, and thus
reduce the harmful effects of injuries, but also ameliorate the economic
impact of accidents that do occur. This ideology arguably underlies the
twentieth-century shift to workers' compensation and governmental
welfare programs, as well as tort doctrines designed to impose the costs
of accidents on corporate actors, rather than individual humans. This
scheme also supports the adoption of rules granting plaintiffs greater
legal rights against injurers, particularly corporate actors, and an
increased willingness of jurors to reach decisions in favor of plaintiffs on
issues of both liability and damages.
124. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 1, at 6-7; WHITE, supra note 2, at 139-243 (discussing
conceptual shifts in tort law initiated by academics); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battlegroundof Social Theory,
68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2002); Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law, supra note 120, at 683-701
(considering several theories that explain the more recent shift in favor of defendants, including
removal ofjudges who pursued "agenda completion").
125. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 38-43 (1985); SHAPO, supra note 1,
at 282-300; George L. Priest, The Culture of Modern Tort Law, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 573, 574-75
(2000); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patternsof Sociolegal Change, 23
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1988) (arguing that expanded liability in the period of 1960-1980 resulted
not only from doctrinal developments but also from cultural shifts in favor of greater protection of
victims and greater responsibility of injurers); Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law, supra note
120, at 683-701 (considering several theories, including the theory that the goal of spreading as a
basis for legal rules creates unexpected and undesirable results). For further discussion of tort law
and culture, see infra notes 186-87 and Part IV.B.
126. For discussion of these competing ideologies in terms of tort reform, see infra notes 15961, 169-70, 204-09, Part IV.B.3.
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2. Legislative Reforms
Even before tort law became a distinct doctrinal subject area in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, legislation played a major role in the
development of tort law. For example, an affirmative defense like a
statute of limitation was adopted as a legislative limitation on tort
claims. 127 In terms of substantive rights, the failure of the common law
to recognize a claim for wrongful death128 was reformed in England by
Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 and by legislation in the United States
starting in New York in 1847. 129 Because the common law hurdles
imposed on workers by the "infamous trilogy" of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule limited
recovery in tort for workplace injuries, Congress and the states acted to
reform or replace tort law. 3 ° In 1908, Congress reformed tort law by
adopting the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") to govern
injuries occurring to employees of railroads engaging in interstate
commerce.' 3' FELA barred the defense of express assumption of risk,
limited the defense of implied assumption of risk, adopted comparative
negligence, and reduced the plaintiff's burden of proof.132 Initially, many
states followed a scheme like that of the FELA. 133 However, as a final
approach, state legislatures addressed accidents in the workplace by a
more draconian method as they replaced the tort system with no-fault
workers' compensation schemes. 134 More recently, legislatures have
reformed tort law by such changes as adopting comparative fault,' 35 by

127. PROSSER
5th ed. 1984).
128.

AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at

165 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,

See, e.g., I STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY

§ 1.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1992).
129. See, e.g., id. §§ 1.8-.9, at 31-32. Some states have a right of action for death in their
constitution. Id. § 1.10, at 34. Many American nineteenth-century statutes granted wives, but not
husbands, a claim for wrongful death. WITT, supra note 101, at 53.
130. See, e.g., 1 LARSON, supra note 98, §§ 2.03-.04; Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky,
Social Changeand the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
131. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 130, at 64-65.
132. Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000); See, e.g.,
KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1, § 1.6[E][1][B], at 44; Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder,
The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional
Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 594-99 (1999). The "doctrine of assumption of risk
was obliterated" by a 1939 amendment. Tiller v. AtI. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943).
133. 1 LARSON, supra note 98, § 2.05.
134.

See, e.g., PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
§§ 2.07-.08;

STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION (2000); 1 LARSON, supra note 98,

Abraham, supra note 52, at 585-94; Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 130, at 69-72.
135. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 119, § 1-4, at 12-13; UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 12
U.L.A. 123-25 (1996).
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adopting statutory approaches to the liability of governmental units, 136
by limiting the liability of charities, 137 and by establishing a statutory
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors.138 In addition, many states
have adopted no-fault automobile schemes to provide a partial
replacement to tort law, 139 and Congress has adopted schemes, like the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 14 to replace tort law
with a system that provides compensation through a scheme that spreads
the loss. Finally, legislation can supplement tort law by creating
statutory rights and schemes for seeking damages for violations of those
rights. These include federal claims for civil rights violations under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985, for discrimination and sexual harassment under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e for discrimination against Americans with
disabilities, and for "wrongful" or "retaliatory" discharge for performing
a civic duty or for exercising a protected
right. 14 1 State legislatures have
14 2
torts."'
"statutory
also created such
C.

Current "Tort Reform " Movement

1. History, Agenda, and Techniques
The history of the "tort reform" movement can be divided into two
overlapping dimensions. The first part, which consists of ad hoc calls for
reforms to address a specific liability insurance "crisis," began in the

136. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-80 (2000); South
Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005); DOBBS, supra note 3,
§§ 268-69, at 715-20; KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1,§ 1.7[B][3][A], at 53.
137. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 113, at 1034 ("As of September 30, 2003: forty-three states
and the District of Columbia have some sort of charitable immunity legislation ....").
138. See, e.g., UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1,12 U.L.A. 194 (1996).
139. See, e.g., Schwartz, Auto No-Fault,supra note 15, at 616-22. For further discussion of nofault automobile schemes, see supra notes 15, 46, 102 and accompanying text.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34 (1988); See, e.g., BURKE, supra, note 1, at 142-70; Derry
Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59 (1999); Elizabeth A. Breen, Note, A One-Shot Deal:
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 316 (1999). For a more
general review of such alternative schemes, see Apelbaum & Ryder, supranote 132, at 601-12.
141. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000) (permitting claims for employees discharged for service on
federal jury); 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (2000) (covering violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (granting rights under ERISA plan); Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000); Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998)
(upholding claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) for employment discharge for obeying federal grand
jury subpoena); BURKE, supra note 1,at 60-102 (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act);
cf Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-8, 11
(1984) (discussing creation of statutory claims and provisions for court-awarded attorneys' fees).
142. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1-70 to -80, 41-15-510, 53-1-150(c) (1976).
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1970s when reforms were sought to address a "crisis" caused by large
increases in medical malpractice liability premiums and in product
liability insurance premiums. 143 In the 1980s, a broader "crisis" was
caused by a general increase in liability insurance premiums. Once
again, reform was sought. 144 In the late 1990s, new "crises" resulted in
products liability and medical malpractice and reforms were declared
necessary.145 Each of these "crises" generated its own response in terms
of proposed legal changes and in terms of support for and against these
changes.
Long-term institutionalized efforts for "reform" characterize the
second dimension of the movement, which began in the 1980s. During

143. See, e.g., ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INS. & TORT Sys., PRELIMINARY
FACT-FINDING REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 43 (1987) [hereinafter ACADEMIC TASK
FORCE]; AM. MED. Ass'N SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF'L LIAB. & INS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
IN THE '80s: REPORT I, at 4-5 (1984) [hereinafter AMA REPORT 1]; BURKE, supra note 1, at 31-32; 4
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN 1. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 26.05[5] (2005) (discussing
products liability in the context of improvements on real property); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT, at III-10 to -11 (1977); F.

Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological
Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform ", 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 295-98 (1989);
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 120, at 1029-30; Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice
Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 419-21 (1986) (describing how the medical
malpractice insurance "crisis of availability" in the 1970s resurfaced as a "crisis of affordability" in

the 1980s); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis:
ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977) (reviewing major tort reform proposals of
the mid-1970s); Allen Redlich, Ending the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38 ME. L.
REV. 283, 316-24 (1986) (describing the adoption of state legislation by forty-nine states from 1974
to 1976 designed to curb the increased cost of malpractice insurance); Glen 0. Robinson, The

Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5
(1986) (noting that the declaration of a medical malpractice "crisis" requiring major legal reform in
the 1980s caused a sense of dojti
vu). Some commentators trace the beginnings of tort reform to the
1960s, when "steep increases in the insurance costs incurred by health care providers... triggered
what came to be known as the 'medical malpractice crisis."' Page, supra note 52, at 649.
144. See, e.g., AMA REPORT I, supra note 143, at 8; BURKE, supra note 1,at 32; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COSTS INCREASED BUT VARIED
AMONG PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS 28 (1986) [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS];
Hubbard, supra note 143, at 298; Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 120, at 1030-32; Qual, supra note
143, at 421; Robinson, supra note 143, at 32; Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races":
The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 212-19 (1990).
145. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR
MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 2-4 (2002) [hereinafter NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS]; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO PREMIUM RATE INCREASES 3, 9-14 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, REPORT ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]; Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 315-21 (2005); Greg

Winter, Jury Awards Soar as Lawsuits Decline on Defective Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at
Al.
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this time, the level and intensity of the debate increased and a major
ongoing long-term struggle developed between two loosely allied
groups. On one side were defense-oriented groups like liability insurance
companies, physicians, and business groups, which are interested in "tort
reform" as the solution to a broad "crisis" in tort liability law and
insurance. 46 On the other side are two groups: (1) plaintiffs' attorneys,
occasionally joined by a variety of consumer rights organizations,
claiming to represent the position of potential victims; and (2) academics
using the rational model to criticize the claims of the "tort reform"
movement.147 The institutionalization and success of the first side are
illustrated by the founding of the American Tort Reform Association
("ATRA") in 1986 148 and the inclusion of "tort reform" in the
Republicans Party's "Contract with America" in 1994. 149 Where an
increase in liability insurance premiums results in calls for tort reform,
this institutional dimension capitalizes on the increase by labeling it a
"crisis" and coordinates efforts to resolve it through reform. However,
the institutional push for reform is constant regardless of whether an
insurance "crisis" exists, and is phrased in broad terms as a "lawsuit
crisis" that is structural, widespread, and potentially enduring unless
reforms are adopted.' 50 The movement also has a continually increasing
and evolving list of proposed reforms to address the "lawsuit crisis."' 5'
Although tort law is predominantly a matter of state law and the
details of tort reform are often fundamentally different from state to
state,152 it is appropriate to speak in terms of a national movement with
respect to five characteristics. First, in every state, a large segment of
society-including doctors, retail store owners, and manufacturersknows it needs to self-insure or purchase liability insurance because of
the risk of being sued for tortious injury. Because these "haves" know
that they are repeat players on the defense side of the tort system, they
have a common motive to reduce costs by reducing the amount of their
potential liability in tort by changing tort law in ways that favor

146.
147.
148.
149.

See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
About ATRA, supra note 57.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699,

700-01 (1995); Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The RepublicanAttack on Women, Blue
Collar Workers and Consumers,48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 673-84 (1996).

150. See infra notes 162-63, 171-74 and accompanying text; see also Daniels & Martin, The
Impact, supra note 59, at 467 (describing a $6.5 million publicity campaign, funded by an insurance
trade group, built around the concept of a "lawsuit crisis").
151. See, e.g., infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
152.

See infra Part IV.A.
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defendants. Thus, they defie tort reform as changes in tort systems that
will have the following two effects: Plaintiffs will win less often, and
winning plaintiffs will get less recovery.' 53 Subgroups may differ on the
relative importance of particular proposals, but all want to reduce
defendants' liability costs. This shared view is reflected in the
membership of ATRA, which includes physicians groups like the
American Medical Association, manufacturers like DaimlerChrysler
Corporation and Caterpillar Corp., and insurance companies like State
Farm. 154
Second, these actors have embraced the political model for
addressing reform and have used their considerable resources to lobby
and support candidates, to conduct massive publicity campaigns, and to
fund conservative think tanks in order to place their common concern for
reform on the political agenda in the states and in Congress. 155 156
In
addition, they make campaign contributions to judges seeking election
and have attacked judicial decisions that hold reform legislation
unconstitutional or that interpret the legislation in a way that favors the
plaintiffs' position.1 57 The funding of these various activities has created
a group of people who provide these activities and who, therefore, have

153. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 13, 22-23 (1988) (referring to tort reforms as "victim take-away programs").
154. ATRA, Sample List of ATRA Members, http://www.atra.org/about/members.php (last
visited Feb. 10, 2007).
155. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1,at 29-30; KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1,§ 2.2. at 7182; Daniels & Martin, PrecariousNature, supra note 58, at 1796-97; Daniels & Martin, The Impact,
supra note 59, at 459-60; Marc Galanter, The Three-Legged Pig: Risk Redistribution and
Antinomianism in American Legal Culture, 22 MISS. C. L. REv. 47, 52-54 (2002); Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 124, at 51-52, 74-88; infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1,at 50; STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 93, at 96-108;
Champagne, supra note 76; infra notes 507-09 and accompanying text. The ATRA website states:
"We identify and champion elected officials and judges who want to fix the system." About ATRA,
supra note 57.
157. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES: 2005, at 38 (2005),
available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES]
(awarding "dishonorable mention" to the Wisconsin Supreme Court because of the court's
interpretation of a punitive damages statute and the court's striking down as unconstitutional a limit
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber,
Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates the Fundamental Federal Constitutional
Principleof Separation of Powers: How to Restore the Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 934-35
(2001). The movement also supports more traditional methods of judicial reform. For example, the
Product Liability Advisory Council ("PLAC"), "a non-profit association with over 130 corporate
members representing . . . product manufacturers ...has filed over 700 briefs as amicus curiae" on
behalf of product manufacturers since 1983. Product Liability Advisory Council,
http://www.plac.com/AM/customsource/security/login.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
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but also to reinforce and
a strong incentive not only to further the agenda
58
exists.'
crisis
serious
a
intensify the belief that
Third, the tort reform movement shares a common ideology
favoring "efficiency" and self-reliance as the bases for the allocation of
the risk of injuries. 159 From the perspective of this ideology, tort law
should foster efficient behavior by having the following characteristics:
(1) injured persons should be required to have primary responsibility for
making decisions about risk, for avoiding injury to themselves, and for
insuring against that injury; (2) plaintiffs should not recover damages
unless they have satisfied their responsibility to protect themselves and
unless the plaintiff has clearly shown that the defendant's conduct
caused the injury; (3) the conduct by the defendant was at least negligent
in the sense that the defendant should have reasonably known the
conduct involved a failure to take a safety precaution that was cheaper
than the accident cost resulting from the lack of the precautionary
measure; and (4) the damages awarded do not exceed the amount
60
necessary to provide "reasonable compensation."'1 If these conditions
158. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 155, at 50. Galanter notes the lack of data about the tort
system and the use of "anecdotes and surmises" to construct arguments. He then notes the
following:
These create opportunities for professional aggrandizement and careerism. Business
people concerned about liability are surrounded by retainers and entrepreneurs with
strong incentives to intensify that concern.... A host of professionals, consultants, and
publicists thrive by magnifying the sense of crisis and touting their ability to exorcize the
menace of enhanced liability. These messages are amplified by a small industry of
corporately-supported think tanks, lobbyists, consultants and "grass roots" groups that
attempt to generate political support for "reforms" of the civil justice system. Politicians
and organizational entrepreneurs, in turn, echo the jaundiced view in order to cultivate
financial support and gamer votes.
Id. (citation omitted).
159. See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 10 (referring to "market culture" that tends "to focus on
the 'pitiless indifference' of a universe in which injurers and victims alike must struggle for
existence"). "Efficiency" is placed in quotes for the same reason that "rational" and "reason" have
been placed in quotes; all of these terms are subject to considerable debate about their nature and
normative significance. For arguments in favor of the role of production and efficiency in tort law,
see, for example, supra notes 30-32, 85; Priest, supra note 125. For arguments indicating that
economic efficiency and wealth maximization arguments have, at best, a limited role in an area like
tort theory because of the contingent nature of the relative rights of the injurer and the victim, see,
for example, Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 208 (1980) ("We
cannot specify an initial assignment of rights unless we answer questions that cannot be answered
unless an initial assignment of rights is specified."); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation,
and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEo. L.J. 585, 593 (2003); supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
160. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 19-32; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 56-61;
B. Michael Dann, Jurors and the Future of "Tort Reform ", 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1127, 1131-35
(2003); Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles
Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REv. 645 (2003); Priest, supra note 125, at 579 (criticizing the
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are not met, payments to a plaintiff are viewed as both unfair and
inefficient. Because of this ideology, as well as the nature of the parties
in the tort reform movement and the movement's embracing of the
political model, it is not surprising that the movement has, to a
16
considerable extent, become allied with the Republican Party. 1
Fourth, this push for reform has attempted to gain public support of
its legislative agenda and its ideology through the use of massive
publicity campaigns that share a common rhetorical emphasis on the
importance of widely shared values like fairness, efficiency, and
personal responsibility. However, reform proponents do not address the
difficult tasks of defining, applying, and justifying their use of these
values in terms of a specific problem raised by a tort doctrine or of the
effect of a specific change on the problem. 162 This rhetoric is bolstered
by attacks on plaintiffs and on the judicial system by means of the
constant repetition of an asserted need to address a crisis and of
anecdotal "horror stories" about the "tort tax," a "litigation explosion,"
"lawsuit abuse," "frivolous lawsuits," "judicial hellholes" and
163
"dishonorable" courts.
cultural framework supporting the scheme of corporate enterprise liability as "redistributive, not
productive").
161. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; see also BURKE, supra note 1,at 44;
Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 132, at 612-35; Betsy J. Grey, The New FederalismJurisprudence
and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 475-80 (2002); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency
Cliches Eroding our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1000
(2003); Andrew F. Popper, A One-term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 123, 125-28 (1998); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in
American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 918 (1996).
162. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 150-54, 169-71, 178-81, 270-71; Daniels
& Martin, Punitive Damages, supra note 94, at 454-72; Daniels & Martin, The Impact, supra note
59, at 454-72; Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
163. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 1,at 4; JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 157, at 38. These
phrases are rhetorical because they are undefined and are based on anecdotes (some of which are
not true) rather than systemic data. For more specific analyses of the rhetorical approach of the tort
reform movement, see, for example, infra text accompanying notes 185-94; see also DANIELS &
MARTIN, supra note 1;STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 93, at 96-108; Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1992); Stephen
Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols,
Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989) (reviewing rhetorical
public relations campaigns); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort
Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004); Daniels & Martin, Punitive Damages, supra note 94; Daniels
& Martin, The Impact, supra note 59; Galanter, supra note 162; Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural
Logic of a PoliticalCrisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance
Famine of 1986, in LAW & SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 236 (Stewart
Macaulay et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter LAW & SOCIETY]; Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999:
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Fifth, the political and publicity campaigns are coordinated at a
national level by groups like ATRA and the U.S. Chambers of
Commerce. 164 For example, ATRA has a "network of tort reform
advocates (state coalitions) that advance ATRA's agenda in state
capitals ... [and] an 'army' of more than 135,000 citizen supporters who
provide]
have joined together in state and local grassroots groups... 1[to
65
an effective one-two punch in the fight for state tort reform."'
The movement pursues two strategies to reduce the tort liability of
its members. First, it seeks adoption of pro-defense changes in tort law.
In terms of specific rules, these changes include: (1) changes made in the
general tort doctrines, such as rules concerning joint and several liability,
collateral sources, punitive damages, and noneconomic damages;
(2) changes focused on product liability law and on medical malpractice;
and (3) changes in procedural and evidence law concerning class
166
actions, jury service, appeal bonds, venue, and expert witnesses. In
addition to doctrinal changes, the movement seeks to achieve a defenseoriented shift in the operation of the tort system by identifying and
supporting judges who share its views 167 and attacking those who do
not. 168 The second goal is described by ATRA as:
[the need] to change the way people think about personal responsibility
and civil litigation... [by shining] a media spotlight on lawsuit abuse
and the pemicious political influence of the personal injury
bar[,] ... [redefining] the victim, [and] showing how lawsuit abuse

affects all of us by cutting off access to health care, costing consumers
tax," and threatening the availability of products
through the "lawsuit
169
like vaccines.

One aspect of this second goal is to stop "regulation through
litigation."'' 70 Given the deterrent goal of tort law, the tort system is
A Building Without a Foundation,27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 397, 420-33, 436-44 (2000) (discussing
"tort tax" rhetoric).
164. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 176.
165. About ATRA, supra note 57.
166. See id. For discussion of specific doctrinal changes, see infra Part IV.A.
167. About ATRA, supra note 57; Champagne, supra note 76, at 1488.
168. About ATRA, supra note 57; JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 157, at 38-39.
169. About ATRA, supra note 57. For discussion of the position that an expansion of liability
has occurred because of a pro-victim cultural shift that has had an important impact on the
application of the sometimes vague, open-textured concepts of tort law, see supra notes 120-26 and
accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & LEAH LORBER, REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION
HAS JUST BEGUN: WHAT YOU CAN DO TO STOP IT 9-12 (1999). A considerable part of the concern
with "regulation through litigation" is litigation by state governments, like that in the tobacco
litigation, where state attorney generals join with plaintiffs' lawyers to recover for "injuries" to the
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inherently a scheme designed to regulate by deterring wrongful conduct.
Thus, stopping regulation through litigation would be a revolutionary
abandonment of the basic deterrent goal of torts.
As the preceding paragraphs indicate, the desire to reduce tort
liability is presented in terms of "reforms" necessary to further the
public interest. For example, it is argued that reform is needed to reduce
unnecessary consumer costs, 17 1 to enhance the availability of healthcare
and medicines, 172 and to make "victims" responsible for their own
actions. 173 The push for reform has also been justified on the basis of the
need to make the United States more competitive in the world market
74
and to enhance innovation in product development. 1
Whether "tort reform" is necessary or will achieve any of these
goals is largely a matter of faith for two reasons. First, rhetorical phrases
like "crisis," "litigation explosion," "lawsuit abuse," and "frivolous
lawsuits" are so vague that, absent a more precise definition, it is
impossible to determine whether we have a crisis or explosion, what
constitutes a frivolous claim or an abuse, or how to balance concerns for
access to courts against the need to prevent abuse. Nor is there any way
to know whether the current level of tort litigation is too high or too
low. 175 Second, because of the limitations on the available data
state. See id. at 16-18; ATRA, Regulation Through Litigation, http://www.atra.org/
issues/index.php?issue=7351 (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). However, the reform movement also
criticizes "judicial departures from basic tort principles" that "extend tort law far beyond its 200year-old moorings." SCHWARTZ & LORBER, supra, at 14-15.
171. See, e.g., La Fetra, supranote 160, at 650-51.
172. See, e.g., NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 145; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 12-25
(2003) [hereinafter GAO, REPORT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE] (examining claims and

concluding that there was no showing of widespread healthcare access problems); Monique A.
Anawis, Presentation:Tort Reform 2003, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 311-15 (2003); infra
note 176 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., La Fetra, supra note 160, at 657-67.
174. See SHAPO, supra note 1, at 5, 10; see also Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and
American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 1, at 127-29 (critiquing innovation and competition assertions); W. Kip Viscusi &
Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability and Innovation, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 1, at 105, 122-23 (analyzing critically innovation
assertion); La Fetra, supra note 160, at 646-57; Priest, supra note 125, at 578-79. The concern for
innovation is not new in tort law. For example, the "strict liability" approach ofRylands v. Fletcher,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338-39 (1868), for causing accidents was rejected by some nineteenth-century
courts on the ground of a need to avoid restricting "progress and improvement." See, e.g., Brown v.
Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873) (rejecting the strict liability approach because "it would impose a
penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable, skillful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition of
barbarism.... [and] throw. . . an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement"); Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476,485-87 (1873).
175. See Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 27,41-46 (2004).
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concerning the operation of the tort system and the effect of reforms,
there is no way to be sure whether the tort system hinders innovation,
competitiveness, or access to healthcare, whether it provides an
improper level of incentives for safety, or whether tort reform will
reduce any undesirable effects. 176 Though these two problems
substantially weaken the position of the proponents of "tort reform" in
terms of the rational model, they provide an ideal situation for the
movement to use its economic resources to push its agenda in the
political arena by exploiting its considerable ability to fund vague,
rhetorical publicity campaigns and to push for legislative change through
lobbying and political contributions.
Thus, it is not surprising that, as the tort reform movement pushes
its defense-oriented agenda, it has chosen to use legislative change and
the political model for decision-making. This preference for the political
model does not mean that a particular proposal for doctrinal change
cannot also be viewed as a reform by the rational model's techniques of
"neutral expertise" and "policy analysis." For example, changing joint
and several liability to accommodate comparative fault has been
supported both by traditional methods 177 and by the more political
methods of the current tort reform movement.178 However, the specific
change adopted may be different depending on the method used. For
example, the ATRA proposal simply abolishes joint and several liability
179
and places all the share of an insolvent defendant on the plaintiff, but
traditional reform proposals tend to involve methods that result in a
1 80
sharing of the problems, such as an insolvent defendant.

176. See TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 1, at 39; Galanter, supra note 162,
at 737-40 (discussing the lack of evidence of impact from the tort system on competitiveness); infra
notes 516-18 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135-36 (2006); 2 ALl,
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 127-57; infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
Reform,
Liability
Several
and
Joint
ATRA:
e.g.,
178. See,
34
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7 5 (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) [hereinafter ATRA,
Joint and Several].
179. Id.
180.

See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135-36 (2006) (reallocating the

share of an insolvent defendant to all at-fault parties proportionally). The American Law Institute
concluded that "[n]o single approach ... is clearly superior" but notes that reforms that shift all the
costs of insolvency on plaintiffs "may have been overreactions." 2 ALl, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 156. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 17, cmt. a (1999) notes that an approach that allocates the share of an insolvent
tortfeasor to plaintiff and other tortfeastors in proportion to fault is "theoretically the most
appealing" approach. For discussion of approaches to changing the doctrine of joint and several
liability, see infra notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
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Traditional reform sometimes has some of these political aspects,
particularly when reform is sought within a legislative context. For
example, rhetoric can play a role because it can usefully communicate in
concrete ways that accurately capture a policy position or motivate
people through a common basis of shared values.1 8 1 In terms of accident
law, an example of this use of rhetoric is reflected in the phrase, "[t]he
price of the product should bear the blood of the workingman," which
was used to support the legislative adoption of workers'
compensation. 182 This rhetorical phrase accurately captures both the riskspreading enterprise liability theory underlying this compensation
183
scheme and the shared concern for injured workers and their families,
even though it begs the question of why workers' injuries should be
viewed as a cost of the employer's enterprise of production rather than a
184
cost of the employee's enterprise of working.
In contrast, "tort reform" rhetoric often lacks such a relationship
and appears designed to persuade by misleading. 185 It is rhetoric, in the
negative sense criticized by Socrates, designed not only to appeal to
shared values but also to take advantage of misconceptions so that it can
be "more convincing among the ignorant than the expert." 186 For
example, ATRA and other supporters of tort reform stress the problem
of "frivolous litigation" and repeat a litany of anecdotes about specific
"loony lawsuits." This approach has a powerful impact on public
opinion because polling data indicate that "Americans believe too many
frivolous lawsuits clog our courts."' 87 However, the movement provides
no definition of "frivolous lawsuits" and no measure of how many
frivolous suits constitute "too many." Nor does it give data to support
the claim of a problem. Instead of addressing the validity of the public
belief that there is a problem of frivolous lawsuits, the movement simply
181. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 82, at 84-85; Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams, Editorial
Introduction to THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1, 5-27 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994);
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Culturaland Communal Life, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 684,691,698 (1985).
182. HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 282 (1954).
183. See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 133-34 (addressing causation issue of "what-is-a-costof-what").
185. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
186. PLATO, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 229, 242 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); see also Hayden, supra note 166, at 252-54 (noting the movement's
manipulation of views by rhetoric based on cultural beliefs).
187. About ATRA, supra note 57 (stating that "[a]ccording to a 2003 ATRA survey, 85
percent of Americans" had this belief).
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utilizes the belief to support its agenda. For example, ATRA claims that
it "successfully translates that frustration [with frivolous lawsuits] into
action and reform." '88But ATRA's "action and reform" concerning
frivolous lawsuits consists solely of legislative proposals that will reduce
a plaintiffs right to compensation regardless of whether the claim is
frivolous under existing substantive rules. ATRA has virtually no
legislative proposal specifically directed toward frivolous litigation in
the sense of claims that are defined as clearly groundless under existing
rules of tort. 189 Indeed, it is hard to know what might be proposed
because, as indicated below, 190 the federal and state systems already
have several specific schemes designed to address groundless lawsuits.
The rhetorical attacks on "frivolous litigation" are part of a broader
rhetorical pattern of criticizing courts by using claims that imply courts
are neither competent nor trustworthy. This broader attack is reflected in
recurring rhetorical phrases such as the need for "real justice in our
courts" and the need to stop "lawsuit abuse," "looney lawsuits," and
"judicial hellholes."' 191 It is also implicit in the "reform" position that
jury verdicts for compensatory and punitive damages are "excessive"
and "erratic" despite judicial control over jury verdicts. The broadest
tort system by asserting a
attack is to question the deterrent role of the
'1 92
litigation."
through
"regulation
stop
need to
These rhetorical attacks on the legitimacy of courts and on the
fairness and efficiency of tort law are consistent with the interest of the
"haves" supporting the tort reform movement to seek limits on legal
curbs on their economic power. As indicated above, 193 decisions of
judges and juries are less subject to manipulation through the use of
economic resources than are legislatures and regulatory agencies. In
addition, courts prefer to use the rational model in decision-making
rather than the political model. 194 Consequently, reducing the role of
courts, vis d vis that of legislatures and agencies, in allocating injury
costs increases the ability of the "haves" to use their economic
advantage in determining the rules and outcomes in particular cases.

188. Id.
189. For discussion of the limited nature of the movement's proposals to address frivolous
litigation, see infra notes 386-91 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying text.
191. About ATRA, supra note 57; see supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 97-99, 107-09 and accompanying text.
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Opposition to "Tort Reform"

As indicated above, the long-term opposition to the tort reform

movement has two forms. First, most "experts," including academics
and authors of neutral governmental studies, have criticized the use of
the political model or have used the rational model to criticize specific
claims and proposals.

195

These experts tend to make the following

arguments: (1) given the vagueness of the rhetorical claims of
proponents and the complexity of determining the impacts of the tort
systems, it is not possible to know whether a change in rules is needed or
whether a change will have the claimed effect; and (2) to the extent data
are available, these data show that there is no problem or that the
196
proposed change will be ineffective or unfair.
The opponents of the "tort reform" movement who have used the
political model are not "repeat players" in the same way as the repeat
players on the defense side. Because the likelihood of being seriously
injured by a tort is so low, most people do not view themselves as
sufficiently likely to be plaintiffs that they are concerned about the rules
of the tort system. Even if one were concerned, a potential victim usually
lacks a sufficient interest to spend time and money opposing tort reform
195. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 73-77. Thomas Burke notes that
academics have "effectively counterpunched against the claims" of those supporting tort reform and
summarizes the role of the academics as follows:
Marc Galanter, a law professor at the University of Wisconsin, has become a kind of
one-man litigation "truth squad," demonstrating that many of the figures widely quoted
by tort reformers-that the United States has 70 percent of the world's lawyers or that
tort litigation costs $300 billion annually-are vast exaggerations that were more or less
made up. These figures still find their way into.the media, but Galanter and several other
sociolegal researchers have managed to draw attention to some of the defects in the tort
reformers' case. Within academia, and particularly among those who most closely study
tort law in action, Galanter's critical view of the tort reform movement
prevails.... [T]hey find little evidence for claims of a "litigation explosion," and they
dismiss the lawsuit horror stories regularly generated by tort reformers as
unrepresentative anecdotes.
BURKE, supra note 1, at 45 (footnotes omitted).
196. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 45, 194; DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at ix-x, 1528; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 73-110; Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (1996); Galanter, supra note 155, at 47-48; Valerie P. Hans &
Stephanie Albertson, EmpiricalResearch and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497,
1522-23 (2003) (reviewing data showing no basis for criticism of juries in terms of bias in favor of
plaintiffs, lack of comprehension, and arbitrary, unpredictable decisions); Deborah Jones Merritt &
Kathryn Ann Berry, Is the Tort System in Crisis?New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315,
315 (1999); Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J.
835, 835-36 (2002); Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1219-20 (analyzing tort reform with respect to
medical malpractice claims). For a summary of data on the tort system, see supra Part II.B. For a
discussion of contrast between accounts based on academic studies and media accounts, see infra
Part IV.B.
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in the political arena. Thus, potential plaintiffs have had very little role
in the opposition. Instead, political opponents of tort reform have
generally consisted of lawyers who specialize in representing tort
plaintiffs. These lawyers are, in effect, repeat players for the plaintiffs'
side because the contingent fee system provides an economic interest in
protecting the plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs' lawyers either act
individually or act collectively through a state group like a state "Trial
Lawyers Association" or a national group like the American Association
for Justice ("AAJ") (formerly known as the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America), which began as the National Association of
Claimants' Compensation Attorneys ("NACCA") in 1946.197 To a lesser
extent, some "public interest" advocates have also used the political
model to oppose tort reform on behalf of potential victims. For example,
Ralph Nader has been termed a "giant" and a "one-man cheering squad"
in the support of the tort litigation system and in opposition to the efforts
of the tort reform movement. 9 8
The political opponents of tort reform have adopted methods
similar to those of proponents. For example, plaintiffs' attorneys use
lobbying techniques and make political contributions to supporters of
their views, including judges in states where judges are elected. 199 To a
limited extent, they have also engaged in publicity campaigns like those
funded by the tort reform movement. 200 These attorneys also use
rhetorical techniques like those of the tort reform movement, for
example, arguing in terms of "rights of victims" without acknowledging
the need for defining and defending the specific rights involved and the
need for examining the impact of specific proposals for reform. 201
Opponents may defend these techniques by arguing that they are just
"responding in kind" to groups like ATRA. However, whatever the
reason may be, the tactics of these political opponents of "tort reform"
are often similar to those of proponents.
The opponents of the tort reform movement are motivated by two
somewhat overlapping ideologies. First, academic opponents, by and
large, are committed to the rational model and frequently criticize the
197. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 45-5 1; American Association for Justice, About AAJ:
AAJ and Trial Lawyers, http://www.atla.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
198. BURKE, supra note 1, at 52.
199. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 50; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 111-43;
Champagne, supra note 76, at 1483.
200. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 49; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 111-43 (noting
limited use of publicity campaigns); Deborah L. Rhode, Essay, Frivolous Litigation and Civil
Justice Reform: Miscastingthe Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 452-53 (2004).

201.

See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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movement's proposals and techniques in terms of their failure to satisfy
rational modes of analysis. °2 Because of their professional training and
practice, plaintiffs' attorneys also tend to be committed to the rational
model as it is exhibited in litigation and judicial decision-making.20 3
Second, the ideology of the political opponents has aspects that are
like the market ideology of the tort reform movement 20 4 because both
emphasize individualism and responsibility. From the opponents' point
of view, however, the evaluation of an individual's choice must be
placed within the context of the circumstances that did not result from
that individual's choice. 205 Thus, the movement's opponents place
significantly greater emphasis on individual rights in terms of concerns
like the vulnerability and lack of choice of injured victims, on the
responsibilities of injurers, and on the need to use tort liability as a
method to control the risks generated by the powerful "haves" in
society. 206 Partly because of this ideology and of Republican Party
support for tort reform, political opponents of tort reform tend to support
the Democratic Party and have received Democratic support in fighting
"reform., 20 7 Despite their concern for social context, political opponents
of reform-as well as supporters of reform-have not tended to support
replacing the tort system with social compensation programs or
regulatory schemes.20 8 For example, plaintiffs' attorneys have fought

202. See, e.g., Page, supra note 52, at 651-55 (contrasting "old tort reform" based in the courts
and on the ideas of scholars, and the "new tort reform" "fueled by... economic self-interest" and
consisting of "a political attack on tort law in the legislative arena"). A group of over twenty
scholars have formed an organization, the Civil Justice Resource Group, to "respond to the
widespread disinformation campaign by critics of the civil justice system." Civil Justice Resource
Group, http://www.cjrg.com//aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). Some have argued that
academics occasionally act from a more political point of view. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz,
Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1076-78 (noting that some academics using
empirical data to defend the tort systems may, at times, be affected by political views in favor of
compensating victims); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (distributional criticisms of
"tort reform").
203. See supra notes 97-99, 107-09 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
205. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 32, at 60-61; SHAPO, supra note I, at
10 (referring to adherents of a "justice culture" who emphasize the vulnerability and lack of choice
of victims and the responsibility of those who generate risk). See generally William H. Simon,
Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The PragmatistChallenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 127 (2004) (critiquing "legal liberalism," which stresses populism, rights, and a
victim perspective). In part, the philosophical dispute involves a conflict between utilitarian or
wealth maximizing schemes vis ivis schemes based on a concern like fairness. See also supra note
37.
206. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 1,at 1-6, 76-77.
207. See BURKE, supra note 1,at 56; supra notes 149, 161 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 266-67, 281-93.
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compensation schemes like no-fault automobile insurance in favor of
using the judicial forum with its emphasis on individualistic, rightsbased approaches to injury.2 9
In this context, "plaintiff lawyers... see themselves as 'equalizers'
who roam through American society looking for injustice, taking the
side of victimized individuals against large, uncaring institutions and in
the process making a lot of money." 210 A public interest advocate like
Ralph Nader is motivated by "a deep distrust of both corporate and
government bureaucracies ...[and] has developed a strong defense of
the adversarial legal model of decision making as against the
bureaucratic model., 21 1 These opponents have a distrust of corporations,
of agencies, and of politics, and they prefer a strong judicial role in
developing safety standards in areas like product development. They are
some delays of "good" innovation in order to prevent
willing to accept 212
innovation.
"bad"
IV.

IMPACT OF THE "TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT

A.

Legislation

Thus far, the tort reform movement has had far more success at the
state level than at the federal level. This difference does not result from
lack of effort; the movement has tried since the 1970s to get national
reform at the federal level.2 13 The failure to get proposals adopted at the
federal level may result in part from the fact that tort law has
traditionally been a matter of state law, and an attempt to federalize
products liability law, for example, would face objections on this basis.
Another reason may be that Congress provides a forum where AAJ (and
209. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 103-41, 171-89.
210. Id.
211. Id.at 53.
212. See generally, e.g., BOGUS, supra note 1 (arguing that heavy regulation in the automobile
industry leads to safer products).
213. See, e.g., Anawis, supra note 172, at 314 (discussing healthcare malpractice bills pending
in Congress in 2003); Rustad, supra note 149, at 674-75, 679-80; Schwartz, supra note 161
(considering strengths and weaknesses of federalizing medical malpractice law and products
liability law); Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward:Reflections on Twenty
Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1023-28 (2000) (reviewing
products liability proposals in Congress); infra note 408 (discussing arguments for federal products
liability reform). There have been a few successes at the federal level. See Apelbaum & Ryder,
supra note 132, at 612-27; see also Popper, supra note 161 (discussing federal act imposing
limitations on liability of volunteers); sources cited infra note 413 (including statute of repose for
general aviation aircraft); infra note 525 and accompanying text.
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other plaintiffs' attorneys), academics, and consumer groups can be
more successful in opposing "tort reform."
At the state level, the tort reform movement has focused on a
relatively explicit list of legislative reforms to tort law. For example, the
ATRA website lists a legislative agenda and areas of focus (with
links) 214 and publishes a "Tort Reform Record" in July and December of
each year.21 5 The Tort Reform Record tabulates the adoption of these
reforms by state since 1986, the year ATRA was founded. The reforms
that are listed and tabulated are: punitive damages, joint and several
liability, prejudgment interest, collateral source rule, noneconomic
damages, product liability, class action reform, attorney retention
sunshine, appeal bond reform, and jury service reform.2 16 The data in
ATRA's Tort Reform Record are presented in a table indicating whether
a state has adopted a reform in a particular area, as well as in a state-bystate listing of more specific information about the reforms adopted in
each state and of judicial consideration of the constitutionality of a
reform.
The following discussion is organized around a series of doctrinal
proposals for reform and provides a review of reasons for and against
specific proposals and a summary of adopted "reforms. 2 17 One of the
most important points concerning the legislative changes is their
diversity. This diversity provides a clear indication that neither
traditional reform nor "tort reform" has followed a simple, cookie-cutter
pattern. Instead, each state has devised its own approach to replacing the

214. ATRA Issue Pages, http://www.atra.org/issues/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). ATRA's
legislative agenda includes items in its "Areas of Focus." For example, venue reform is included as
an area of focus and ATRA has supported federal legislation to limit the venues available to tort
plaintiffs. See Gretchen Schaefer, ATRA, U.S. House Supports End to Lawsuit Abuse, Oct. 27,
2005, http://www.atra.org/newsroom/releases.php?id=7974 (supporting H.R. 420, 109th Cong. § 4
(2005)). It also supports state venue "reform." ATRA, Forum and Venue Reform,
http://www.atra/issues/index.php?issue=7356 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
215. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, ATRA TORT REFORM RECORD (2005) [hereinafter
TORT REFORM RECORD], available at http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/799-Record_12-31-05.pdf. A

similar review is compiled by the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
("NAMIC"). NAMIC Online, July 2004 Update to "An Overview of State Legislative Efforts to
Improve the Legal System," http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/default.asp (last visited Jan.
8, 2007). For a review of arguments for and against reform and a summary by state of selected

"reforms,"

see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE

STATES, at ix, 2-3 (2004), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5549.
216. TORT REFORM RECORD, supra note 215, at 2.
217. These summaries should be viewed as rough snapshots. Each state is different in many
important respects, and a single statute may not capture the complete picture. Moreover, any review
of all states raises difficult research challenges in terms of being sure one has not missed a case or a
statutory provision.
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common law doctrines targeted for "reform" by the reform movement,
and this independent approach has resulted in fifty different sets of rules
to address "tort reform."
1. Collateral Source Rule
Under the common law "collateral source rule" or "collateral
benefits rule," a plaintiff s damages in a torts suit may not be reduced by
benefits received from sources like unemployment compensation, first
party insurance, or public schemes like Medicare and Medicaid. These
benefits are regarded as collateralto the tort litigation; evidence of these
benefits is, therefore, inadmissible and cannot operate to lessen the
damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. 21 8 The reasons traditionally
given in support of this rule are: (1) it is unfair for the defendant to get
the benefit of such things as payments from plaintiffs' health insurance
or voluntary donations of services by family members; and (2) reducing
a damage award by collateral benefits would reduce the deterrent effect
of the award because the defendant would no longer be paying the full
19
amount of the accident costs caused by the wrongdoing.
The main argument given for abolishing the rule is that it "allows
plaintiffs to be compensated twice for the same injury., 220 Defenders of
the rule respond that this double compensation argument is somewhat
misleading because it ignores two points. First, they argue that any extra
compensation is fair because the defendant should not get the benefit of
something paid for by or donated to the plaintiff.221 Without the rule, the
defendant would receive a windfall at the plaintiffs expense. Second,
because providers of the benefit generally have a contractual or statutory
right to subrogation or to a lien, which allows the provider to recover the
222
value of the benefit from successful tort claimants, there is rarely any
218. DOBBS, supranote 3, § 380, at 1058.
219. See, e.g., Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-69 (1970) (noting also
the need to pay attorney's fee); Arambula v. Wells, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 586 (Ct. App. 1999);
DOBBS, supra note 3, § 380, at 1058-59; 2 ALl ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1,at 16263.
4
220. ATRA: Collateral Source Rule Reform, http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=734
ALl
2
See
criticism.
this
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Traditional reformers have also made
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1,at 162.

221. See O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Ky. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1977); Michael Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral
Source Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 39,43 (1990).
222. See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006) (recognizing
health plan's right to equitable lien based on right of subrogation in plan covered by Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")); LARSON, supra note 98, § 116.01 (explaining
workers' compensation statutes); Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1256-60; infra note 227 and
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Critics of the rule respond that subrogation

involves additional administrative costs because shifting the tort
payment from the plaintiff to the provider entails time and expense as
the plaintiff and provider determine the rights of the provider. 224
Defenders meet this response by arguments that the administrative costs
of subrogation are offset by increased success in achieving the goals of
fairness and deterrence.2 25 They also argue that eliminating the right of
subrogation would increase the costs paid by-and the premiums and
other payments necessary to pay for-private first party insurers,
workers' compensation carriers, and public health payment schemes.22 6
In addition, eliminating the right of subrogation by state legislation
would27 be unfair to plaintiffs where federal law has preempted the
2
area.

The tort reform movement has had considerable success in using
the political model to get legislatures to abolish or limit the collateral
source rule, and only about a third of the states still adhere to this
common law rule. 228 The states that have modified the rule 229 differ

accompanying text. In practice, the insurer may not receive full payment because the amount can be
reduced to reflect the plaintiffs costs in securing payment and, where a settlement is involved, the
reduction in amount of payment resulting from the acceptance of a lesser, but certain amount.
Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1259.
223. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 380, at 1058-59. Subrogation also helps reduce first party
insurance premiums. See id. at 1059.
224. See Helfend, 465 P.2d at 65 n.8, 67-68. As indicated supra note 222, the amount of
payment is subject to negotiation.
225. See supra notes 28-35, 221 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920A cmt. b (1977) (discussing punishment and, by reference to section 901, deterrence).
226. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 380, at 1059; Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1260.
227. See, e.g., Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that New Jersey's anti-subrogation statute was preempted by ERISA). Some state statutes
eliminating the collateral source rule provide that the elimination does not apply to federal programs
with a federal statutory right or duty to seek subrogation. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1303.508(d)(4) (West Supp. 2005).
228. The following states still have the rule: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (West 2006); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 351-63 (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 490.715 (West 1996 & Supp. 2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-35 (2000 & Supp. 2006); Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 776-77 (Kan.
1993); O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995); Weir v. Gasper, 459 So. 2d 655,
658 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980); McConal Aviation,
Inc. v. Commercial Aviation Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 133, 136 (N.M. 1990); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d
734, 738 (N.C. 1987); Maguire v. Licht, No. C.A. PC1000-3391, 2001 WL 1006060, at *7-8 (R.I.
Super. 2001); Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 144-45 (S.C. 2004); Jurgensen v. Smith, 611
N.W.2d 439, 442 (S.D. 2000); Scottsdale Ins. Co v. Nat'l Emergency Servs., 175 S.W.3d 284, 300
(Tex. App. 2004); Hall v. Miller 465 A.2d 222, 227 (Vt. 1983); Gamick v. Teton County Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 39 P.3d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 2002). A Nevada statute modifying the rule was repealed by
initiative and referendum in 2004. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.020-.021 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp.
2005).
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widely in terms of details concerning the extent of the change and how
the change is implemented. More specifically, there is wide variation in
whether only some benefits will be affected by the modification of the
rule and if so, which benefits,2 30 in whether evidence of collateral
benefits is admissible where a right of subrogation exists, 231 and in
whether subrogation will be barred.232 The impact of the change has also
been limited by the choice of some states to eliminate the collateral
benefits rule only for some claims-e.g., only for products liability or
for medical malpractice.2 33 There is also disagreement about the process
of trial in terms of whether the evidence of collateral benefits is admitted
for jury consideration 234 or is used solely by the judge to calculate a final

229. The following indicates the states that have modified the rule: ALA. CODE § 6-5-545
(2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 985 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52225a (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205.1 (West 2003);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.14 (West 1998); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(f) (LexisNexis
2002 & Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9941-17(2)(a) (West 2006); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-308 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819
(LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545 (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.20,
2323.41 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1D (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 31.580 (2005); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2926-119 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (West
1992); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth
Hosp.-Mayo Health Sys. 700 N.W.2d 201, 208-09 (Wis. 2005). Though the adoption of legislation
in response to the tort reform movement is a relatively recent development, legislatures have
occasionally modified the rule in the past. See, e.g., MARC H. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN, &
MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 783 (8th ed. 2006)
(discussing 1895 Massachusetts statute abolishing rule in suits against railroads for property
damage). Courts have also modified the rule in some situations. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Dinger, 524
A.2d 366, 378 (N.J. 1987) (abrogating "water company's immunity for losses caused by the
negligent failure to maintain adequate water pressure for fire fighting only to the extent of claims
that are uninsured for underinsured").
230. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508(d) (West Supp. 2006) (excluding life
insurance and certain government programs from collateral source provisions).
231. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5(1) (2002). The reason for this concern is that
otherwise a plaintiff could be forced to pay the insurance company even though the plaintiff did not
receive any money for the loss covered by the benefit. Some states allow the plaintiff to introduce
evidence of obligation to repay. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (West 1992).
232. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508(c) (West Supp. 2006) (barring rights of
subrogation).
233. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-520 (2005) (abrogating rule for medical expenses related to
products liability cases); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a) (West 2005) (modifying rule for
medical malpractice cases).
234. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-1(b) (2000).
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damages amount after the jury renders a verdict amount for the
plaintiff.2 35 Finally, there is considerable variation in whether and how a
plaintiff's payment of premiums for a benefit should be considered.2 36
2. Joint and Several Liability
Where two or more wrongdoers ("tortfeasors") caused a plaintiffs
injury, the common law imposed joint and several liability on them as
joint tortfeasors. This traditional scheme of liability has several
important features. First, as a matter of procedure, a plaintiff may elect
to sue one, some, or all joint tortfeasors in one suit or in separate suits
against individual tortfeasors 37 Second, though a plaintiff can only get
one full recovery for his injury, each tortfeasor is liable for the full
amount of plaintiffs loss. 238 Because each tortfeasor is liable for all the
damages under the traditional scheme, the verdict for damages in a suit
with multiple defendants does not allocate shares of fault among the
defendants. Third, a joint tortfeasor who paid the judgment could not
compel any of the other joint tortfeasors to pay him a share of the
judgment. 239 This third feature of the rule has been changed by statute or
by case law in most jurisdictions, and the wrongdoer who has paid the
judgment to the plaintiff can now seek "contribution" from other joint
tortfeasors. 240 Though the right of contribution was an improvement for
the defendant who paid the judgment, it has two shortcomings from the
perspective of this defendant because the paying defendant bears: (1) the
burden of seeking contribution; and (2) the risk that the required
contribution from another tortfeasor might be uncollectible.
The doctrine of joint and several liability has been defended on the
ground that the disadvantages placed on joint tortfeasors were fair
because they were wrongdoers and the injured plaintiff was innocent.2 4'
This description was accurate when any negligence, no matter how
slight, totally barred the plaintiff from recovery. However, this
description no longer applies because nearly all jurisdictions now have

235. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2005).
236. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308(2)(a) (2005) (cost of securing collateral source
benefit for five years prior to the incident); MINN. CODE ANN. § 548.36 (West 2000) (requiring the
court to determine the cost of collateral source for two years prior to incident); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.20(B) (LexisNexis 2005) (allowing a plaintiff to introduce evidence of any amount
paid or contributed).
237. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 170, at 413.
238. See id.
239. Id. § 386, at 1078.
240. Id. § 386, at 1078-79; id. § 387, at 1080.
241. See, e.g., Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. 1978).
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comparative fault, 24 2 which may allow an at-fault plaintiff to get partial
recovery in tort. Thus, it is not surprising, first, that changing the
doctrine of joint and several liability can be viewed as a reform both in
terms of traditional tort reform and the tort reform movement, and
second, that some states changed the rule before the tort reform
movement gained momentum.24 3 Nor is it surprising that traditional joint
and several liability, even with a right of contribution, is no longer the
majority rule in the United States; only ten states now follow the
doctrine. 2 4
Reforming the rule of joint and several liability initially appears
easy because of the intuitive appeal of simply substituting a rule that
each defendant should be liable only for his percentage of fault.
However, reform is actually far more challenging because defining and
measuring "fault" are complicated tasks. 245 Moreover, many
jurisdictions use thresholds in comparative fault, and bar recovery in
some states if a plaintiffs fault exceeds 50% or, in other states, if the
plaintiffs fault is 50% or more.246 In a state with this arrangement, a
threshold approach has appeal in addressing a replacement approach for
joint and several liability-for example, by retaining joint and several
liability unless the defendant's share of fault is less than 50%.247 Finally,
drafting a new rule presents intertwined substantive and procedural
problems. Substantive issues include whether and how plaintiffs and
defendants will share the problem of an uncollectible judgment, how to
determine if a joint tortfeasor's share is uncollectible, and whether there
will be exceptions to the abolition of joint and several liability. Both
procedure and substance become involved in determining whether and
how a defendant can join another defendant-who will then bear a
percentage of fault-as a party to the suit, 248 whether nonparty
wrongdoers can be allocated a share of the fault, 249 and how to

242.

See supra notes 119, 135 and accompanying text.

243.

However, there is no universal agreement on whether the adoption of comparative fault

necessitates abolition of joint and several liability. Compare, e.g., Laubach, 588 P.2d at 1075
(holding that the adoption of comparative fault abolishes joint and several liability), with Am.
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978) (finding no abolition).

Moreover, traditional reform and "tort reform" may not necessarily make the same change. See
supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
244. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 119.
247. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(A) (Supp. 2005). For similar schemes, see infra

note 256 and accompanying text.
248.
249.

See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
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implement the approach where a joint tortfeasor is immune, is subject to
a dollar limit on liability, has settled prior to trial, or is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court.25 °
Because of this complexity, the states have varied widely in terms
of the scheme used to replace joint and several liability. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, which was adopted in
1999, identifies six approaches used in the states: 25' (1) retain common
law doctrine of joint and several liability (ten states),252 (2) retain joint
253
and several liability unless the plaintiff was also at fault (two states);
(3) adopt pure several liability based on percentages of fault (eighteen
states),254 (4) adopt comparative fault and reallocate uncollectible share
255
from any defendant by percentage of fault of all parties (five states),
(5) retain joint and several liability but apply it only to a defendant
whose share of fault exceeds some threshold percentage (twelve
states), 25 6 and (6) retain joint and several liability but only for economic
250. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
251.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17, cmt. a (1999). The

counts for each category in the text above are based on 2005, not 1999, the date of the adoption of
the Restatement.
252. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 31403, 3-1404 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § I (West 2000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § IB-3 (2005); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9317 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-6
(1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (2000); Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So. 2d 990, 992 (Ala. 1985);
Great Am. Assurance Co. v. Fisher Controls Int'l, No. Civ.A. 02C-05-168 JR, 2003 WL 21901094
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2003); Bd. of Educ. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796, 802
(W. Va. 1990).
253. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 23, § 15(D) (West Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.070(1)(b) (West 2005).
254. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (2003); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-55-201 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(1) (West 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-33(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803(3) (2004); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-51-2-5 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1994 & Supp. 2006); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.182 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324(B) (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7
(West Supp. 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(4) (LexisNexis 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 413A-I (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (2000 &
Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(e) (2005);
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992).
255. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.6304 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-e (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610 (2005).
256. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 2005); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (West
2003 & Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.067 (West Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:155.3 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22
(LexisNexis 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(A) (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-8-15.1

(Supp. 2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997).
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harm, as opposed to noneconomic harm (three states).257 There is also
considerable overlap among and variation within the alternatives to joint
and several liability. 258 For example, schemes that initially allocate
among defendants on the basis of percentage of fault must address the
issue of which tortfeasors are included in the allocation. Two possible
answers are: allocating among parties only, and allocating among all
wrongdoers, including nonparties.2 59 Where only parties are included in
the allocation, a state must determine whether party defendants have a
right to join nonparty wrongdoers.2 6 ° Where nonparties are included in
the allocation, will there be an exception for some wrongdoers, such as
the plaintiffs employer who would be immune on the basis of the
doctrine of workers' compensation exclusivity, which generally bars an
injured employee from suing his employer? 261 Another reason for
variation is that schemes that reallocate an uncollectible share must
define "uncollectible" for purposes of reallocation and provide a system
for reallocation. 262 There is substantial agreement in the schemes
257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (Deering Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,185.10 (LexisNexis 2004).
258. For example, the Oklahoma scheme provides that joint and several liability applies if: (l)
plaintiff is not at fault; or (2) the defendant's share of fault exceeds 50%. OKLA. STAT. tit 23, § 15
(West Supp. 2006). The Florida statute combines: (1) retention of joint and several liability where
the plaintiff is not at fault; (2) no joint and several liability unless the defendant is more than 10% at
fault; and (3) joint and several liability for economic damage, based on a sliding scale in terms of
defendant's percentage of fault and the amount of economic damage. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81
(West 2005).
259. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-7 (West 1999) (allocating among parties and
nonparties), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(6)(c)(3) (2006) (allocating among parties only).
Courts have disagreed about the constitutionality of allocating a share of fault to a nonparty. See,
e.g., Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 927 P.2d 1011, 1016-18 (Mont. 1996) (striking down
earlier Montana scheme that allowed nonparty allocation); Haffv. Hettich, 593 N.W.2d 383, 389-90
(N.D. 1999) (upholding nonparty allocation).
260. See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 875 (Kan. 1978) (holding that defendants may
join joint tortfeasors).
261. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-38, -39 (2002 & Supp. 2006) (including immune
parties unless fault of all immune persons is less than 40%, in which case share of immune persons
is shared by all at fault nonimmune persons); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(1) (West 2005)
(excluding entities immune from liability, such as employer within workers' compensation scheme).
For further discussion of workers compensation, see, for example, LARSON, supra note 98,
§ 100.01; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C20 (1999). The reason
for this bar is that workers' compensation is viewed as based on the following quid pro quo
exchange: The worker receives guaranteed payments for injuries (though at a lower rate than in tort)
and the employer receives the benefit of an immunity from tort liability. LARSON, supra note 98,
§ 100.01[l]. However, the employee can sue a third party like a product manufacturer that sold a
workplace machine with a design defect that caused the employee's injury. See, e.g., S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 42-1-550, -560 (1985). For discussion of suits for subrogation by third parties against the
employer, see LARSON, supra note 98, §§ 121.01-.09.
262. See. e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610(3) (2005).
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modifying joint and several liability on some points, particularly the
following: (1) certain actions still involve joint and several liabilitye.g., intentional tortfeasors and persons acting in concert; 263 and (2)
vicarious liability doctrines like respondeat superior are not affectedi.e., the employer and employee are treated as a single party. 26
3. Noneconomic Damages
Under the traditional common law scheme, the amount of damages
for noneconomic injuries, which include such things as pain and
suffering, mental distress, and loss of enjoyment of life, is typically
determined by the jury based on the evidence at trial. Though trial
judges have the discretionary power to use a special verdict form that
contains separate amounts for economic damages and for noneconomic
damages, 265a common practice is to have a general verdict that
combines both types of compensatory damages in a single figure unless
a party requests a special verdict. 266 Where a general verdict is used,
there is no way to know the amount of noneconomic damages. In order
to assure that the amount of compensatory damages is supported by the
evidence, the amount is subject to review by the trial judge and the
appellate court. When a party files a motion challenging the amount of a
verdict, the trial judge must review the damages awarded by the jury and
decide if the damages are: (1) reasonable, in which case the motion is
denied; (2) merely inadequate or excessive, in which case a new trial nisi
remittitur (decreasing the amount of damages) or new trial nisi additur
(increasing the amount of damages) is granted; 267 or (3) so grossly
inadequate or excessive that they are the result of passion, caprice or
263. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803(5) (2004) (applying joint and several liability to
parties acting in concert); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(C)(3)(a), -(F) (Supp. 2005) (applying joint
and several liability to parties acting in concert and intentional acts); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §§ 12, 15 (1999) (same).
264. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 2005) (applying joint and several
liability where person is acting as agent or servant); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 13 (1999). Respondeat superioris discussed supranote 52.

265.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text for discussion of types of damages.

266.

RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 251-52 (2003).

267. As indicated in the text, there are two types of new trial nisi. First, if the verdict is "merely
inadequate" or "merely insufficient" based on the evidence, a new trial nisi additur is granted.
Second, if the trial court determines that the jury's verdict is "merely excessive" based on the
evidence, a new trial nisi remittitur is granted. In either case, the trial judge gives a dollar figure

believed to be a fair verdict and designed to be a fair settlement of the dispute. The refusal of the
party prevailed against on the motion to accept the proposed dollar amount results in a new trial.
The litigation is ended if the parties accept this proposed dollar amount. For discussion of this
scheme in terms of a particular state, see F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH
CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 550-55 (3d ed. 2004).
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prejudice, in which case a new trial is granted. If there is an appeal of
any of these rulings, the appellate court reviews the record to determine
if the trial court has abused its discretion-i.e., to determine whether the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record and whether it
accords with applicable legal doctrine.
Critics of granting recovery for noneconomic damages in this way
have used the rational model of tort reform to make the following fourpart argument: (1) even though pain and mental trauma are "real" injury
costs, these noneconomic injuries have no equivalent dollar value that
will "fix" or "replace" these psychic injuries; (2) money (regardless of
amount) cannot really "compensate;" (3) because there is no measure for
noneconomic harm, the amount of awards is erratic and unpredictable;
and (4) recovery for noneconomic damages should, therefore, be limited
or abolished.268 The tort reform movement has bolstered this reasoning
for limiting noneconomic damages by arguing that damages for
noneconomic injuries are said to be "erratic" and "excessive" because
juries are too generous in awarding noneconomic damages based on
sympathy for a plaintiff elicited by skillful plaintiffs' attorneys.2 69 In
addition, limits on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases
268. See Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General
Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489,
493-512 (2006) (reviewing empirical studies, arguments, and proposals for reform). One of the best
known early proponents of this view is Louis Jaffe, who argued that, in a world of widespread
insurance and "enterprise liability" (which he mistakenly assumed was likely to characterize tort
law), damages for noneconomic injuries, particularly past injuries, should not be recoverable, except
perhaps for "a consolation, a solatium," because "neither past pain nor its compensation has any
consistent economic significance." Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of
Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224 (1953). For discussion of enterprise liability, see
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. For more recent arguments concerning the lack of an
economic equivalent for noneconomic loss, see, for example, STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 133-35 (1987); Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent,
Incalculable, Incomensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
253 (2006); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort
Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004); see also Priest, supra note 1, at 1546-47 (arguing that lack of
first party insurance for noneconomic harm indicates the view that money does not "compensate"
for noneconomic harm). Some of the recent arguments refine Jaffe's arguments against
noneconomic damages in the context of a scheme imposing "enterprise liability" on an actor that is
able to spread losses. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be
Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 262 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 408 (1988). However, as indicated supra notes
50-51 and accompanying text, enterprise liability is a questionable doctrine when adopted by a court
and does not characterize a substantial area of tort law.
269. See, e.g., ATRA: Noneconomic Damages Reform, http://www.atra.org/issues/
index.php?issue=7340 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the
Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment ", 54 S.C. L. REV.
47,48-49 (2002).
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are claimed to be necessary as a way to reduce malpractice insurance
premiums and maintain access to healthcare.2 7 °
Opponents of limitations on noneconomic damages have a response
to each of the arguments. First, because the pain and mental trauma from
things like serious incapacitation, dismemberment, disfigurement or loss
of a child in a horrible accident are real injuries, the payment of
substantial sums is necessary for three reasons: (1) to provide adequate
deterrence of wrongful conduct; 271 (2) to provide at least some
meaningful measure of compensation for horrible, tragic losses; 272 and
(3) to provide more equitable treatment to some classes of people-e.g.,
women, children, and the elderly-who tend to have a lesser amount of
certain types of economic damages than, for example, middle-aged men,
who generally have a higher amount of lost income.2 73 Second, jury
verdicts are neither erratic nor excessive because they are subject to
control by such things as rules of evidence, judicial guidance through
instructions from the trial judge, and judicial review-at the trial level
and at the appellate level-as to whether the amount of damages is
supported by the evidence.274 Third, there is little reason to think that
Liability
Reform,
http://www.atra.org/issues/
e.g.,
ATRA:
Medical
270. See,
index.php?issue=7338 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (arguing that in order "[t]o help bring a degree of
predictability and fairness to the civil justice system that is critical to solving the growing medical
access and affordability crisis," it is necessary to adopt several reforms, including "a $250,000 limit
on noneconomic damages"); The White House, Medical Liability, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/infocus/medicalliability/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (supporting limit of $250,000).
271. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1097, 1097-99, 1112-13 (2003); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV.
773, 804-10 (1995) (stressing deterrent role and urging the use of the ex ante approach to
determining amount of noneconomic damages).
272. For arguments that money damages do compensate in some way, see, for example, Steven
P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs ofAccidents: Pain-and-SufferingDamages in
Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1818-22 (1995); Feldman, supra note 7, 1585-89 (arguing that
compensation for noneconomic harm is necessary to restore victim's ability to "flourish"); Richard
N. Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 502 (1982) ("Ten units of pain is still ten units
of pain, but it will be easier to bear in Bermuda."). For an argument that noneconomic damages
have an important symbolic value as society's recognition of the importance of plaintiff's loss even
if they do not restore the status quo ante, see Margaret Jane Radin, Essay, Compensation and
Commensurability,43 DuKE L.J. 56, 69-86 (1993).
273. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Jacqueline Ross, Will States Protect Us, Equally,from Damage Caps in Medical
MalpracticeLegislation?, 30 IND. L. REV. 575, 594 (1997). For discussion of review of verdicts by
trial judges, see supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text. There is some empirical support for the
argument that jury verdicts are not erratic. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, EmpiricalEvidence on the Deep
Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awardsfor Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE
L.J. 217, 260-61 (1993); Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1235-45; Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for
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limitations will increase access to healthcare. 275 Even if there were such
an increase, it is unjust to subsidize medical malpractice premium costs
in order to increase access by forcing the most severely injured victims
of medical malpractice to forego part of the compensation necessary to
"make them whole. 276
Assessing these competing positions by the standards of the rational
model is difficult for three reasons. First, the data on verdicts are limited,
particularly given the widespread use of the general verdict, which
combines economic and noneconomic damages and thus restricts the
data on the amounts of noneconomic damages involved in tort cases.277
Second, even if better data were available, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to determine whether there is a pattern of awarding "erratic"
or "excessive" amounts of noneconomic damages. Given the procedures
in place to prevent jury excess and given that studies of jury behavior do
not indicate any pattern of erratic behavior,27 8 it seems plausible to think
that erratic jury behavior is rare. On the other hand, given the lack of an
objective measure of the money value of pain, it is also plausible to
think conscientious fair-minded juries would vary enormously in setting
a dollar value on a plaintiffs psychic harm. 279 Third, the imposition of
limitations on noneconomic damages raises the question of how much
compensation is needed for noneconomic damages rather than the issue
of whether any noneconomic damages should be compensated. Because
Medical Malpracticeand Post- Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 278-

99 (1998) (discussing data showing strong downward impact as a result of postverdict review of
jury awards of noneconomic damages). There is also evidence to show verdicts are erratic. See, e.g.,
Abel, supra note 268, at 291-303 (presenting evidence and arguments to show that awards are
erratic and unpredictable); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Painand Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 919-27 (1989).
275. See infra notes 519-21 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Coming Down to Earth: Why Rights-based Theories of
Tort Can and Must Address Cost-basedProposalsfor Damages Reform, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 469,

485 (2006).
277. Some jurisdictions require separate verdicts. Data from three of these jurisdictions
(California, Florida, and New York) provide reason to believe that noneconomic damages constitute
about 50-60% of total awards in many instances of personal injury. See Vidmar et al., supra note
274, at 296. However, there is considerable variation in terms of specifics. For example, a study of
the impact of California's $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages indicated wide variation in
noneconomic damages as a percentage of total awards. For example, "[w]hile the overall percentage
of non-economic awards is [forty-two] percent of the aggregate awards originally granted by juries
in all cases, as total award size increases, the proportion of non-economic damages decreases,
except in death cases." NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 19-20 (2004) [hereinafter
CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS].

278. See supra notes 265-67, 274 and accompanying text.
279. See Abel, supra note 268, at 291-97.
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money for pain and mental trauma cannot literally restore the plaintiff to
status quo ante, the issue of how much to compensate in order to address
the goals of tort law is more complex than determining whether to award
some compensation. Ultimately, the issue of how much is adequate,
rather than inadequate or excessive, may not be answerable in any
precise manner.
Given the lack of data concerning the amount of compensation for
noneconomic damages and the challenges of determining how much to
compensate for psychic harm, it is not surprising that the states have
adopted widely varying approaches to limiting noneconomic damages.
The only area of agreement seems to be that limitations on the maximum
amount recoverable are the way to reform awards of noneconomic
damages.2 80 This agreement may reflect the political reality that the tort
reform movement has included these limitations in its legislative agenda.
Except for this agreement that, if reform is needed, limitations are the
way to reform this area of damages, the states have varied widely in their
approaches.
About half the states have no limitations on noneconomic damages
except for miscellaneous restrictions. Many of these states have never
enacted legislation. 281 Four of these have explicit constitutional
prohibitions of limitations.2 82 Some legislative limits have been declared
280. For example, as an alternative to using limits, a schedule based on nature of injury could
be used. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 274, at 938-76; see generally Frederick S. Levin,
Note, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Curefor Damages Measurement "Anomie ", 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 303 (1989) (describing how to develop guidelines for determining pain and suffering
damages and explaining how these guidelines will be effective); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors
Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 763 (1995) (proposing guiding juries
by reference to types of injury and ranges of awards for each type). Though there are problems with
a scheduling approach, it would avoid a basic problem with limitations-i.e., only reducing the
recovery of the most severally injured. Limitations also permit the challenged characteristics ofjury
determination of noneconomic damages, like variability and uncertainty, to continue to exist for
verdicts within the limit. Adopting schedules would involve difficulties. However, a full
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of schedules is beyond the scope of this Article. The
point in terms of the text above is that alternatives like schedules are not considered by legislatures
while limitations are not only considered but also adopted. The only schedule-type approach used in
legislation is to vary the limit upward in cases of severe physical injury. See infra notes 287, 290,
301 and accompanying text.
281. These states include the following: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming. Cf
Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of FederalCaps in Medical MalpracticeLiability Actions: Will
They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REv. 417, 431-58 (2004) (showing, in
a survey of how the states treat caps on damages in medical malpractice cases, these states as having
no cap damages in medical malpractice cases, and discussing those states that have caps on
noneconomic damages specifically).
§ 18; WYO. CONST. art.
§ 31; KY. CONST. § 54; PA. CONST. art. III,
282. ARIZ. CONST. art. I1,
X, § 4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/4

60

Hubbard: The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement
2006]

THE "TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT

unconstitutional, and some caps on noneconomic damages have been
upheld.2 83
About ten states have enacted general legislation limiting
noneconomic damages in personal injury actions, 28 4 but these limitations
vary enormously. For example, they vary in absolute amount, ranging
from $250,000 to $1,000,000,285 and in terms of the method of
computation of the amount-e.g., determining the amount of the limit
by: (1) an absolute figure, or (2) the greater of an absolute figure or a
figure based on some variable measure-such as the greater of $400,000
or life expectancy years multiplied by $8,000.216 There is also a wide
variation in the treatment of such things as severe disfigurement or
288
physical impairment, 287 particular torts (like intentional torts),
wrongful death, 289 or some other "justification" for exceeding the

283. For cases striking limitations, see, for example, Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.
2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1232-33, 1237 (N.H. 1991); Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 728 (Wash. 1989); Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701
N.W.2d 440, 447, 491 (Wis. 2005) (holding limits on all medical malpractice claims
unconstitutional, though limits on wrongful death medical malpractice claims constitutional). For
cases upholding limitations, see, for example, Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 66869 (Cal. 1985); Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 905, 907 (Colo. 1993); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (Ind. 1980); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard
Univ., 607 So. 2d 517, 521 (La. 1992); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 899900, 908 (Mo. 1992). For discussion of constitutional challenges to limits on noneconomic
damages, see generally Ross, supra note 274; Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Annotation, Validity and
Construction of State Statutory Provisions Relating to Limitations on Amount of Recovery in
Medical Malpractice Claim and Submission of Such Claim to Pretrial Panel, 80 A.L.R.3d 583
(1977).

284. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West
2005 & Supp. 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (LexisNexis 2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61603 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 11-108 (LexisNexis 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2005);
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006). Many states have
more narrowly focused limitations. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203(1)(a) (2004) (wrongful
death claims).
285. Compare, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (2004) (imposing a cap of $250,000 for
noneconomic damages), with FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2003) (imposing a cap of $500,000 for
noneconomic damages as against medical practitioners, and $1,000,000 if the injury resulted in
persistent vegetative state or death).
286. ALASKA. STAT. § 09.17.010(b) (2004) (providing, except for cases involving severe
permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement, cap of the greater of $400,000 and the life
expectancy of the beneficiary times $8,000).
287. See, e.g., id. § 09.17.010(c) (imposing cap of the greater of life expectancy times $25,000
or $1,000,000 for permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement).
288. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603(4)(a) (2004) (exempting a cap for willful, reckless,
or felonious conduct).
289. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483(1) (West 1996) (raising cap from
$280,000 to $500,000 if death or permanent loss of vital bodily function); id. § 600.6304(l).
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amount. 29 0 The approaches also vary in terms of whether the limit is
applicable to each occurrence, to each claimant, to each claim, or to each
defendant 29 1 and of whether the limit is automatically adjusted for
inflation and if so, how it is adjusted.292
Twenty-two states have legislation with limitations on
noneconomic damages applicable to medical malpractice actions.293 As
the following six examples illustrate, these focused limitations vary
considerably: (1) some states limit the amount of noneconomic damages
because they have adopted a cap for both economic and noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions; 294 (2) the states vary in their
approach to multiple claims or multiple defendants; 295 (3) the amount of
the limit on noneconomic damages varies from $250,000 to $500,000;296
(4) the states vary in their approach to inflation; 297 (5) some states allow

290. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (West 2005) (imposing cap of
S250,000 unless court finds justification by clear and convincing evidence for cap of $500,000).
291. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ lI-108(a)(2)(i), (b)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis
2002) (imposing cap of $500,000 per beneficiary, $700,000 per occurrence).
292. See, e.g., id. (increasing cap by $15,000 per annum beginning the year after passage of the
statute).
293. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2004 & Supp. 2005); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.118(2), (4) (West 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-13-1(b) (Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West 1998) (imposing cap on both
economic and noneconomic damages); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.42-.43 (2001 & Supp.
2006) (imposing cap on both economic and noneconomic damages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 60H (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-60 (West Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West Supp. 2000 & Supp. 2006); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2825 (LexisNexis 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-5-6 to -7 (West 2003) (imposing cap on both economic and noneconomic damages);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.IF (West Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (Supp. 2005);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2004 & Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (imposing cap on both economic and noneconomic
damages); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006). Alaska, Colorado, and
Ohio also have a general limit on noneconomic damages. See supranote 284.
294. See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2004) (imposing cap on total damages of
$1,000,000).
295. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1996) (imposing cap, per occurrence of
$500,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2005) (imposing cap of $500,000 per
beneficiary, which can rise to $1,000,000 for multiple beneficiaries); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220
(Supp. 2005) (imposing cap of $350,000 per claimant for single healthcare institution; cap of
$350,000 per claimant per healthcare provider; and cap of $1,050,000 per claimant for any
combination of healthcare institutions and healthcare providers).
296. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2005) (cap of $250,000), with N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-42-02 (1996) (cap of $500,000).
297. See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. § 13-64-302(l)(c) (2004) (raising, by legislation, limit from
$250,000 to $300,000 to "reflect an adjustment for inflation"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(F)
(Supp. 2005) (adjusting cap yearly based on consumer price index).
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increased recovery for "special" cases, such as wrongful death, 298
especially egregious conduct like recklessness, 299 -perhaps by a
showing of clear and convincing evidence- 30 0 or substantial injuries
like brain damage, spinal cord injury, severe injury to reproductive
301
system, or loss of cognitive ability that eliminates ability to live alone;
and (6) some states apply the limit only to certain types of medical care,
such as obstetrics.30 2
4.

Punitive Damages
a.

Current Common Law and Constitutional Law
Framework

Under the generally followed common law approach, a plaintiff can
receive punitive damages if the defendant's conduct was especially
wrongful-for example, reckless, intentional, or malicious. 303 These
damages are in excess of the amount needed to compensate the plaintiff
and are imposed as punishment for the defendant's egregious conduct.
As with any punishment, punitive damages serve two purposesdeterrence and corrective justice, which is sometimes referred to as
retribution. 304 From a deterrence perspective, punitive damages are
necessary where compensatory damages are not sufficient to provide
298. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2002) (raising
cap of $350,000 to $500,000 in wrongful death and personal injury actions).
299. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-32-220(E) (Supp. 2005) (imposing no limit where "grossly
negligent, willful, wanton, or reckless" conduct was the proximate cause, defendant engaged in
fraud or misrepresentation related to the claim, or defendant destroyed medical records to avoid the
claim).
300. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (2005) (increasing the cap from
$250,000 to $500,000 if there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-1708.IF(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (lifting cap in cases where judge finds by clear
and convincing evidence that defendant was negligent).
301. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1996) (raising cap of $280,000 to
$500,000 if claimant has suffered brain damage, spinal cord damage, damage to reproductive
system which prevents procreation or damage to cognitive ability which prevents living alone).
302. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.IF(A)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006)
(limiting noneconomic damages in cases involving pregnancy to $300,000).
303. See I GHIARDI ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 5.01-.03. RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.2, at 90-97 (2005 ed.); DOBBS,
supra note 3, § 381, at 1062; Owen, supra note 35, at 364; cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1993) (holding that "egregiously tortious conduct" standard "in West
Virginia and elsewhere" satisfies due process). There are exceptions to this pattern. For example,
the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practice Act allows treble damages, which means actual damages
are trebled so that the total award is one-third actual damages and two-thirds punitive damages for
negligent violations. See S.C. CODE §§ 39-5-140(a), (d) (1985).
304. See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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adequate deterrence. In any deterrence scheme, the amount of the cost
imposed on a wrongdoer may vary in terms of factors other than the
amount of injury to a particular victim. For example, deterrence schemes
generally increase the punishment imposed on a wrongdoer in terms of
the seriousness of wrongdoing, of whether the wrongdoer is a recidivist,
of the likelihood of detection, and of the amount of profit from the
wrongdoing.3 °5 Punishment's retributive or corrective function requires
that wrongdoers receive their "just deserts., 30 6 Therefore, inefficient
overdeterrence may be tolerated because the negative impact of deterrent
sanctions on wrongdoers, particularly very culpable wrongdoers, is
treated as less important than
the concern for retribution for egregious
30 7
harm to innocent victims.

305. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438-39
(2001) (discussing "optimal deterrence" in terms of harm inflicted and likelihood of detection);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577, 582 (1996) (holding that "a recidivist may be
punished more severely than a first offender" and that higher ratios of punitive damages to
compensatory damages may "be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine"); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (approving Alabama scheme for imposing punitive
damages, which included consideration of concerns like "duration of [the] conduct, the defendant's
awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct," as well as
"profitability" of the conduct); cf, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (recognizing
that punishment schemes of increased penalties for recidivists are based on the "propensities [the
wrongdoer] has demonstrated over a period of time" and such increased punishment is permissible
because, in part, of a desire "to deter repeat offenders"); see also Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction
to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL

791, 844-45 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939). Three of the variables relevant to punishment in Bentham's
deterrence scheme are: (1)"The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense,
which it may be worthwhile to be at,
in the way of punishment"; (2) "Where two offenses come in
competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the
less"; and (3) The "punishment must not be less than. .. the profit of the offense." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
306. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 n.24 ("The principle that punishment should fit the crime
'is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence."' (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983))); id. at 582 (holding that "low awards of compensatory damages may
properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages").
307. Cooper Industries,Inc. notes:
[lit is not at all obvious that even the deterrent function of punitive damages can be
served only by economically "optimal deterrence." "[C]itizens and legislators may
rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to
deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally
offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration among many."
532 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and
Legal Pluralism,42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1450 (1993)).
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Even before the tort reform movement, three states did not allow
punitive damages except where authorized by law.3 °8 In addition, states
that permit a punitive award disagree on whether an entity like a
corporation should be liable for punitive damages if no management
official engaged in or ratified the egregious conduct,30 9 whether punitive
damages are insurable, 310 and whether an estate can recover for or be
liable for the decedent's egregious conduct. 31
Under the common law, there is no mathematical or strict monetary
limit on the amount of punitive damages.312 Instead, the award in each
case is based on the circumstances involved, and the process of trial and
appeal is designed to help insure both that a punitive award is
appropriate and that the amount is not excessive. At the trial stage,
punitive damages are always stated as a separate item in the verdict. 313 In
addition, it is not uncommon to bifurcate the trial into a liability phase
and a punitive damages phase so that evidence relevant only to punitive
314
damages will not be considered by the jury when determining liability.
Under this approach, the jury determines two issues in the first phase:
(1) whether the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and, if so,
the amount of those damages; and (2) whether the defendant has been
shown to be reckless, willful, or intentional, often by a standard of clear
and convincing evidence.3 15 If the answer to the second question is
"yes," a second phase will be undertaken so that the jury can determine
the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.316 The jury's decision to
grant or deny a punitive award and the amount of any award are subject
to review by the trial judge, who has the power to affirm the award,
reverse the award and require a new trial, or to reduce the award.3 17

308. See I GHIARDI ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 4.07-.11 (showing that the states are Louisiana,
Massachusetts and Nebraska).
309. Seeid., supra note 35, § 24.05.
310. See id., supra note 35, § 7.11; JOHN W. MORRISON, THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: COMMENT AND JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS 4 (2d ed. 1986).
311. See I GHIARDI ET AL., supra note 35, § 9.10.
312. See infra note 321.
313. James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 REV. LITIG.
419, 450 (1995).
314. See I GHIARDIET AL., supra note 35, §§ 12.01, .05, .13.
315. Seeid. §§9.12,21.13.
316. Id. § 12.10.
317. See, e.g., id. at §§ 18.01-.10. Technically, the trial judge can grant a remittitur reducing
the award. This grant gives the parties the choice of either accepting the reduction or appealing the
judge's decision. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text for discussion of remittitur.
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These decisions by the trial judge are reviewed by the appellate court to
insure that the trial judge has not abused his discretion.3 18
In the last fifteen years, the Court has imposed due process limits
on punitive awards. In terms of the conduct subject to punitive damages,
the Court has adopted a bright-line general rule: No state may impose
punitive damages for conduct that only affects another state. 319 The
Court has also addressed limits on the amount of punitive damages.
Under guidelines issued by the United States Supreme Court, the trial
judge must review the amount of an award of punitive damages to
determine if it satisfies due process by considering three factors: the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio of compensatory
damages to punitive damages, and the criminal and regulatory sanctions
for conduct like that engaged in by defendant. 320 The Supreme Court has
stressed that the application of these factors to a punitive damages award
varies widely in terms of the facts involved and that, therefore, there are
no rigid rules-for example, a rigid formula about the ratio of
compensatory damages to punitive damages.3 21 On the other hand, the
Court has also indicated that the ratio of punitive damages to actual
damages is an important variable in reviewing punitive awards and that
there is a presumption against very high, three digit ratios. 322A

318. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445-47 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (discussing the fact that the common law tradition was to leave the decision of
punitive damages within the province of the jury, and to use an abuse of discretion standard).
319. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) ("A State
cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.... Nor, as a
general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a
defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction."); BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
320. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 440; Gore, 517 U.S.
at 575-85.
321. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio
which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.... [T]here are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive
damages award may not surpass ... ").
322. See, e.g., id. at 425-26 ("Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios
in range of 500 to I .... [T]here is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-I ratio.");
Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 ("When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1 .. .the award must surely 'raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow."'). It is possible to rebut the presumption. TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1993), approved a punitive award that was 526
times as large as the actual damages award because of the potential for substantial harm to others
(and for gain to defendant) if the defendant's conduct was not deterred. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582,
noted:
[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in
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procedural limit imposed by the Supreme Court is that the trial judge's
decision concerning the punitive award will be reviewed de novo by the
appellate court-i.e., the appellate court will make its own independent
granting any presumption of validity to
review of the evidence without
323
judge.
trial
the
by
decision
the
b.

Reform Proposals

Studies of verdicts show that punitive awards are uncommon.3 24
Though many proponents of "reform" agree that awards of punitive
damages are relatively rare, 325 they criticize punitive damages on the
basis of the impact of the number of claims for punitive awards. For
example, ATRA argues that reform is necessary for the following
reasons:
[T]heir frequency and size have grown greatly in recent
years.... [and] they are routinely asked for today in civil lawsuits.
The difficulty of predicting whether punitive damages will be awarded
by a jury in any particular case, and the marked trend toward
astronomically large amounts when they are awarded, have seriously
and have led to wildly
distorted settlement and litigation processes
3 26
inconsistent outcomes in similar cases.
Depending on one's definition of "routine," there is support for
ATRA's assertions because there are data indicating that claims for
punitive damages are at least not exceptional. 3 7 Though there is some

which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine.
323. See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 431.
324. See, e.g., TRIALS AND VERDICTS, supra note 23, at 7; Denise E. Antolini, Punitive
Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive Damages
Judgments in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 207-08, 216 (2004) (presenting data to show
Hawaii awarded punitive damages in slightly greater than five percent of all damages judgments);
Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical
Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 387-88 (1999) (discussing data from urban county in Ohio
indicating no punitive awards in medical malpractice or products liability and that "[p]unitive
damages were much more common in business disputes"); Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive
Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 15, 19-20, 69; Eaton et al., supra
note 24, at 1094 (citing studies showing low percentages and moderate amounts of punitive
awards).
ATRA:
325. For example, ATRA agrees that "punitive damages awards are infrequent ....
Punitive Damages Reform, http://www.atra.org (follow "Issues" hyperlink then follow "Punitive
Damages Reform" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Punitive Damages Reform].
326. Id., see also TORT REFORM RECORD, supra note 215, at 17.
327. See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 324, at 222; Eaton et al., supra note 24, at 1094. Thomas
Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 181-82.
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support for ATRA's assertion that awards of punitive damages are
difficult to predict, there are also data indicating considerable
predictability. 8
In order to address these alleged problems with punitive damages,
several changes have been proposed. 329 First, ATRA argues that a strict
standard of "actual malice" by the defendant should be imposed as a
requirement for any punitive award; however, this term is not defined by
ATRA. 330 Apparently, the tort reform movement would prefer a standard
requiring an intent to cause harm to the specific victim or personal ill
will toward the specific victim. 331 Second, the plaintiff should be
required to show the egregious conduct by clear and convincing
evidence. 332 Third, there should be proportionality so that the
punishment fits the offense. 33 Fourth, federal legislation should be
adopted to address the problem of multiple punitive awards by different
states.334
Other aspects of punitive damages have been criticized and, to
some extent, addressed by traditional tort reform. 335 For example,
because compensatory damages are designed to make the plaintiff whole
Antolini, supra note 324, at 222, reviewed Hawaiian verdict data and summarized the data on
claiming of punitive damages as follows:
Of the three Hawaii systems, the federal court experienced the highest mean annual
request rate for punitive damages-43.52%, slightly higher than the annual mean of
37.14% for state courts, and three times higher than the CAAP ["Court Annexed
Arbitration Program" for smaller-value cases] annual mean of 15.47%. In short, punitive
damages claims are most often requested in the high-value federal court cases in Hawaii,
"often requested" (i.e. about one-third of the time) in Hawaii state courts, and not very
often sought in the lower-value CAAP cases. Thus, characterizing the tendency to
request punitives as either "routine" or as "exceptional" would exaggerate the data. The
best overall characterization is that punitive damages are "moderately often" requested in
Hawaii.
Eaton et al., supra note 24, at 1094, note that "[p]laintiffs sought punitive damages in 3763 of the
tort claims filed... but obtained punitive damages awards in only fifteen cases."
328. Thomas A. Eaton, David B. Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, The Effects of Seeking
Punitive Damages on the Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 343, 347-48 (2005)
(reviewing arguments and studies).
329. See Punitive Damages Reform, supranote 325.
330. See id.
331. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(5) (2005) (defining "malice" as "personal ill will
toward the claimant"). The statute also allows recovery of punitive damages if the defendant
engages in fraud or in willful or wanton conduct. Id. § 1D- 15(a).
332. Punitive Damages Reform, supra note 325.
333.

Id.

334. Id.
335. See, e.g., GHIARDI ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 21.01-21.22; OWEN, supra note 111,
§ 18.1,
at 1124-27 (discussing history of criticism); Owen, supra note 35, at 382-413 (discussing criticisms
and proposed reforms).
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336
again by restoring the plaintiff to status quo ante, punitive awards
have been criticized by traditional reformers as constituting a financial
windfall to plaintiffs.3 37 One approach to address this windfall is to
impose a scheme whereby part of the award is shared with the state so
that it becomes more like a fine.338 Generally, these schemes seek to
provide enough return to the plaintiff so that plaintiffs-and their
attorneys, who are paid on a contingency fee basis-will have an
339 Because this
adequate incentive to act as "private attorneys general.,
approach allows high punitive awards and has a minimal impact on the
incentives of plaintiffs, it has not often been urged by the tort reform
movement. For example, the ATRA website does not advocate this
change.
Critics of "reform" challenge the need for changing the law
concerning punitive damages. 340 For example, some argue that the
proponents' claims that punitive awards have "distorted settlement" or
have "led to wildly inconsistent outcomes" are speculative and
conclusory. 341 Instead, given the variation among cases, awards will
vary; and, this variation is not necessarily inconsistent, particularly in
342
The
light of the procedural scheme for reviewing punitive awards.

336. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145 (Ohio
2002); Scott Dodson, Note, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of Alaska's SplitRecovery Punitive Damages Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1345-51 (2000); Todd M. Johnson,
Comment, A Second Chance: A Proposalto Amend Missouri's Tort Victims' Compensation Fund,
67 UMKC L. REV. 637, 647-49 (1999); Clay R. Stevens, Comment, Split-Recovery: A
ConstitutionalAnswer to the Punitive Damage Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 857, 865 (1994).
338. See, e.g., Dardinger,781 N.E.2d at 145; Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort
Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 93
(1992); Dodson, supra note 337, at 1345.
339. See infra notes 374-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of using punitive
damages to assist law enforcement, see Owen, supranote 35, at 380-81.
340. See, e.g., Lori Woodward O'Connell, The Case for Continuing to Award Punitive
Damages,36 TORT & INS. L.J. 873, 874 (2001); Koenig, supra note 327, at 170.
341. Compare Punitive Damages Reform, supra note 325, with Eaton, Mustard & Talarico,
supra note 328, at 343, 347-49, 365 (reviewing studies, noting lack of empirical research, and
concluding that "there is little systemic evidence that the threat of punitive damages casts a large
shadow" on settlement negotiations). See also Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5-14; Steven Garber, Products Liability, Punitive
Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 250; Koenig, supra
note 327, at 170; Rustad, supra note 324, at 31, 56, 65.
342. See, e.g., Eaton, Mustard & Talarico, supra note 328, at 347-48, 365-66 (reviewing
studies showing predictability of punitive awards and noting that their study of Georgia verdicts
indicated that "punitive damages were awarded in a higher percentage of Georgia bench trials than
jury trials"); Koenig, supra note 327, at 207. But see generally Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi,
Punitive Damages: How Judges and JuriesPerform, 33 J.LEG. STUD. 1 (2004) (arguing that juries
award punitive damages more often than judges, award higher levels, and award punitive damages
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impact of potential punitive damages verdicts on settlement negotiations
will be the same as the impact of a potential compensatory verdict-i.e.,
both sides will consider the likelihood and possible amount of the
potential verdict of punitive damages in settlement negotiations.
However, such consideration is not a "distortion," regardless of whether
punitive damages or compensatory damages are involved, because
rational settlements should be based on the likely outcomes of
litigation.343 For example, even if punitive damages are "routinely asked
for" as ATRA claims, a rational defense attorney would discount this
request for punitive damages by reference to the fact that punitive
awards are rare. 344 Finally, given the uncertainty as to what constitutes
optimal deterrence, the concern for retribution indicates that erring in
favor of some overdeterrence is a good approach.345
Opponents also argue that the current system satisfies the concerns
of the reform movement. Virtually all states now require egregious
conduct. 346 Adopting a more specific standard that focuses on the
specific victim would allow wrongdoers who intentionally or recklessly
endanger "statistical victims" to avoid punitive damages-for example,
using fraudulent schemes that will result in substantial harm to only a
portion of users. Similarly, though change in some states may be needed,
proof by clear and convincing evidence is widely used as the standard.347
As to the need for federal legislation to address multiple awards by
different states, there is no such need because the Supreme Court has

with less relationship to punitive awards). Comparisons of judges and juries may be unreliable
because of choices made in choosing to forego the right to jury trial. See Joni Hersch, Demandfor a
Jury Trialand the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 119, 140 (2006).
343. See Eaton, Mustard & Talarico, supra note 328, at 366 (concluding that "a claim for
uncapped punitive damages impedes rather than coerces settlement" because trials where uncapped
punitive damages were involved were more common than trials where a cap was involved); Koenig,
supra note 327, at 208, 209. For a discussion on the policy implications of punitive damage caps,
see generally Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An
Economic Perspective,40 EMORY L.J. 303, 323-39 (1991).
344. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text. It may be that the reform movement has
allowed its rhetoric to distort its understanding of the facts and thus gives too high a premium to the
risk of punitive damages. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 162, at 751-52 (pointing out the risk that a
person who uses a deliberately misleading story may eventually be ."persuaded by his own story');
Garber, supra note 341, at 283 ("[C]ompany decisionmakers are likely to substantially overestimate
the frequency and magnitudes of punitive damages awards in automobile product liability cases.").
345. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
346. See supranote 303 and accompanying text. But see supra note 303 (discussing the right to
treble damages for negligent violations of a statutory scheme barring unfair trade practices).
347. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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clearly barred any state from imposing punitive damages for conduct
that only affects another state.348
c.

Impact of "Tort Reform" on Doctrine

Though various statutory provisions concerning punitive damages
have been adopted, it is hard to determine the impact of the reform
movement for two reasons. First, because some proposals are supported
by both the "tort reform" movement and by the traditional rational
approach to reform, it is sometimes difficult to determine the basis for
adopting a specific doctrine. Second, at other times, it is hard to
determine whether a change in the common law, as opposed to a
codification of the common law, has been proposed or adopted. In any
event, the statutes have addressed punitive damages in several different
ways.
First, though some statutes adopt a specific standard of liability for
imposing punitive damages, the legislation often simply restates the
common law standard of reckless, intentional, or malicious injury in
different words.3 49 Other statutes vary the common law standard by
requiring personal ill will or intentional harmful conduct directed toward
the plaintiff.350 Given the questionable effect of such provisions in terms
351
as in the case of
of conduct threatening only statistical victims,
marketing a drug known to be dangerous, this type of statute would
appear to be the result of the movement's efforts.
Second, "reform" statutes frequently contain procedural provisions
that either do not change the common law or merely change it slightly.
More specifically, a statute may do things like the following: (1) impose
a burden of proof requiring a standard of clear and convincing evidence
as to the required degree of culpability or the amount of punitive
damages 352 or, as in a few states, impose a burden of proof beyond a
353
reasonable doubt to show the requisite culpability or to provide a basis

for satisfying a scheme for avoiding a cap on the amount of punitive
damages; 354 (2) require bifurcation of the compensatory damages and
See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 (2004) (providing that a plaintiff must prove
"oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct").
348.

350. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-5(5) (2005). The statute also permits recovery of punitive
damages if the defendant engages in fraud or in willful or wanton conduct. Id. at § ID-1 5(a).
351. See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 (2004) (requiring that culpability be proved by clear
and convincing evidence).
353. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 2005).
354. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(D)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 2006).
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punitive damages phases of trial in all cases, or at the request of a
party; 356 and (3) structure the imposition of punitive damages by
addressing the charge to the jury357 and the review of a punitive award
359
358
by the trial judge and appellate courts.

Third, various statutory schemes have been adopted to limit the
amount of punitive damages, either in terms of a fixed limit, 360 or of a

variable limit based on a specific factor or list of factors. Where a
variable limit is imposed, it can vary in terms of factors like the
following: (1) a fixed multiple of compensatory damages;361 (2) the
lesser or greater of a fixed amount or a variable amount-for example,
the lesser or greater of (A) a multiple of compensatory or (B) a
percentage of the wealth or income of the defendant or profitability of
the misconduct; 362 (3) different types of defendants-for example,
differing treatment for small businesses or for defendants based on their
net worths; 363 (4) different types of injuries (e.g., wrongful death) or
claims (e.g., products liability); 364 and (5) different types of
misconduct-for example, crime or conduct motivated by financial gain
where adverse consequences are known.36 5 Where limits are imposed,
there may be exclusions from the limits-for example, there might be no

355. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(a) (2004).
356. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-21 1(a)(1) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 2315.21 (B) (LexisNexis 2005).
357. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.01 l(a) (Vernon 1997).
358. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-23(b) (2005).
359. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-210 (2005).
360. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (West 2005) (limiting punitive
damages to $250,000, unless the court finds justification by clear and convincing evidence to
support a higher amount; in no case to exceed $500,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West 1999)
(limited to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $50,000).
361. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.505(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (double
compensatory damages).
362. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e)-(f) (Supp. 2006) (cap of lesser of defendant's
maximum annual income for any one of the past five years or $5,000,000; or where the defendant
realizes or will realize a profit, up to one and a half times that profit).
363. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2005) (lesser of $10,000,000 or three percent
of defendant's net worth); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (D)(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (two times
compensatory or if "defendant is a small employer or individual," the lesser of two times
compensatory or ten percent of net worth, up to $350,000).
364. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-29 (2005) (wrongful death actions are exempt from cap); GA.
CODE. ANN. § 51-12-5. 1(e)(l) (2000) (cap not applicable to products liability cases).
365. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2005) (noting that "[w]here... the wrongful
conduct.., was motivated soley by unreasonable financial gain and.., the unreasonably dangerous
nature of the conduct,... [and] the high likelihood of injury.., was actually known by the
[defendant]," punitive damages shall not exceed the greater of four times the damages awarded each
claimant or two million dollars).
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36 6
limit in cases involving intoxication by the defendant, conviction of a
3 67 wrongful death,3 68 or a product
caused the injury,
felony which 3 69

liability claim.

Fourth, some statutes bar punitive awards for certain situations.
Such statutes, for example, prohibit punitive awards if: (1) the defendant
is a governmental entity; 370 (2) the defendant complied with regulatory
372
371
was of unsound mind;
or government standards; (3) the defendant
or (4) punitive damages for the same conduct have already been imposed
by a court unless the prior award is "insufficient" in amount, in which
373
case the prior award will be subtracted from the total.
Fifth, some statutes provide that a punitive damage award will be
4
shared with the government. 37 These statutes vary in terms of such
375
factors as the following: (1) the amount to be shared; (2) the use of the
376 (3) exceptions to sharing with the government
governmental share;
(e.g., no sharing where the wrongful act was specifically directed at the
plaintiff); 377 and (4) the calculation of the plaintiff's attorney's
378
contingency fee in terms of the plaintiffs share or of the total award.
This reform approach has even been adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court
which, acting on its inherent common law powers: (1) held that a caseby-case consideration of sharing punitive damages with the public was
appropriate, and (2) awarded a portion of a $30 million punitive award
37 9
to a cancer institute at Ohio State University.

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
Act).

See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-l-65(3)(d)(ii) (West Supp. 2005).
Id. § Il-1-65(3)(d)(i).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-29 (2005).
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(1) (2000).
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(b) (2005) (included as part of state's Tort Claims

371. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2107 (West 2003).
372. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11 A-5 (1994).
373. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West 2005).
374. See, e.g., Patrick White, Note, The PracticalEffects of Split-Recovery Statutes and Their
Validity as a Tool of Modern Day "Tort Reform ", 50 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 595 (2002).
375. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (seventy-five percent of punitive
award less reasonable costs of litigation, including attorney's fees remitted to the state).
376. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(b) (West 1999) (seventy-five percent of punitive
award to the state's violent crime victims compensation fund).
377. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. I (West 1998) (awarding plaintiff the full amount of
or
punitive damages where "the conduct of the defendant was directed specifically at the claimant,
at the person from which the claimant's claim is derived").
378. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1207 (West 2003) (judicial discretion to
apportion punitive award, including determination of attorney's fees).
379. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145-46 (Ohio 2002).
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5. Frivolous Claims
There is universal agreement that frivolous claims, whether
presented by a plaintiff or a defendant, are undesirable. Consequently,
all jurisdictions use motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment to eliminate claims that should not go to the jury. In addition,
states have a wide range of schemes for sanctioning frivolous claims.
These schemes include the following: (1) common law claims, such as
38
tort claims for malicious civil prosecution 380 or for abuse of process; '
(2) procedural rules like Rule 11 (sanctions for improper, unwarranted,
or unsupported claims) and Rule 37 (sanctions for noncooperation in
discovery) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) "frivolous
proceeding" statutes; 382 (4) disciplinary rules for lawyers who file
frivolous claims; 383 and (5) the explicit and inherent disciplinary powers
384

of courts.

Despite these schemes, the tort reform movement constantly asserts
that frivolous claims are an important widespread problem in that there
are "too many" frivolous lawsuits. Opponents disagree with this
assertion, and this disagreement involves such subissues as: What does
"frivolous" mean? How common are frivolous claims? Given the current
limits on frivolous claims and that addressing frivolous claims by more
draconian measures, like mandatory severe sanctions, can be
counterproductive in the sense that the costs-both in terms of the time
and resources to apply such measures and of possible reduction in access
385
to the courts-will exceed the benefits? How many are too many?
Opponents also note that data on claims indicate that because many
potential tort claims are not filed, there may be more of a problem with
underclaiming than overclaiming. 386 Generally, the tort reform
movement ignores data and specific issues and simply repeats its litany
of anecdotal "horror stories" and its refrain that there is too much
frivolous litigation. Moreover, the tort reform movement has virtually no
380. See DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 436-37, at 1228-34.
381. Id. § 438, at 1234-40.
382. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-14.5 (LexisNexis 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1536-10(A)(l)(d) (Supp. 2005).
383. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006).
384. See, e.g., Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 579 S.E.2d 605, 611 (S.C. 2003) (fraud upon the
court); Jarrell v. Petoseed Co., 500 S.E.2d 793, 793-94 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (civil compensatory
contempt).
385. See,
e.g.,
ATLA
Press
Room,
'Frivolous'
Lawsuit
News,
http://www.atla.org/pressroom/facts/frivolous/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (summarizing
ATLA position and listing studies (with links) supporting position).
386. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,
448-50 (1987). For more discussion of underclaiming, see supra Part II.B.2.
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proposal specifically designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits. ATRA's
387
"Issue Pages" do not have a separate listing of this as an issue and its
Tort Reform Record does not address doctrinal changes directed at
reducing frivolous litigation.388 To the extent that changes that might
address frivolous litigation are proposed by the tort reform movement,
the proposals take three forms. First, limitations on the right to sue in
tort and on the amount of damages in tort can arguably be viewed in part
as measures to reduce the incentive to bring frivolous litigation. Second,
there are proposals to make relatively minor changes in the existing
limits on frivolous litigation. These proposals include imposing
inflexible mandatory penalties on frivolous actions regardless of
possible procedural inefficiency, 389 and imposing an "objective"
standard for misconduct in the form of whether a "reasonable attorney"
would know of a lack of facts or of a legal basis for a claim, rather than a
good faith standard based on a subjective belief in a factual or legal basis
for a claim. At least one state has adopted such a reasonable attorney
standard. 390 Third, pretrial screening mechanisms have been proposed
and some of these have been adopted, particularly for medical
malpractice claims. 39'
6. Contingency Fees
Contingency fees are generally viewed as ethical 392 and as3 93a
access to the courts.
workable method of providing victims with
However, the dollar amount of a contingency fee based on 30-40% of a
multimillion dollar settlement or verdict can be very large, and the

387. See ATRA: Issue Pages, supra note 214.
388.

See TORT REFORM RECORD, supra note 215, at 1-3.

389. See, e.g., H.R. 420, 109th Cong. §§ 2-3, 6-8 (2005) (amending Rule II of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to eliminate "safe harbor" provision that allows a litigant to withdraw a
frivolous claim without sanctions, requiring state courts to apply this amended version if the "action
substantially affects interstate commerce," imposing a "three strikes" rule for suspending an
attorney, and adopting other sanctioning measures).
390. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10(A)(3)(b)-(d), -10(A)(4)(a)(ii)-(iv) (Supp. 2005).
391. See infra notes 457-66 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)-(c) (2006).
393. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. b (2000);
JR.
see also 2 ALl, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 273-75; 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
& W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 8-27 to -28 (3d ed. Supp. 2003) ("In particular,

contingent fees... can provide access to the courts by persons with possibly meritorious claims
who would not otherwise be able to litigate."); Drew C. Phillips, Contingency Fees: Rules and
Ethical Guidelines, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 233, 233, 234 (1998); infra note 396 and
accompanying text.
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system has been the subject of considerable debate. 394 Such high fees are
often attacked as unfairly excessive on the basis of one or both of the
following arguments: (1) they take too much money from the victim;
and (2) such large fees provide too much incentive for plaintiffs'
attorneys to bring suit, particularly in situations where the suit becomes
financially feasible because the large amount of possible recovery
provides a reason to bring a suit with such a low probability of recovery
that the suit is, to some, questionable or frivolous. 3 95 Opponents reply to
these attacks by noting the access provided by the contingency fee
system and by pointing to evidence showing that plaintiffs' lawyers have
an hourly fee that is comparable with that of other professionals. 396 In
addition, the contingency fee system forces plaintiffs' attorneys to act as
gatekeepers because they have no incentive to bring a suit with so little
chance of success that it is not likely to be worth the attorney's costs. 3 9 7
Currently, attorneys' fees are limited in all states by rules of
professional conduct that prohibit lawyers from charging unreasonable
fees.398 Some states have imposed additional statutory limitations on
contingency fees. The limit is usually in the form of a sliding scale in
which the fee percentage decreases as the amount of the recovery
increases. Of the states with limits, at least six states have general limits

394. See, e.g., Symposium, Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America, 47 DEPAUL
L. REv. 227 (1998).
395. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics
Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 282 (1996); Michael Horowitz, Essay, Making Ethics Real,
Making Ethics Work. A Proposalfor Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, 182 (1995);
Allison F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and
Reform from an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 761-63 (1992); ATRA:

Contingent Fee Reform, http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7354 (last visited Mar. 14,
2007) (supporting legislation to limit use of contingency fee "where a legitimate risk of nonrecovery exists" and to require an hourly fee where there is "no legitimate risk of non-recovery");
ATRA: Medical Liability Reform, supra note 270 (arguing for "a sliding scale for attorney's

contingent fees").
396. See, e.g., Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort Reform: A Reassessment and Reality
Check, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 186-87 (2001); Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1233; cf, e.g.,

Daniels & Martin, supra note 58, at 1795 (reporting plaintiff's lawyer's perception that contingency
fee practice was unstable, difficult and contracting).
397.
398.

See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), (c) (2006) (explicitly approving

contingency fees subject to requirements such as "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee").
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on contingency fees in personal injury or wrongful death actions, 399 and
at least nine states have limits for medical malpractice only.4 °°
7. Products Liability
Increases in liability insurance costs for sellers of products have
played a major role in the push for "tort reform" since the 1970s.4°1
However, only a few proposals have been aimed exclusively at productcaused injuries. One reason for this lack is that some general reforms
have been a particular concern of product manufacturers, particularly
punitive damages "reform" and the elimination of the doctrine of joint
and several liability. Eliminating joint and several liability has been
important to manufacturers because it could reduce the liability of
product manufacturers and other sellers where third party wrongdoers
are also involved. For example, in a "crashworthiness" case, the
manufacturer might be liable for using inadequate design features to
protect the driver in case of a crash. In such a case, eliminating joint and
several liability could mean the manufacturer's share would be less in
relation to the share of a drunken driver who went through a stop sign
and collided with the car driven by the plaintiff.40 2 Another reason for
the lack of specific proposals is that, as the common law in this area has
proceeded on the basis of the traditional model, the general development
has been consistent with the concerns of the defense position. More
specifically, at one time it appeared that "liability without fault" might
become the law concerning liability for product-caused injury. 403
However, doctrinal developments in the last two decades have
reaffirmed that, with only a few exceptions, fault is required in most

399. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c (West 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 601
(West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (West 2001); MICH. CT. R. 8.121(A)-(D) (2004); N.J. R.
CT. 1:21-7(c) (2006 & Supp.); WYO. CT. R. ANN., R. COVERING CONTINGENT FEES 5 (2003).
400. FLA. CONST. art 1. § 26; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 6865 (West 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1114 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-18-18-1 (LexisNexis 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2961 (2000); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 474-a (McKinney 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (2000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 655.013
(West 2004).
401. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
402. The text uses the phrase "could mean the manufacturer's share would be less" because
some schemes would reallocate the share of the driver among all the wrongdoers if the driver's
share is uncollectible and some states use a threshold scheme. See supra notes 253, 255-56 and
accompanying text. With such schemes, the manufacturer's share might be less.
403. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965) (amended 1998); George
L. Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundationsof
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 512-13 (1985).
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states. 4°4 Thus, though a need to "reform strict products liability" is
sometimes given as a reason for reform,4 °5 there is little need for reform
of a doctrine that is not widely used.
One proposed product-focused "reform" has been the adoption of a
statutory scheme providing that compliance with government regulations
should raise at least a rebuttable presumption that the product is not
defective and should bar the awarding of punitive damages.40 6 Several
states have adopted such a presumption.40 7
The primary area of state legislative "reform" focusing on products
themselves has been in the area of statutes of repose, which bar any suit
for injury caused by a product defect after a set time period from the sale
of the product.40 8 For example, this approach to time limits on the right
404.

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 2 (1998); James

A.

Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 522-27, 530-32 (1990) (identifying the trend in
products liability toward an increasing percentage of opinions in favor of defendants and toward a
decreasing success of plaintiffs at trial); Rabin, supra note 52, at 1204-08. Under the Restatement's
approach, liability without fault is only imposed in two situations: (1) where a "manufacturing
defect," caused by a departure of the product as manufactured from "its intended design," is
involved; and (2) where a "seller," such as a retailer, is held liable for an injury caused by a product
defect even though the seller had no role in manufacturing or designing the product or in deciding
about warnings. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a), (c) (1998). A few
jurisdictions still impose strict liability on sellers of products in some other situations. See, e.g.,
James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and Marketing
Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 967-73 (2002) (observing that courts impose strict liability in
"abnormally dangerous activities" and legislatures impose strict liability with worker's
compensation); Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers,the Third Restatement, and
the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 889, 891 (2005). Analysis of the
law in this area is complicated because, for example, some consumers' expectations tests (which
can be "strict liability" standards) have the effect of imposing less liability than negligence. See,
e.g., OWEN, supra note 111, § 8.3, at 489. In addition, courts often speak in terms of a consumer
expectation test of liability, but apply a negligence type cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Kysar, supra
note 67, at 1726-46.
405. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 1, at 1535-36.
406. For discussions of such proposals, see, for example, Owen, supra note 35, at 412 (arguing
that, at most, there should be a presumption against punitive awards); Ashley W. Warren,
Compliance with Governmental Regulatory Standards:Is It Enough to Immunize a Defendant from
Tort Liability?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 763, 766, 772 (1997) (arguing that "compliance generally
should be merely evidence of, and at the most a rebuttable presumption of, nonnegligence"); supra
note 371 and accompanying text.
407. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (West 2000) (drug manufacture and sales); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000) (drug, food and device warning or instruction); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.4-02 (2006) (aviation products liability); OH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.76
(LexisNexis 2005) ("ethical drug"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (2002) (general compliance with
government standards).
408. See, e.g., FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, § 26.05[l], [3]. It has also been argued
that Congress should act so that uniformity in products liability law can be achieved. See, e.g.,
Robert L. Rabin, Federalismand the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1997) (reviewing
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to sue is urged on the website of the National Association of
Manufacturers. 40 9 The reasons given for adopting a statute of repose
include the problems of proof after the passage of time, the need for
certainty about potential liability after a period of time, and the
increasing potential for problems of misuse and alteration as a product
ages.410 To a considerable extent, these concerns are addressed by
common law doctrine recognizing the relevance of a product's age411
and by statutes of limitation, which bar a suit unless it is brought within
a time period (for example, three years) from the time the plaintiff knew
or should have known of a tort claim. The arguments against statutes of
repose, as opposed to statutes of limitations, include the inflexibility of a
set period of time for all products and the unfairness of cutting off
liability before a victim knows of the claim, could reasonably know of
the claim, or has even been injured.4 12
In response to the arguments in favor of reform and to address
concerns of a "crisis" in products liability, Congress enacted legislation
limiting the time within which certain aircraft claims may be brought.41 3
Similarly, a number of states have adopted one of three types of time
limitations (in addition to a traditional statute of limitations) on products
claims: (1) a time-specific statute of repose; (2) a more flexible "useful
life" of the product scheme; or (3) a hybrid of (1) and (2). In terms of
time-specific statutes, about ten states have such a statute of repose for
products liability actions. 414 Some states have adopted a time-specific
arguments and taking a skeptical position on the need for federal legislation); Schwartz, supra note
161 (reviewing proposals for federal legislation, discussing problems from lack of uniformity, and
noting problems with federal legislation); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, A Proposalfor
Federal Product Liability Reform in the New Millennium, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 261, 267-70

(2000) (arguing for federal legislation).
http://www.nam.org/snarn/doc 1.asp?
Agenda,
Reform
Legal
409. NAM:
CID=20233 1&DID=234995 (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). NAM also supports a misuse or alteration
"defense" that would reduce a plaintiff's recovery. Id. However, this doctrinal approach is already
generally followed. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 (1998).
410. See, e.g., FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, § 26.05[l].
411. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. d (1998) (stating that
"age of the product" is relevant to defect); Charles E. Cantu, The Useful Life Defense: Embracing
the Idea That All ProductsEventually Grow Old and Die, 80 NEB. L. REv. 1 (200 1).
412. See, e.g., FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, § 26.05[l].
413. See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552,
1553 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)); Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002).
414. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(3) (West 2005) (presumption that product
not defective ten years after sale); id. § 13-80-107 (seven years for new manufacturing equipment);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-1 l(b)(2) (2000) (ten years); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-3-1 (West 1999) (ten
years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(2A) (West Supp. 2006) (fifteen years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.310(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (five years); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-224 (LexisNexis 2004)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

79

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
516

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:437

statute of repose that was subsequently held to be unconstitutional. 5 In
states with a valid time-specific statute of repose, the time period for
these statutes varies from five to fifteen years.416 There are also other
variations among the states. For example, one part of Colorado's scheme
utilizes a rebuttable presumption that, ten years after the first sale for use
or consumption of a product, the product was not defective and the
manufacturer was not negligent.417 Nebraska's statute of repose is
triggered at the date of first sale or lease for use of products made in
Nebraska; if the particular product is not manufactured in Nebraska, the
repose period is that of the state of manufacture unless that state has no
statute of repose, in which case the Nebraska ten-year repose period is
applicable.41 8 The states vary in terms of exceptions to the statute of
repose. For example, some have exceptions for express warranties for
other periods, 41 9 and for intentional, willful, fraudulent, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct. 420 There are also various other exclusions
for
422
42
certain products-for example, asbestos ' and breast implants.
Some states have also adopted useful life statutes to address the
possibly long period of use of products.423 Useful safe life statutes differ
from statutes of repose in that, instead of providing a specific time
period in which the plaintiff must bring his suit, these statutes employ a
rebuttable presumption that, if a product has been used beyond the term
of the statutorily defined useful life, the defendant is not negligent or the
product is not defective. Six states have adopted a useful life statute, but
these statutes vary enormously.42 4 The statutes in Idaho and Kansas do
(ten years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(a)(6) (2005) (six years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2125.02(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (ten for wrongful death relating to product defect); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (2005) (eight years); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012(b)
(Vernon Supp. 2006) (fifteen years).
415. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982); Best
v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (Il1. 1997); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464
A.2d 288, 296 (N.H. 1983); Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 611 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 2000).
416. See supra note 414.
417. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(3) (West 2005).
418. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-224(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2004).
419. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1403(2)(b)(1) (Supp. 2006).
420. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(d) (West 2005).
421. See, e.g., id. § 52-577a(e) (West 2005).
422. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30-908(2) (2005).
423. See, e.g., Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in the Products
Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1689 passim. The concept of useful life is arguably a part
of the common law as well. See supra note 411,414 and accompanying text.
424. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2)(b) (West Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1403(1)
(Supp. 2006); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3303 (West Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5805(13) (West Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 2006); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(l)-(2) (West 1992).
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two things: (1) state that a product seller who proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the product's useful safe life had expired is not
liable for harm caused by the product; and (2) establish a presumption,
rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence, that ten years is the useful
safe life of a product.425 Washington's statute is similar, except the
presumption of useful safe life arises at twelve years and can be rebutted
by a preponderance of the evidence.42 6 In Minnesota, the length of the
useful life of a product is not defined; instead, it is determined by the
experiences regarding similar products, taking into account the factors
listed in the statute.4 27 Michigan's statute provides that a plaintiff does
not get the benefit of any presumptions if the product has been in use for
more than ten years.4 28 Florida employs a complex scheme prescribing
different useful lives for various products.429
Two states have products liability statutes of repose that combine
the approaches of both time-certain statutes and useful safe life statutes.
In Tennessee, a plaintiff has the shorter of one year after the expiration
of a product's anticipated life or ten years from its purchase to bring
suit. 430 Connecticut's hybrid statute provides that products liability
actions must be brought within ten years from the date the defendant
parted with possession or control of the product; however, this timecertain limitation is inapplicable in all actions except workers'
compensation actions if the plaintiff can prove that the harm occurred
during the product's useful safe life.431
8. Medical Malpractice
As with products liability, concern about the increases in medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums has played a major role in the
push for "tort reform" over the years. The most recent rate increases,
which began in the late 1990s, 432 appear to have abated. 4 3 3 The tort

425.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1403(l)(a)-(2)(a) (Supp. 2006); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 60-3303(a)(l)-(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
426.

427.
tear, (ii)
renewals
428.
429.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(1)-(2) (West 1992).

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 2006) (stating that the factors are: (i) wear and
progress within the industry, (iii) local conditions, (iv) the policy regarding repairs,
and replacements, (v) represented useful life, and (vi) modification by user).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(13) (West Supp. 2006).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (West Supp. 2007) Certain things, including commercial

aircraft, large sea vessels, commercial railroad equipment and improvements to property are not
subject to the statute of repose.
430.
431.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (2000).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-77a(a), (c) (West 2005).

432. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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reform movement asserts that these increases are caused by a "lack [of]
reasonable limits on liability." 414 Because of this lack, insurance
companies "either leave the market or substantially raise costs" and
physicians "are choosing to stop practicing medicine, abandon high-risk
parts of their practices, or move their practices to... states" with lower
malpractice rates.435 Physicians are also said to be practicing wasteful
"defensive medicine." 436 In order to remedy these problems, ATRA
argues for reform "that includes: (1) a $250,000 limit on noneconomic
damages; (2) a sliding scale for attorney's contingent fees; (3) periodic
payment of future damages; and (4) abolition of the collateral source
[rule]. 4 37 Assessing these claims and proposals for reform is difficult
because, as with any area of tort law, litigation statistics are so
incomplete.
It has been particularly hard to assess the reasons for increases in
medical malpractice premiums and proposals for reform because of six
characteristics of medical malpractice. First, it is difficult to determine
the amount of the impact of claims on premium costs, even though it
appears that there has been an increase in medical malpractice
payouts, 438 because other factors have affected the amount of
premiums.4 39 Moreover, it is hard to know whether any increases in
claims or payouts have resulted simply because more valid claims have

433. See JOANNE DOROSHOW & J. ROBERT HUNTER, AMS. FOR INS. REFORM, INSURANCE
"CRISIS" OFFICIALLY OVER-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES HAVE BEEN STABLE FOR A YEAR I

(2006), availableat http://www.insurance-refortn.org/pr/MMSOFTMARKET.pdf.
434. ATRA: Medical Liability Reform, supra note 270.
435. Id.
436. See, e.g., The White House, Medical Liability, supra note 270 (arguing that "[t]rivolous
lawsuits and excessive jury awards are ... forcing doctors to practice overly defensive medicine").
The amount of any impact of defensive medicine on costs and access to medicine is not clear. GAO,
REPORT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 172, at 26-29 (reviewing reports but concluding
prevalence and costs of defensive medicine are not reliably measured); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Commentary, Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an Old Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 267, 267-68 (1996). But cf Mello & Brennan, supra note 18, at 1606-07 (arguing
that the growth of managed care diminished the practice of defensive medicine, to the extent that it
occurred at all). In addition, concern about insurance premiums, not about defensive medicine, has
been the primary motivation for physicians' support of "tort reform." See DOROSHOW & HUNTER,
supra note 433, at 7-8.
437. ATRA: Medical Liability Reform, supra note 270.
438. GAO, REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 145, at 1-2. But see, e.g., Bernard
Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005) (presenting data showing no substantial increase in Texas for
period 1988-2002).

439. See infra notes 440-47 and accompanying text.
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been brought.44 ° Second, each state has a unique medical malpractice
insurance situation because the tort system in each state is, to some
degree, unique and because medical malpractice insurance is sold stateby-state rather than nationally.441 Third, rates vary among medical
specialties, and some specialties-e.g., obstetrics-can have very high
injury costs in situations where undesired outcomes occur.44 2 This results
not only in higher potential verdicts and settlements where the claim has
merit, but also in increased incentives for a plaintiffs attorney to take
the case. Consequently, these specialties could have higher premiums
even if the doctors involved are no more likely to be negligent than other
medical specialists. 4 Fourth, premium rates are, to some extent,
affected by changes in the amount of income generated on invested
premiums, by competition among the small number of carriers in this
sector of the insurance industry, and by changes in reinsurance
markets. 444 Fifth, medical malpractice litigation, which generally
requires extensive use of expensive experts, is costly. 445 Sixth, there is a
long time lag between an allegedly negligent act by a healthcare giver
and resolution of a potential claim. 446 For example, data from Florida

440. Increases in valid claims could explain increases in payouts because studies of medical
records to determine the amount of malpractice occurring in medicine indicate that the number of
harmful outcomes due to medical negligence exceeds the number of claims filed by a substantial
amount. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 11 (1986) [hereinafter
GAO, No AGREEMENT]; David A. Hyman, Commentary, Medical Malpracticeand the Tort System:

What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 164247 (2002); cf To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al.
eds., 2000) (estimating that preventable medical errors cause 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year); J.

Douglas Peters et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Medical and Legal Professions' Experiences and
Perceptionsof Medical and Legal Malpractice, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 601, 613 (1986) (noting
that approximately three-fourths of physicians surveyed indicated that competent physicians
sometimes deviate from accepted standards of care and thereby injure their patients). Danzon notes
that in the late 1970s, "at most I in 10 negligent injuries resulted in a claim, and ... at most I in 25
negligent injuries resulted in compensation" and that even assuming an extreme increase in claims
by the mid-1980s, the "rough current estimate is that only I in 5 incidents of malpractice gives rise
to a malpractice claim." DANZON, supra note 18 at 24-25. These figures are consistent with studies
of the ratio between claims and potential claims in terms of tort claims in general.
441. See, e.g., GAO, REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 145, at 3, 9-10.
442. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1223-24.
443. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: EFFECTS OF
VARYING LAWS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MARYLAND, AND VIRGINIA 26 tbl.llI. 1 (1999).
444. See GAO, REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 145, at 2, 8, 10.
445. See Daniels & Martin, PrecariousNature,supra note 58, at 1798.

446. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance UnderwritingCycle, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 422-23 (2005); Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (l)legitimate

Interests of the Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 454 (2005); William
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indicate that settlements occur in most cases between three and six years
after the injury.447 Because premiums at any given time must be based
largely on historic claims data from earlier years, actual claims payouts
for conduct in the year the premium is paid may be so high that the
premium was inadequate. The cumulative impact of these diverse factors
makes it very hard to determine the causes of increases in medical
malpractice premiums and to analyze the impact of any particular
proposed "tort reform."
Regardless of the reasons for the increase, medical malpractice has
been a focal point of tort reform for several reasons. First, access to good
medical care is essential, and any possible negative impact on access to
healthcare is a matter of great concern. Second, because of costcontainment measures imposed by private insurers and by publicly
funded programs like Medicare, doctors have only a limited ability to
pass on the costs of medical malpractice premiums to patients. Third,
doctors are humans rather than corporate actors. This adds a different
dimension, both in the form of doctors' reactions to being sued and to
the need for tort law-as opposed to licensing, ethics, or pride in craftto deter wrongdoing.448
A number of "reforms" have been adopted to address the "problem"
of medical malpractice insurance premiums. First, as indicated above,
twenty-two states have adopted various schemes for limiting
noneconomic damages. 449 Second, some states have modified the
collateral source rule for medical malpractice claims. 450 Third, several
states have adopted contingency fee restrictions for medical malpractice
actions .45 A fourth type of reform concerns expert witnesses. Doctors
have long complained that the rules about medical experts qualified to
testify about the standard of care and the cause of the injury are too

M. Sage, Medical MalpracticeInsuranceand the Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 48081(2005).
447. Vidmar et al., supra note 145, at 334.
448.

See, e.g., Anawis, supra note 172, at 310-11; Hubbard, supra note 143, at 356. Anawis

argues as follows:
As a physician, I would argue that it is not the responsibility of the legal system to
determine the quality of medical care, the existence of negligent care, or to
deter... "bad conduct." We as physicians need to do a better job at identifying and
educating physicians who are not providing quality medical care.
Anawis, supra note 172, at 311. For a critique of the deterrent effect of tort liability in the medical
malpractice context, see Mello & Brennan, supra note 18, at 1607-23.
449. See supra notes 293-302 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
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lax.452 As a result, statutory definitions of "expert" have been adopted,

and at least twenty states require the plaintiff to file an affidavit from a
statutorily qualified expert that a claim exists. 453 These requirements
vary in terms of such things as: (1) whether the affidavit must be filed
with the complaint or within some specified time after filing,45 4 (2)
whether the requirement applies to all professional negligence or only to
medical negligence,455 and (3) the procedures and sanctions for failure to
comply. 456

In order to reduce frivolous claims and reduce litigation costs,
"thirty-one states adopted screening panels of some sort." 45 7 Because of
problems with these panels, some were repealed,4 58 while others were
held unconstitutional in many states. 459 Today, at least seventeen states
452. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF'L LIAB. & INS., AM. MED. ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY IN THE '80S: REPORT 3, at 13 (1985) (criticizing the use of expert witnesses who

"routinely serve as expert witnesses for plaintiffs" because such "traveling experts often have little
actual experience in the particular speciality of the defendant physician or knowledge of the
appropriate standard of care"). Physicians also criticize many expert witnesses, particularly
academic experts, on the ground that these experts are unable to understand the proper standard of
care because they lack an appreciation of the unique circumstances involved. Id.; Feinstein, Medical
Negligence and the Tort System: What are the Options?, 74 J. FLA. MED. A. 774, 776-77 (1987).
Another target of criticism is the retired physician who serves as an expert. Id. at 777.
453. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West 2005); FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 766.203 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 2005); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/2-622 (West Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a)
(LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 538.225 (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1536-100 (Supp. 2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon 2005); W. VA. CODE

ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991); PA. R. Civ. P.
1042.3 (West 2006).
454. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1a (Supp. 2005) (requiring affidavit to be filed with
the complaint), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006) (requiring affidavit to be filed within
thirty days of the complaint being filed).
455. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100(B) (Supp. 2005) (applying to all professional
negligence claims), with MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58(1) (West Supp. 2005) (applying only to
actions against a "licensed physician, healthcare provider or healthcare practitioner").
456. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006) (providing that if the affidavit is not filed
within thirty days of filing, the complaint shall be dismissed).
457. Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and ProceduralReform in Medical
Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 990 (2004).
458. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona
Medical Liability Review Panel, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1991) (tracing the history of the
Arizona Medical Liability Review Panel, adopted in 1976 and repealed in 1989).
459. See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 421
A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980); cf, e.g., Heather Brann, Comment, Utah's Medical Malpractice
PrelitigationPanel: Exploring State ConstitutionalArguments Against a Nonbinding Inadmissible
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require, or encourage, that medical malpractice claimants submit their
claims to some form of screening panel prior to filing a complaint or
shortly thereafter. 460 These requirements vary in terms such as the
following: (1) composition of the panel, 461 (2) whether the requirement
applies to all professional negligence or only to medical negligence,462
(3) the effect of the panel's decision (varying from no impact on
litigation, to admissible at trial, to admissible with a464presumption of
correctness), 463 and (4) whether the panel is mandatory.
Because of two problems with prelitigation screening schemes, they
have often been a disappointment. One problem arises because, unless
the screening is done carefully, it is unfair (and perhaps unconstitutional)
to impose severe restrictions on those who "lose" before the panel.
However, careful screening will involve costs and delays. If there are
still trials even with such screening, the overall combined costs of
screening and trials may be higher than the costs of a litigation system
Procedure, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 359, 385-416 (suggesting constitutional challenges to the Utah
panels under the theories of denial of access to the courts, non-uniformity of laws and usurpation of
judicial power); Karnezis, supra note 283, at 589-90. For more detailed discussion of some of these
problems, see infra notes 467-68 and accompanying text.
460. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6803-14 (2006) (requiring
a patient to submit a claim to a review panel as an alternative to filing a corroborative affidavit of
another professional); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-12 (1993);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1001 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-18-10-1 to -8 (West 1999); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4901 (Supp. 2001) (requiring panel review upon request of one party); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.47(A) (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-53 (2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4903 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105 (2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2840 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-B:1 to B:3
(Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-14 (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-12 (2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (2000). In order to reduce litigation costs, at least one state has adopted a
requirement of filing a "Notice of Intent to File Suit" as a way of facilitating mediation and
settlement prior to filing a complaint. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (Supp. 2005) (providing for
some minimal discovery and requirement of mediation within 120 days).
461. Membership can be based on requirements that members include persons such as the
following: attorney, physician/healthcare provider, lay person, and claims expert. See, e.g., HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-11(b) (1993) (providing that the panel shall consist of three persons: a
chairperson who is familiar with the personal injury claims settlement process, an attorney, and a
physician or surgeon).
462. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-14 (West 2003) (providing for panels solely for
medical malpractice cases).
463. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6812 (2006) (admissible at trial); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 6-1003 to -1004 (2004) (no impact); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(d)
(LexisNexis 2002) (admissible with presumption of correctness with the burden "on the party
rejecting it to prove that it is not correct").
464. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2840(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring submission of
claim to panel); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Supp. 2005) (providing that any party may request
review by panel).
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alone. In addition to concerns about fairness and constitutionality,
reducing the costs of the screening by making it less careful may result
in it having no real effect on the number of jury trials because the parties
may not accept the results of the process. Once again, overall costs may
increase because the process will involve time and expense, and jury
trials will still be necessary for many claims.a 65 A second type of
problem may arise if the screening system is effective in reducing
overall costs by providing a cheaper, faster scheme for resolving claims
in a meaningful manner. This effect satisfies the goal of reducing
litigation costs as the plaintiffs costs for bringing a claim will be
reduced. However, because of this lower cost, additional claims may be
filed and overall medical malpractice claims payouts may increase.4 66
9. Constitutional Review
When tort reforms have been subject to challenge under state
constitutional law, many reforms have been declared constitutional
while many others have been held unconstitutional.467 The primary
grounds for challenging these reforms are: right to jury trial, right to
obtain damages, equal protection, due process, separation of powers,
special legislation, unconstitutional taking, and right of access to the
courts. 468 The results have varied considerably, and it is hard to
465. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 458, at 1107 (arguing that panels are unsuccessful
because they impose costs and delays without sufficient benefit); Marc R. Lebed & John J.
McCauley, Mediation Within the Health Care Industry: Hurdles and Opportunities,21 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 911, 920-24 (2005) (discussing the medical profession's view that benefits are not worth
costs); Struve, supra note 457, at 992-96 (concluding that panels have had little success because
benefits are not worth the costs).
466. See, e.g., Struve, supranote 457, at 991-92.
467. See, e.g., TORT REFORM RECORD, supra note 215, passim (noting constitutional litigation
concerning specific legislation); Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs' Rights: The
Constitutional Battle over Statutory Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 405,
419-34 (1995); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 157, at 939-76 (containing appendices listing
reforms held unconstitutional and reforms held constitutional after 1983); Kristine Cordier
Kamezis, Annotation, Validity of State Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages, 103 A.L.R. 5th 379,
391-415
(2002);
ATRA:
Judicial
Nullification
of
State
Civil
Justice
Reform,
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7350 (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (listing state-by-state
statutes held constitutional and statutes held unconstitutional); supra notes 286, 457-59 and
accompanying text (discussing constitutional challenge to limitations on noneconomic harm and to
pretrial screening schemes of medical malpractice claims). For criticism of cases holding "reform"
legislation unconstitutional, see supranotes 157-58 and accompanying text.
468. See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d I (N.C. 2004) (upholding a limitation of
punitive damages and denying constitutional challenges under theories of separation of powers,
right to trial by jury, taking, equal protection, due process, access to courts, special legislation, and
void for vagueness); MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 792 (7th ed. 2001); Kamezis, supra note 467, at 391-415; cf John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the
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generalize about these challenges because of variations among the states
in terms of the statutory schemes and constitutional frameworks.
10. Conclusion
It is hard to know precisely what the overall doctrinal effect of the
tort reform movement has been. Many changes have been adopted, but
some of the changes were adopted before the movement gained
momentum in the 1980s and some are supported by both rational reform
arguments and by the tort reform movement. Moreover, the changes are
very diverse in terms of details. Finally, there is no scheme of
"jurimetrics" for measuring the impact of any single rule or doctrinal
change on a complex system like tort law. Nevertheless, it seems
plausible that the various pro-defendant changes have had at least some
even if it is not
pro-defendant impact in terms of plaintiffs' recoveries,
469
impact.
that
of
extent
the
measure
possible to
B. Culture
1. Evidence of Impact
As indicated above, one goal of the tort reform movement has been
to shape cultural views of tort law in ways that favor the defense side.47°
To the extent this goal is achieved, it will be easier to convince courts
and legislatures to shape doctrine in ways the movement prefers and to
persuade juries to render fewer and smaller plaintiff verdicts. There are a
number of reasons to conclude that this effort has been successful. For
example, the campaign is facilitated by widespread ignorance
concerning how the system operates, particularly in terms of the
available statistical data about the tort system. The widespread cultural
belief that there is "too much" litigation, particularly "frivolous"
litigation, appears to be based on misperceptions about the system's
methods of screening frivolous claims and about the small number of

Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 537-59 (2005) (arguing that, though there is no right to a
specific set of tort rules, there is a right to a legal scheme for redress of private wrongs). See
generally Symposium, State ConstitutionalLaw, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001) (discussing various
constitutional challenges to state tort reform legislation).
469. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, PrecariousNature, supra note 58, at 1797-1801 (observing
the responses of a sample of plaintiffs' attorneys indicating their perceptions that formal legal
changes had a negative impact on their practices and that the impact varied depending upon the
nature of their practices).
470. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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such claims overall.47 1 Changing these misperceptions with reports of
reliable statistical data is difficult because
[i]n the broader public debate .... tort reform critics are outfinanced
and often outgunned. Their research typically appears in specialized
academic publications and is only occasionally discussed in the
popular media. Moreover, there is no prolitigation think tank to rival
the likes of the Manhattan Institute's Center for Legal Policy, which
supports the research of [tort reform proponents] 472
The impact of these superior resources is reflected in the fact that the
massive marketing campaign of the movement has achieved a high
degree of useful brand identification for its proposals; the phrase "tort
reform," which literally means an improvement in the tort system, is
generally viewed in terms of the movement's agenda.
There is also evidence to support the conclusion that the
movement's campaign has strengthened perceptions in ways that favor
the defense. For example, the movement has had legislative success at
the state level, and this success arguably indicates public support for
changing doctrine. At another level, there is support for the view that
jurors' attitudes have become less supportive of plaintiffs in tort suits
and that this change has affected verdicts.4 73 One commentator has
argued that the movement's bromides about a "litigation explosion" and
a "liability crisis" have played a role in shifting judicial attitudes about
471. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, The Impact, supra note 59, at 476-93; see also Galanter,
supra note 155, at 53 (discussing the relationship between corporate actors and "lawsuit abuse").
472. BURKE, supra note I, at 45; see, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 73-110, 270306; see also GINSBERG, supra note 90, at 149-80 (noting the advantages of superior economic
resources in influencing public opinion in elections and arguing that the political right has more of
these economic resources). Ginsberg observes that this increased access to resources "has given the
forces of the political right a significant-perhaps a decisive-competitive edge." Id. at 176. The
lack of effect of academic studies on popular opinion is supported by an empirical study of opinions
about litigation and verdicts before and after an academic study was made and released to the press.
This study revealed that, although the detailed academic study of tort litigation (which showed no
significant increase in the number of suits filed or verdict amounts) had been published in a limited
way in the media, the public and most legislators were not aware of the study and continued to
believe there had been substantial increases. However, the legislators and lobbyists working on tort
reform legislation were aware of the reporter's findings and this awareness apparently played a role
in the failure of the legislature to adopt the proposals for tort reform. Donald R. Songer, Tort
Reform in South Carolina:The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite PerceptionsConcerningJury
Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585, 602-03 (1988).
473. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note I, at 32; Daniels & Martin, The Impact, supra note 59, at
479-82 (using anecdotal evidence from attorneys); Daniels & Martin, PrecariousNature, supra note
58, at 1802-08; Hans & Albertson, supra note 196, at 1506-09. But see Edith Greene et al., Jurors'
Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 805, 813-16
(1991) (discussing contrary results in a study of mock jurors and indicating some level of rejection
by jurors of claims made by proponents of the tort reform movement).
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granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in favor
of defendants. 474 Thus, it seems plausible that the sustained large-scale
public relations campaign of the tort reform movement has caused at
least some increase in the view that the tort system needs "reform."
2. Scale and Complexity of Culture
Our culture is so large and complex that it is not possible to
determine the extent and importance of any change in support of the tort
reform movement's agenda. Any sufficiently inclusive definition of
"culture" would include not only the vast array of beliefs and values we
share, but also all the social and institutional means used to
communicate about them and implement them.4 75 Thus, any analysis of
law and culture must recognize the scale and complexity of culture,
particularly the interconnection between law-as a part of culture-and
the other parts of culture.4 76 Because of these interconnections, it is clear
that culture affects law and that law affects culture. 4 Unfortunately, the
complexity involved makes it hard to do more than state broad
generalizations, such as: Legal rules (and conceptions of justice) are
controversial where there is cultural disagreement about the proper
rule. 78
One common way to simplify-at least partially-the analysis of
culture is to focus on images of law presented in mass media
and
law
like movies, television, books, and magazines. In using this approach,
474. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 404, at 504-05 (identiling a trend of decreasing
success for plaintiffs at trial).
475. Donald Black defines culture in a way that conveys a sense of the scale and complexity of
the concept:
Culture is the symbolic aspect of social life, including expressions of what is true,
good, and beautiful. It thus includes ideas about the nature of reality, whether theoretical
or practical, and whether supernatural, metaphysical, or empirical. Examples are science,
technology, religion, magic, and folklore. It also includes conceptions of what ought to
be, what is right and wrong, proper and improper-apart from the behavior of social
control itself. Values, ideology, morality, and law have a symbolic aspect of this kind.
And, finally, culture includes aesthetic life of all sorts, the fine arts and the popular, such
as poetry and painting, clothing and other decorative art, architecture, and even the
culinary arts. It should be clear that culture has an existence of its own, apart from the
way people experience it.
DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 61 (1976) (citation omitted).

476. See, e.g., Introduction to LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 163, at 6-10.
477. See, e.g., id. at 7, 15-16; SHAPO, supra note 1, at 6-11,269-300.
478. See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1. Shapo argues, for example, that doctrinal controversies
concerning tort law are "relatively accurate cultural mirror[s]" and that "when a judicial decision
has something to say about culture, it is likely to reflect a fairly deep rooted idea." Id. at 269-70. For
further discussion about using minimal consensus to develop schemes of law and justice, see supra
notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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one can focus either on the content of the presentations 479 or on the
nature of the presentations. 480 However, adopting this narrowed
perspective to address the issues of the impact of the media-based
publicity campaign of the tort reform movement does not help that much
because even a large, sustained public relations campaign is just a small
part of the vast array of media images of law. More specifically, media
stories about tort law vastly outnumber the accounts presented by the
movement. However, these media stories have a tendency to distort
images about tort law in ways that favor the movement; for example,
media accounts of jury verdicts generally overreport large verdicts.48'
Because of the neutrality and sheer scale of media accounts and because
the media's distorted images are consistent with the movement's claims,
it is plausible to think that news accounts have played the predominant
role in causing (or reinforcing) widespread popular misperceptions, such
as that large verdicts are more common than they are.482 Similarly, both
news and entertainment accounts present images of greedy plaintiffs
bringing frivolous claims for large amounts of money.483 In short, it is
hard to know whether and to what extent public views are shaped by
publicity campaigns as opposed to the entertainment and news media
and if (or how) media accounts respond to, rather than shape, public
views.

479. See, e.g., LAW ON THE SCREEN (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
480.

See, e.g., RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN

LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); Kimberlianne Podlas, As Seen on TV: The Normative
Influence of Syndi-Court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004).

For a more general account of the impact of changes in the nature of media, see, for example, BILL
KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA (1999).

481. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 61-72, 156-81, 195-226, 303-06
(providing data to support view that institutionalized aspects of media result in a tendency to
support the tort reform movement because of the following: (1) a preference for "anecdotal tort
tales" because of their simplicity and support by widely accepted "truths" about life and law; (2) a
preference for publishing uncommonly large verdicts because of the "holler of the dollar;" and (3)
reliance on easily accessible, readable stories); Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating
Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64, 64 (Sept.-Oct. 1996); see also
Galanter, supra note 155, at 51-52.
482. See Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 481, at 64-65; Galantersupra note 155, at 51-52.
483. For example, Saturday Night Live, a program not noted for endorsing a pro-business bias,
had a recurring character, the "Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer," who in one sketch demands, and is
immediately given by the jury, "two million in compensatory damages, and two million in punitive
damages."
Saturday
Night
Live
Transcript
of
"Unfrozen
Caveman
Lawyer,"
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/91/91gcaveman.phtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). A Seinfeld episode
portrayed a similar image as Kramer was advised to seek punitive damages for too-hot coffee.
KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 6-7. This overly litigious character is, in effect, an American
cultural category. See Hayden, supra note 163, at 248-50.
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Thus, even if we focus on the successful adoption of doctrinal
changes supported by the movement, it is not possible to determine such
things as whether a particular legislator shared the movement's position
because of the public relation campaign, because of other media
presentations, or because of some other reason. In this regard, it is
important to remember that society is not monolithic. People vary in
their values, in how they form opinions, and in the issues they consider
important. For example, a study of the effect on opinions of a report with
thorough statistical data on verdicts indicated that, although neither
popular opinions nor legislators' opinions in general were affected by
publicity about the data, the legislators and lobbyists working on the
legislation were aware of the study and this awareness affected their
views and the legislation.484
3. Two Ideological Conflicts
Underlying the debate about tort reform are two types of
ideological conflicts. The first conflict reflects the lack of a consistent
cultural consensus concerning the relationship between the individual
and society, particularly in terms of a wide range of decisions involving
product design, air and water pollution control, scenic conservation, and
occupational health and safety. 485 On one hand, there is a rights-based
individualism that views events like injuries and natural disasters as
items to be addressed and remedied by society generally or by
"wrongdoers," rather than as inescapable facts of life.4 86 In terms of tort
law, this view is reflected in the notion that the tort system plays an
important role in controlling corporate misconduct and compensating
victims. Support for this role is often reflected in movie and television
presentations that provide positive images of tort law, showing the legal
victories of ordinary people in combating large, greedy, unscrupulous
corporations. 487 On the other hand, there is a responsibility-based view
of individualism that emphasizes the need for potential victims to protect

484. Songer, supranote 472, at 602-03.
485. This same conflict underlies the national "takings reform movement" which has many
similarities in terms of tactics and ideology with the tort reform movement. See, e.g., F. Patrick
Hubbard, "Takings Reform " and the Process of State Legislative Change in the Context of a
"NationalMovement ", 50 S.C. L. REV. 93, 109-21 (1998).
486. See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note I, at 10; Engel, supra note 17, at 558; Galanter, supra note
162, at 717-18.
487. See, e.g., A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998); ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films
2000); see also La Fetra, supra note 160, at 658-59; Diane Waldman, A Case for Corrective
Criticism: A Civil Action, in LAW ON THE SCREEN, supra note 479, at 201, 201.
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and take care of themselves.4 88 Media accounts also support this viewfor example, by presenting tort law as a system where greedy lawyers
and plaintiffs "extort" damages in "frivolous" lawsuits. 489 These images
of litigiousness are so widespread that "litigiousness" has been referred
to as an American cultural category characterized by flawed courts and
greedy plaintiffs.49 °
The two competing cultural views reflect a basic ideological divide
that parallels the ideological conflict between the supporters and
opponents of "tort reform" with regard to their views about injuries.
Both sides prefer an individualized approach based on recovery for
wrongdoing rather than regulatory programs or no-fault compensation
schemes. 491 However, the "tort reform" position is based on an
individualistic perspective that emphasizes the victim's responsibility to
engage in self-protection and self-insurance, while the opposing position
emphasizes the injurer's responsibilities in terms of the rights of victims
and the need to use the tort system to control injurers' behavior and
protect the rights of vulnerable victims. 492 The broader culture is in
tension on "tort reform" because popular culture reflects both views:
Those plaintiffs-and their lawyers-who are simply "greedy whiners"
should not be compensated, but "worthy victims" should be.493 Applying
this two-part cultural view to "tort reform" in the political arena is
complicated by the fact that most people know so little about how the
tort system distinguishes between greedy whiners and worthy victims.
Because this tension goes beyond tort law and involves a broader
cultural debate, the tort reform movement's publicity campaign could
have broader effects-it can cause a shift toward decreased support of
injurer control and increased support for placing responsibility with the
injured individuals, rather than the injuring actors.
The second ideological conflict concerns the nature and role of
truth in legal development. As indicated above, the rational model of
decision-making places considerable weight on empirical studies of how
the tort system operates and takes reasoned moral debate seriously. The
political model, however, tends to view truth as more malleable and
involves a greater willingness to pick and choose among anecdotes and

488.

See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 10; Engel, supra note 17, at 558-59.

489. See supra note 483 and accompanying text.
490. See Hayden, supra note 163, at 248.
491. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 159-60, 202-12 and accompanying text.
493. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 17, at 558 (contrasting "rights-oriented individualism" with
"individualism emphasizing self-sufficiency").
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studies in order to present its picture of the truth. In terms of popular
culture, the contrast and struggle between these models has been
captured by Stephen Colbert, the host of the Colbert Report, a satirical
"news" show on the Comedy Central cable television channel, as the
contrast between "truth" and "truthiness." In Colbert's scheme,
"Truthiness is sort of what you want to be true, as opposed to what the
facts support.... Truthiness is a truth larger than the facts that would
comprise it-if 'you
94 cared about facts, which you don't, if you care
about truthiness. A
The word was voted word of the year by the American Dialect
Society,495 and one commentator has voted that the word "caught on
instantaneously last year precisely because we live in the age of
truthiness."496 In the world of truthiness, "[w]hat matters most now is
' 97
whether a story can be sold as truth, preferably on television. A
The distinction between truth and truthiness parallels the line
between the rational model of decision-making vis A vis the political
model. In this regard, the tort reform movement's success in using the
political model and publicity campaigns to persuade legislatures to adopt
its reform proposals could be important at two levels. In terms of tort
reform, the success indicates a reduced role for the rational model in
debate about tort reform. This reduced role is reflected in the minimal
impact that empirical studies of the operation of the tort system have had
on the general cultural awareness of how the system operates. 498 As a
result, more decisions will be based on the political model, where the
repeat defense-side actors have advantages compared to potential
victims and compared to academic critics. Because most people know
little about how the tort system distinguishes between "greedy whiners"
and "worthy victims," this comparative advantage is likely to enable the

494.

Jacques Steinberg, Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, § 4, at 3, available at 2005

WLNR 20926880 (quoting Colbert's comments from a "recent interview"). Though Colbert
invented its definition for his show, the term existed before his use of it, but with a different
meaning.

18

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

629

(2d ed. 1989) (defining

"truthiness"

as

"truthfulness, faithfulness").
495. Press Release, American Dialect Society, Truthiness Voted 2005 Word of the Year (Jan.
6, 2006), http://www.americandialect.org/Words-of the Year_2005.pdf (announcing the vote of
"truthiness" as word of the year (noting that "truthiness refers to the quality of preferring concepts
or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true")).
496.

Frank Rich, Op-Ed, Truthiness 101: From Frey to Alito, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, § 4,

at 16, availableat 2006 WLNR 1184978.
497. Id.; See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1,at 270-71 (noting use of "'symbolic
politics,' "empirically ungrounded political lore," and "iconic images" to "mold public agendas").
498. See supra note 472 and accompanying text.
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tort reform movement to shift more costs to victims. At a broader level,
the tort reform movement's success has caused-or simply revealedthe reduced role of the rational model in cultural and political debate in
today's world. In either event, the reduction of the role of rationality will
have important impacts not only in the "tort reform" context but also in
resolving the inherent cultural conflicts. As the political model becomes
more dominant, more power will shift to actors with the ability to
influence decisions made on the basis of that model.
C. The Role of Courts
The impact of the tort reform movement on the courts overlaps with
its impact on doctrine and its impact on culture. More specifically, to the
extent that doctrinal changes in tort law reduce plaintiffs' recoveries, the
courts will be less important in the overall scheme of compensating and
regulating injury costs. In addition, if the tort reform movement's
campaign has caused the political culture to change in the sense that
legislatures will continue to take a larger role in changing tort doctrine,
the relative power of courts to make rules will also be reduced. Finally,
from a more general cultural perspective, it is plausible to assume that
the sustained attacks on the courts, along with the diminished role of the
rational model favored by courts, have had some negative effect on the
power of courts, though it is not possible to know how much.
The impact of any shift in the power of courts may not be that great
for several reasons. First, thus far, much of the tort system is unchanged.
More specifically, a considerable range of common law doctrine has not
changed; judges retain considerable power to change tort doctrine and
interpret legislation, and judges and juries still play a central role in
applying tort rules. In addition, courts still have the right to determine
whether a "tort reform" statute is constitutional. Second, lawyers on the
defense side have substantial resources and have generally done well in
litigation4 99 except, perhaps, in areas where plaintiffs' attorneys may
now have greater litigation resources. 500 Therefore, any increase in
outcomes favorable to the defense from new doctrines might not be
substantial. Third, the power of courts vis A vis the legislature has been
declining over the last century. 50 1 This shift has resulted in large part
because the "slow, unsystematic, and organic quality of common law
change made it clearly unsuitable to many legal demands of the welfare
499.
500.
501.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-3 (1982).
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state."5 °2 This institutional dimension may have had more impact on the
role of courts than attacks by the tort reform movement. Finally, with the
"accidental" exception of workers' compensation, 503 which is now
supplemented by OSHA regulations designed to deter unsafe conduct, 5 4
extensive legislative or administrative regulation of injurers' conduct to
reduce accidents or broad welfare schemes to provide compensation are
not favored in the United States.50 5 Instead, we have relied upon private
market systems like first party insurance and, where "wrongs" are
involved, upon the tort system, which is dependent on courts.50 6 It is not
clear how far the tort reform movement, whether through doctrinal
change or through efforts to delegitimize courts, can go in reducing the
deep cultural preference for these types of schemes rather than social
welfare schemes.
Even if the power of the courts is not substantially reduced, the
exercise of power by courts may be changed as a result of two factors.
First, as indicated above, judges' views may be influenced by the
cultural impact of the reform movement's efforts to change public views
about tort law. Though judges know more about the mechanics of the
tort system than the general public, many will not have the time,
resources, or inclination to investigate the academic literature about such
topics as studies of jury verdicts and caseloads. Moreover, judges may
feel compelled to respect cultural views notwithstanding their own
personal skepticism about the validity of those views. Second, though
increased politicization of the popular election process for judges has
resulted from factors other than tort reform,50 7 the selection of judges has

502. Id. at 5.
503. See WITT, supra note 101, at 20-21 (arguing that the adoption of workers' compensation
was a unique "accident" of American history).
504. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 64-67 (discussing the advantages of a scheme of
penalties or fines to achieve deterrence where a loss spreading scheme is used).
505. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1361-64 (2001).
506. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 2-20, 171-204; W.G. Friedmann, Social Insuranceand
the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1949) (arguing that English and American

tort law were developing differently because Great Britain was using welfare schemes to address
accidental injuries).
507. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AM. BAR. ASS'N, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY 13-18 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]; Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered
Species List, Add: NonpartisanJudicialElections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1404-13 (2003);

supra note 76 and accompanying text. The increasing politicization ofjudicial elections has resulted
in a United States Supreme Court decision prohibiting states from barring judicial office candidates
from announcing their views on political or legal issues, and in lower court opinions prohibiting
states from restricting the rights of judicial candidates to attend or speak to political gatherings, to
seek, accept, or utilize a partisan endorsement, and to solicit funds. Republican Party v. White, 536

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/4

96

Hubbard: The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement
2006]

THE "TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT

become more politicized in recent years, partly because both proponents
and opponents of tort reform have focused on elections and have made
increasingly large contributions to candidates running for judicial
office. 5 °8 For example, in the 1988 election for the Texas Supreme
Court, where two-thirds of the seats were at issue, the defense side and
the plaintiffs' side contributed heavily to their preferred candidates.
"Factoring primary opponents into the calculation, $10,374,442 was
raised by all candidates for the court that year and another $1.4 million
was contributed to a plaintiffs' lawyer-funded independent [political
action committee]. '' 509
This "situation was a harbinger of things to come in many states
that held judicial elections." 5'0 The impact of fundraising on judicial
independence is evidenced by a recent filing of a petition for certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court challenging a ruling of the Illinois
Supreme Court and requesting review of the following issue: "May a
judge who receives more than $1 million in direct and indirect campaign
contributions from a party and its supporters, while that party's case is
pending, cast the deciding vote in that party's favor, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding as unconstitutional a canon of judicial conduct that prohibited
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues); Republican
Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the partisan activities and
solicitation clauses violate the First Amendment).
508. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1,at 50-51; JUSTICE INJEOPARDY, supra note 507, at 20-22,
37-38; supra notes 76, 155-58 and accompanying text. Burke summarizes recent spending as
follows:
From 1994 to 2000 the amount of money contributed to state supreme court candidates
more than doubled, from about $21 million to over $45 million. State supreme court
candidates who raised money in 2000 averaged $430,000 in contributions, at least half of
which has been identified as coming from business and legal interests .... [A]lmost all
of the contributions were concentrated in just a few states-Alabama, Illinois, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia-that feature high-profile judicial
struggles over the tort system. Indeed, Alabama alone recorded more than $13 million in
contributions in 2000. Beyond their contributions to candidates, business and plaintifflawyer groups in four tort battleground states-Ohio, Alabama, Michigan, and
Mississippi-also bought their own television ads to participate directly in the election.
In Ohio, where the supreme court had recently struck down a comprehensive tort reform
law, business interests-in particular, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Citizens for a
Sound Economy-dominated the ad war, spending nearly $2 million in direct
advertising against $1 million spent by plaintiff lawyers and their labor union allies.
Ohio viewers saw a total of more than twelve thousand television ads costing more than
$5 million; many of the ads were devoted to criticizing or defending the judges' votes on
civil liability issues.
BURKE, supra note 1,at 50-51.
509. Champagne, supra note 76, at 1483.
510. Id. at 1484.
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Constitution?" 511 The politicization of courts is paralleled by an
increasingly political context for traditionally neutral debate about tort
law' 12-for example, as the American Law Institute restates the rules
adopted by courts 5 3-and by criticisms that some academic research
and debate appears514to be moving from the rational model to the political
model of analysis.

D.

Other Concerns of the Movement

One goal of "tort reform" has been the reduction in the dollar
amount of tort liability, referred to rhetorically by the tort reform
movement as the "tort tax." This reduction is viewed as important
because the movement views the current amount of tort liability as too
high in the sense that plaintiffs are either compensated where they
should not be or overcompensated where they do have a right to
compensation. These excessive amounts are viewed as not only unfair to
defendants but also harmful to society because excessive liability
511. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct.
1470 (2006) (No. 05-842) (denying petition). The petition summarized the facts as follows:
Illinois selects the judges of its highest court through partisan elections. This case
reached that court on October 2, 2002 after a $1.05 billion verdict against Respondent,
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., was unanimously upheld by the Illinois Appellate
Court. The case was argued before and submitted to the Supreme Court of Illinois in
May of 2003. Illinois then held a regularly scheduled judicial election in November 2004
for a vacant seat on the Supreme Court. The winner of this election, then-trial judge
Lloyd Karmeier, directly received over $350,000 of donations from Respondent,
Respondent's Lawyers, and Respondent's Amicus and their lawyers. Over $1 million in
additional funds came indirectly from groups with which Respondent State Farm was
affiliated and a member. After his election, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse himself
from this matter, and then cast the decisive fourth vote overturning the verdict against
State Farm.
Id.
512. See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 324, at 150-51; Galanter, supra note 162, at 750-5 1.
513. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Introduction, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products
Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 214 (1997) (noting that waiting on consensus among states
on products liability law would postpone the Restatement effort "indefinitely"); Marshall S. Shapo,
Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761, 766 (1998); Frank J. Vandall, A
Critique of The Restatement Third, Apportionment as it Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49
EMORY L.J. 565, 570, 573 (2000); John F. Vargo, The Emperor'sNew Clothes: The American Law
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth "for Section 402A ProductsLiability Design Defects-A Survey of
the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 507-36 (1996); Symposium on the
American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship,and the Restatements of Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
567 (1998).
514. See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 324, at 151, 154 (noting the increased funding of academic
research by "corporations hit with large punitive damages awards" and that academic "studies have
become ensnared in the polarized politics of tort reform"); Galanter, supra note 341, at 13-14; supra
notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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535

inhibits America's competitiveness in the international market, reduces
innovation, and results in a loss of access to medical services because
doctors are unable to obtain insurance
or avoid specialties with high
51 5
medical malpractice premium costs.
51 6
As indicated above, statistics on the tort system are very limited.
Moreover, because the effective date of a legislative change is frequently
phrased in terms of application to claims arising after the adoption of a
statutory change, there can be long delays between the adoption of a
change and any effects of that change on the tort system. In any event,
for whatever reason, there is cause to believe that "tort reform" has not
caused a decrease in the total payouts from the tort system. For example,
an actuarial and management consulting firm estimated that the total
costs of the tort system were $205 billion in 2001, and $260 billion in
2004. 51 7 One can interpret such an increase in figures in several ways,
including the following: the data are not reliable, the increase would
have been more without "tort reform," the increase indicates the need for
more "tort reform," or the data indicate that wrongful injuries or
legitimate claims are increasing. There is even greater room for
interpretative disagreement in trying to assess the impact of the tort
system (and "tort reform") on things like competitiveness and
innovation. To the extent data are available, there is good reason to be
skeptical that there has been any substantial impact.51 8
Nevertheless, it seems plausible to assume that at least some of the
doctrinal changes will lower overall liability levels. For example,
limitations on noneconomic damages probably lower total liability costs
because at least some judgments will be lower and plaintiffs' attorneys
will have a substantially reduced incentive to sue in some cases. Some
studies have shown that caps do reduce the amount of plaintiffs'
recoveries.519 Other studies indicate that, while medical malpractice
insurance premium rates have risen in most states and while states with
515. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
516. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
517. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
518. See, e.g., Litan, supra note 57, at 128-31; Viscusi & Moore, supra note 174, at 114-15,
122-23.
519. See, e.g., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS, supra note 277, at xx-xxi (estimating that
California cap of $250,000 reduced plaintiffs' recoveries in a five-year period (1995 to 1999) from
$421 million to $295 million); Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 77-78 (1986) (finding an
overall reduction based on the combination of both limits on all compensatory damages and limits
on noneconomic damages); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical
MalpracticeDamages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391, 407-08, 411, 419-22 (2005); Vidmar, supra
note 60, at 1252-53.
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caps can have higher rates than states without caps, states with a limit on
noneconomic damages had lower percentage increases in rates than
states without caps. 520 However, it is not possible to know: (1) whether
any reduction in claims or premiums was caused by the caps or other
factors; (2) the amount of any reduction; or (3) whether any reduction
provides greater access to healthcare. 52 1 Moreover, it is important to
keep in mind that any reduction from a limitation on damages on the
amount of medical malpractice liability is not a reduction in the social
costs of medical malpractice. The victim still incurs the cost. The
limitation simply prevents the courts from shifting the amount above the
cap to the defendant.
E. Costs of "Tort Reform"
"Tort reform" has a number of costs. The most obvious costs
include the expenditures of time and money spent by the movement and
its opponents as they fight over "reform"-for example, the money both
sides have spent for publicity campaigns and for lobbyists and the value
of the time spent by corporate personnel and doctors on tort reform
rather than other tasks. Some sense of the scale of these costs is reflected
by a study indicating that $101.3 million was spent to support or oppose
tort liability proposals on the ballot in seven states in the 2003-2004
election cycle.522 Another cost is the extent to which the preventive and
corrective justice goals of tort law may have been frustrated. Less
obvious costs include the possible erosion of the legitimacy of courts as
a result of the attacks by the reform movement.
From a broader perspective, a substantial cost has been the impact
of the movement on the legislative agendas of Congress and the states.
Because the movement is able to place its proposed reforms on
legislative agendas, other possible reforms of accident law have not been
considered. The range of possible alternative approaches is very broad,
partly because of the possible problems that can be identified and placed
on the agenda for reform. For example, if the high administrative costs
of tort are viewed as the primary problem, the legislature could adopt
520. See, e.g., GAO, REPORT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 172, at 30-31; GAO,
REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 145, at 11-14; Anawis, supra note 172, at 312;

Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1252-53.
521. See, e.g., GAO, REPORT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 172, at 30; Sharkey,
supra note 519, at 408-10; Vidmar, supra note 60, at 1252-53.
522. RACHEL WEISS, THE INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, TORT LAWS ON TRIAL:

LAWSUIT LIABILITY

MEASURES,

2004,

at 2 (2006), http://www.followthemoney.org/press

/Reports/200603211 .pdf.
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schemes that might reduce these while also achieving goals of
prevention, corrective justice, and spreading.
One such approach would be first, to adopt a universal healthcare
scheme that grouped physicians into hospitals and hospital networks;
523
healthcare costs.
and second, to abolish the collateral benefits rule for

This scheme could go further. If physicians were grouped into hospitals
or hospital networks to provide healthcare, one could eliminate claims
for medical malpractice based on negligence and substitute a no-fault
scheme in which each hospital or network is liable for any specified
"avoidable adverse event." Deterrence would be achieved by
implementing an experience rating for each hospital or network. This
rating scheme would also serve corrective justice ends because the
payments to victims would correlate to premium costs to the hospital or
network. Though the rating scheme and the application of the scheme to
avoid adverse events would involve administrative costs, these costs
would be substantially lower than those of the tort system.
Both proposals would have at least some chance of success within
the political model. AAJ's objection to the loss of the collateral benefits
rule or to malpractice claims would be offset to some extent because
victim compensation and universal healthcare are consistent with its
ideology of rights-based individualism. Doctors traditionally oppose
socialized medicine, but they also have a strong dislike of medical
malpractice litigation. Depending on the financing mechanism for the
healthcare scheme, business interests would be supportive of a scheme
that not only eliminates the collateral benefits rule for healthcare costs
but also shifts healthcare costs from the employment context to the
government.
There are, of course, many details and problems to be addressed in
such proposals for healthcare and tort reform. However, the point is not
that this scheme is the solution. Instead, the point is that the tort reform
movement has so dominated the legislative agenda that other approaches
are simply not considered. In the long run, this failure to consider more
may be the highest cost of the tort reform movement's
basic changes
524
success.

523. For discussion of such a scheme for healthcare, see BURKE, supra note 1, at 201 (noting
that "national healthcare in itself is a tort reform"). For discussion of an "avoidable adverse event"
scheme, see Mello & Brennan, supra note 18, at 1623-37. For a critical review of the adverse event
approach, see Hyman, supra note 440, at 1639.
524. For similar criticisms of the impact on the movement's political agenda and discussion of
other alternatives not considered, see, for example, HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 289;
Rhode, supra note 200, at 447. For another specific choice that has not been considered in the
political arena, see supra note 280.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most interesting issue raised by the tort reform
movement is: How will we know if the movement has succeeded in
"reforming" tort law? The ills to be addressed-such as, "loony
lawsuits," unnecessary consumer costs, and inefficient restrictions on
innovation and competitiveness-are so vague that it is hard, if not
impossible, to develop a test of when they are cured. Similarly, it will be
hard to determine if the cultural campaign to "change the way people
think about personal responsibility" has succeeded. Passage of changes
to all of the items on ATRA's current legislative agenda would not
necessarily count as success because there would still be other ways to
change tort law doctrine in order to reduce recoveries. Moreover,
achieving ATRA's doctrinal agenda might not be sufficient to address
the "improper" cultural framework.
In any event, it seems unlikely that the movement will declare
success (or failure) any time soon. Instead, the push is likely to continue
for three reasons. First, the ideology of the movement provides a sense
of intense moral commitment to get the United States on the right track
and keep it there. Second, changing the tort system in favor of the
defense side is in the self-interest of the movement's members because
reducing payouts to claimants reduces their costs. Third, the
professionals seeking these "reforms" have a personal stake in
continuing their employment.
In all likelihood, the movement's push for tort reform not only will
continue but also will evolve to include more ways to achieve change
favoring defendants. More specifically, the following are likely: (1)
pushing for new doctrinal changes in favor of the defense side; (2)
asserting new reasons why tort reform is needed; and (3) finding new
forums to push for reform.52 5 Opposition to reform will also continue.
This recurring theme of disagreement is not new; defining legal
standards of wrongful conduct and liability always involves dispute.
However, the nature of this struggle over tort law has shifted, and is
likely to continue to shift, to a more politicized context where money
and rhetoric tend to supplant traditional rational analysis.

525. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, 'Silent Tort Reform' Is Overriding States' Powers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5 (arguing that administrative officials appointed by President George
W. Bush are using their power to adopt schemes to preempt state law, including tort law, that sets
safety standards for certain industries).
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